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Abstract  
 
This study aims to explore the two questions: 1) Does the interpreter’s relevant bodily 
experience help her to achieve coherence in the source text (ST) and the target text 
(TT)? 2) How does the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence 
reflect the textual structure of the ST? The findings of this study contribute to the 
general understanding of how coherence is achieved in simultaneous interpreting (SI). 
The theoretical framework is based on the concept of the Idealized Cognitive Model 
(ICM), which emphasizes the role of bodily experience in organizing and 
understanding knowledge.  
    A bodily experience based experiment was conducted with two contrastive groups: 
experimental group and control group, involving thirty subjects from a China-based 
university, who had Chinese as their first language and English as their second 
language. The data collected was recordings of English to Chinese simultaneous 
interpretations. Coherence in SI was analyzed on the basis of both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches by virtue of coherence clues. The analysis shows that the 
interpreter’s bodily experience helped her to achieve coherence and distribute her 
mental effort in both the ST and TT. As the term ICM suggests, the cognitive model is 
idealized on the grounds that the ICM does not fit into the real specifics of a textual 
structure perfectly or all the time. The ICM is an open-ended model in terms of the 
analysis of understanding abstract concepts especially in this SI discourse and needs 
more research. This study can contribute to SI research and training, suggesting that 
specialization is a trend in interpreting education.  
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Preface  
The aim of this study is to explore coherence in simultaneous interpreting (SI) from 
the viewpoint of Embodied Cognition, a theory based on bodily experience, and in so 
doing, to make a critical examination of the previous theories in the field of linguistics 
and simultaneous interpreting studies, relating to coherence, and to provide a new 
perspective on SI research and training.       
    This study is the outcome of a growing personal concern and enthusiasm for 
interpreting theories and practice. I started to work as a professional translator and 
interpreter for a China-based machine tool company since 1991 after I had pursued 
my studies of English language, linguistics and translation and interpreting theories 
for nearly a decade since my BA program in 1982. My translation and interpreting 
profession involved mostly translating a large amount of technical documents, and 
more often than not, interpreting for technical and business negotiations consecutively, 
and intermittently doing whispered interpreting simultaneously, and occasionally 
sight interpreting. During this period I started to be fascinated by SI.  
After some time groping for interpreting I came to find that, for an interpreter, 
making sense of the speaker’s utterances in a particular situation by drawing on her 
background knowledge, and establishing links between units of concepts to achieve 
coherence is the most important skill. In other words, interpreting does not mean 
word-for-word literal translation, but involves both cognitive process and knowledge. 
Some knowledge which is directly related to understanding is based on bodily 
experience, that is, understanding on the basis of a certain physical engagement, 
coherence can be achieved instantly; other knowledge, for instance, technical 
concepts, is abstract, but can be understood indirectly by making analogy to everyday 
concept (e.g. electric current can be compared to water flow in the pipe). This 
suggests to  me that I could make sense and achieve coherence more in what I was 
involved in through bodily experience than in what was invisible or beyond me. 
Therefore, what are the links between an interpreter’s bodily experience, her 
understanding and her capacity to build coherence?  
In addition, I normally received reminders from the chief negotiators before 
interpreting for an international technical and business project; for instance, save your 
energy today because we start with general descriptions; but tomorrow your 
interpreting task will be demanding since we will move on to the technique specifics, 
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especially, tomorrow afternoon, you must be attentive in that we will come to the 
critical terms of payment and its mode.  It suggests to me that, there is a certain match 
between the way information is conveyed, i.e. the information structure, and the 
required mental effort expended in achieving coherence, but how are both of them 
connected?      
To address these questions, it was obvious that an interdisciplinary approach was 
needed. I set out to formulate some of my concerns about the nature of the principle, 
rules and skills advocated in interpreting studies. Some of the methodology was valid 
and seemed to make sense, some was questionable. 
    In 2005 I had an opportunity to pursue my further study in translation and 
interpreting in the Department of Language and Intercultural Studies (LINCS), 
Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, UK, as a visiting scholar, thanks to the funding 
from China Scholarship Council (CSC). During the one year study (May 2006 to May 
2007), I was privileged to be supervised by Professor Ian Mason, who helped to 
broaden my horizon by studying cognition and pragmatics-based Relevance Theory, 
from which I went on to study Embodied Cognition theory. The combination of 
interpreting and Embodied Cognition appealed to me, echoing the concern latent at 
the back of my mind, but it became obvious that the complex nature of the issues 
involved required a prolonged period of concentrated and diligent research.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
Simultaneous interpreting (SI) is a mode of conference interpreting, in which the 
interpreter produces messages in the target language (TL) whilst listening to them in 
the source language (SL). SI is widely used in international conferences as a form of 
instant and efficient translation. As the communication needs in international 
cooperation have increasingly expanded in the fields of politics, business, science and 
technology, researchers have studied SI by drawing broadly on concepts of other 
academic disciplines, such as cognitive science and linguistics. However, much 
remains to be discovered about how exactly the interpreter is able to carry out her 
work. This thesis will contribute to the ongoing project by discussing how Embodied 
Cognition, a bodily experience based theory, may further our understanding of SI.    
The simultaneous interpreter speaks into a microphone while seeing and hearing 
the source language speaker via the sound-proof booth windows and earphones 
respectively and rendering her interpretation to the target language listeners. She 
alternates with another team member every twenty to thirty minutes or as the speakers 
take turns on the conference floor. But conference interpreters are normally trained 
initially in consecutive interpreting (CI), either short or long. In short consecutive 
interpreting, the interpreter relies on memory and segments each message into short 
chunks, while in long consecutive interpreting the interpreter takes two to five minute 
notes to facilitate rendering a long chunk of speech. Consecutive interpreting is 
generally used at small, bilingual meetings, such as technical and business 
negotiations, and ceremonial occasions. In interpreting training, a continuous, 
successive approach to CI and SI is adopted; the interpreter trainees are guided from 
practising CI, allowing the greatest degree of accuracy and the full telling of the 
narrative, subsequently to practising SI, which requires great concentration in order to 
achieve the synchronic processing of listening and speaking.    
The exclusive concern of this study is to discover how the simultaneous interpreter 
makes sense of the speaker’s utterances and establishes links between concepts – units 
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of meaning and knowledge, in order to achieve coherence, while simultaneously 
producing the interpreted version. In order to achieve this coherence, the interpreter is 
trained to develop a particular set of skills. For instance, the interpreter needs to 
develop the skill of anticipation – that is, recognizing speech formulae (e.g. ladies and 
gentlemen), word collocation (e.g. we will help you with this project), and the 
function of the speaker’s stress or intonation – using her knowledge to predict what 
the speaker is about to say. If the speaker’s utterances are vague, or if the interpreter 
lacks the background knowledge, she has to use her skilled judgment to make a final, 
appropriate choice of the message among several alternative scenarios for her output. 
The interpreter needs to have the ability to compensate, using contextual or topical 
knowledge to summarize rather than trying to translate everything. This allows the 
interpreter to compensate for the idiosyncrasies in the speaker’s delivery that is too 
fast, or unclear links or lack of clarity. The interpreter is trained to develop the skill of 
coordination, by dividing attention, or alternately switching attention between her 
listening and speaking progression, so as to become coordinated and automatic with 
practice and experience; in so doing, the interpreter learns to take advantage of the 
speaker’s pauses to put out her interpreted messages where possible. Although it 
partially involves examination of these interpreting skills, this research is primarily 
focused on the interpreter’s coherence-building process, in relation to the cognitive 
process which is taking place.    
 
1.1   Introducing the topic  
 
The most spectacular and mysterious aspect of SI is its synchronicity (Setton 1999: 
27). SI requires the interpreter to listen in one language while speaking in another 
with ear-voice span (EVS) or lag ranging from two to four seconds minimum (Paneth 
1957/2002), and two to ten seconds maximum (Oleron and Nanpon 1965). Regarding 
the rate of speech input, Seleskovitch (1965) suggested that an input rate of one 
hundred (100) to one hundred and twenty (120) words per minute (wpm) was an 
optimum one for the interpreter, with one hundred and fifty (150) to two hundred (200) 
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wpm as an upper limit. In order to achieve synchronicity, SI requires the interpreter to 
develop both her working memory (WM), the ability to hold actively in the mind the 
information needed to do complex tasks such as reasoning, understanding, and her 
short-term memory (STM), the ability to process and retrieve information.  
The account of these phenomena in SI above involves cognition. In a broad sense, 
the term cognition refers to the mental processes in acquiring and using knowledge, 
involving perception, thinking, comprehension, memory, and language. In the field of 
cognitive science, the meaning of the term cognition varies between the classical view 
and the Embodied Cognition perspective. Embodied Cognition theory has been 
derived from the second generation of cognitive science of the embodied mind. 
According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 78), the distinction between first generation 
and second generation cognitive science lies in disembodied or embodied cognition, 
and the difference is one of philosophical and methodological assumptions. The 
traditional first generation of cognitive science claims that the capacity for thought 
and reason is abstract and not necessarily embodied in any organism. In other words, 
the human embodiment of understanding has no significant bearing on the nature of 
meaning and reason (Johnson 1987: x). In opposition to this classical Objectivist view, 
by the mid-to late 1970s, an increasingly prominent view of cognitive science, based 
on Experientialism, developed into Embodied Cognition theory, challenging the 
fundamental tenets of traditional cognition theories. On the basis of a series of 
empirical studies, the experientialists assert that thought primarily grows out of bodily 
experience, i.e. embodiment.  
According to the notion of embodied cognition, in a broad sense, any interaction 
with both the physical and social environments counts as Experience (capitalized in 
the original) (Lakoff 1987: xv). In a narrow sense, embodied cognition stresses the 
role of the sensorimotor system (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 11) - our eyes, legs, arms 
and their associated sensory nervous systems - to understand the world. This physical, 
direct experience gives rise to the ‘best understanding’ or ‘direct understanding’ 
which encompasses embodied concepts (Lakoff 1987: 294), ‘accessible in a single 
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step' for processing (Sperber and Wilson1985/1996: 138). However, those concepts 
which are beyond the direct physical experience will need imagination to process, for 
instance, by metaphor. These non-embodied, abstract concepts which need several 
steps to process (Sperber and Wilson1985/1996: 138) are taken to be based on 
‘indirect understanding’ (Lakoff 1987: 294). The concepts are formed at different 
levels of accessibility. They appear to be stored at different distances from the 
processing centre, i.e. the brain, measured via the cognitive load required to access 
them. 
The term cognitive load in this study is used to refer to the interpreter’s capacity to 
control her working memory in order to retain and process information. The 
interpreter has only a limited amount of mental capacity available for processing 
information with varying degrees of difficulty in the textual structure. The interpreter 
builds coherence better when she builds on what she already understands. However, if 
the interpreter does not make any sense of the current stretch of speech, she is 
unlikely to achieve overall coherence. In this case, the interpreter’s cognitive load is 
higher because her brain must work harder to understand the new information. As an 
index of cognitive load, the interpreter’s mental effort is defined and measured in 
different ways, for instance, in terms of the score of coherence clues (see Section 1.2) 
attained through her interpreting performance.  
Cognitive processing is not just dependent on the immediate context but also on a 
large number of stored and interrelated contexts which we have experienced. The 
term cognitive model is used to cover these knowledge-based cognitive 
representations pertaining to a certain field (Ungerer and Schmid 2001: 47). The 
theoretical framework for this present research is based on the theory of the Idealized 
Cognitive Model (ICM). The ICM is one of the primary concepts of Embodied 
Cognition theory, and it is concerned with how knowledge is organized and structured 
on the basis of bodily experience and imaginative capacity. For the thinker, the ICM 
is an internal model constructed in the mind. As human individuals, basically we each 
make a mental model of patterns of our daily life in order to be able to think about 
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things. For the theorist in embodied cognition, the ICM is a particular cognitive model, 
which is designed to describe knowledge structures. Knowledge consists of 
conceptual structures, and the ICM is used to describe these conceptual structures. 
According to Embodied Cognition theory, an ICM has the following basic properties 
(Lakoff 1987: xiv–xv): thought is embodied. The core of our conceptual system is 
directly grounded in perception, body movement, and experience of a physical and 
social character. Thought is imaginative. All of those concepts which are not directly 
grounded in experience must use imaginative capacities, such as metaphor, metonymy, 
and mental imagery for understanding. Thought has an ecological structure in which 
elements interact and feed off each other. The conceptual structure has the overall 
unified structure, beyond the mere mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols. This 
ecological structure determines the efficiency of cognitive processing, as in 
interpreting and memory. The word idealized means that the ICM might not fit what 
is true of the world all the time and ‘one would need to allow background conditions 
to fit partially and to allow partial contradictions’ (Lakoff 1987: 202).  
Coherence is a problematic and elusive notion due to the diversity of linguistic and 
non-linguistic factors (Baker 2008: 218 - 253). From the perspective of the texture (i.e. 
aspects of text organization), coherence is a network of relations which organize and 
create a text. This approach to coherence analysis is based on text linguistics which 
concerns itself mainly with the analysis of spoken and written texts above the level of 
individual sentences (Hatim and Mason 1990: 243). From the perspective of the 
recipient, either the reader or the listener, coherence is an outcome of the interaction 
between knowledge presented in the text and the recipient’s own knowledge and 
experience of the world (Baker 2008: 219). This kind of approach to coherence 
analysis is based on pragmatics, which is concerned with the way utterances are used 
in communicational situation and the way they are interpreted in context. It may also 
be based on cognition which is concerned with the way the communicator mentally 
processes the information for comprehension; the way a recipient’s mental processes 
reflect the textual structure of the source text (ST) with different difficulty degrees in 
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information distribution. In this study, coherence is defined, from the perspective of 
the interpreter, as a cognitive process of building up links to relevant concepts from 
the source text (ST), and applying her bodily experience based knowledge, in order to 
generate an equivalent target text (TT). This research is conducted to explore how 
coherence is achieved in SI, from the textual and embodied cognition view, based on 
a comparison of the source text (ST) and target text (TT), by investigating two points: 
(1) the effect of the interpreter’s relevant bodily experience in helping her to achieve 
coherence in ST and TT. As discussed above, bodily experience here emphasizes 
physically engaged actions which give rise to the basic-level concepts, directly 
grounded in our perception, rather than Experience in a broad sense. However, direct 
bodily experience is turned into Experience in this broad sense as it is integrated into 
the social context. 2) The interpreter’s mental effort, expended in achieving coherence, 
reflecting the textual structure of the source text (ST). The concepts are formed at 
different levels of accessibility due to different distances to the processing centre - the 
brain, the interpreter’s mental effort is measured, via her cognitive load required to 
access them, in her coherence-building process.    
 
1.2 Introducing the research question and the objective     
 
My research aims to address the following questions:   
 
1) Does the interpreter’s relevant bodily experience help her to achieve 
coherence in the source text (ST) and target text (TT)?  
2) How does the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence 
reflect the textual structure of the source text (ST)?  
 
These two questions are explored to contribute to the general understanding of how 
coherence is achieved in SI from an ICM perspective. These research goals are 
formulated in the following objectives: 
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(1) to make a critical examination of previous theories in the field of linguistics 
about coherence and SI studies relating to coherence (Chapters 2 and 3).  
(2) to provide a new perspective on coherence in SI as applied to the field of 
research and training (Chapters 4 and 5).    
(3) to contribute to the general understanding of how coherence is achieved in SI  
(Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
1.3 Outline  
 
To address these research questions and objectives, I have carried out a relevant 
literature review and attempted a supporting experimental study. There is a three-part 
literature review covering coherence, coherence in SI and the ICM. It begins with a 
review of linguistic theories on coherence (Chapter 2), summarizing and 
systematizing the findings while pointing to the limitations. It moves on to review the 
research on coherence in SI (Chapter 3), primarily giving an account of how linguistic 
theories on coherence have influenced SI research and findings, and also how the 
relevant SI theories and findings to be reviewed will contribute to this study.  
Chapter 4 introduces the ICM as an approach to mental coherence, on the basis of 
relations between bodily experience and the coherence-building process, in Sections 
4.1 and 4.2. Section 4.3 provides an account of the constituents of the ICM, and 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the way the ICM in the interpreter’s mind works in 
achieving understanding and coherence both in cognition and in the discourse, while 
Section 4.6 summarizes the role of the ICM in achieving coherence. In Section 4.7 
three ICM-based tools are discussed, and used for tracing coherence clues. On the 
basis of the literature review, Chapter 5 explains how the research methodology is 
established. In Section 5.1 primary research questions are formulated, as stated above 
in Section 1.2, and the hypotheses are posited. In Section 5.2 the test material is 
described, based on a conference speech about a shiatsu massager, explaining why 
and how this material serves the purpose of this research. Section 5.2 describes why 
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and how thirty subjects were recruited, including two contrastive groups, the 
experimental group who were exposed to a relevant bodily experience and the control 
group who were not. In each contrastive group there were five teachers, five 
postgraduates and five undergraduates in interpreting studies. The 15 subjects of the 
experimental group were given a bodily experience of handling the automatic shiatsu 
device, to enable them to develop a mental picture of its structure and installation 
procedures before their interpreting performance. They were guided in activating and 
construing the links of concepts and actions relating to the massager before carrying 
out their interpreting. When the interpreting subjects completed their interpretations, 
their recordings were transcribed and annotated, and corpora were built, helping me to 
observe and analyze how the experimental group had achieved coherence in SI 
performance, in comparison with the control group in different sections of the text 
(Section 5.3). Chapters 6 and 7 present the results and discuss the findings that 
primarily the experimental group achieved a higher level of coherence than the 
control group, and that the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving 
coherence is also dependent on her relevant bodily experience and reflected in the 
textual structure of the source text.  
This study is designed to make both theoretical and practical contributions to SI 
research and training (Chapter 8). It attempts to explore the role of the interpreter’s 
bodily experience in helping her to achieve coherence, through an empirical study, as 
advocated by Pöchhacker (1992, 2004), but not previously attempted. Combining the 
ICM with theories of information structure (Seleskovitch 1986) and mental effort 
(Gile 1995), this study proposes the formulation of an original, integrated theoretical 
basis for empirical investigation; initiates experimental analysis on this basis, testing 
out the hermeneutic power of this approach; and, looking ahead, aims to shed light on 
SI teaching methods and programme requirements. 
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1.4 Introducing spelling conventions and terminology 
 
It is necessary to explain my use of some general spelling conventions and certain 
terminology. In order to distinguish sovereign communicators from secondary 
receivers and speakers including translators and interpreters, hereafter, I will follow 
the common conventions as introduced by Setton (1999: 343) and Sperber and Wilson 
(1986/1995), using ‘Speakers’ and ‘Addressees’ with initial capitals S and A. In 
addition, the feminine pronoun is used for the interpreter and the masculine for both 
Speakers and Addressees, on the grounds that most conference interpreters are women, 
and most conference participants are men. 
More specifically relevant to this research is my usage of certain terms. The first 
term that needs to be defined is a concept vs. concept, (the latter is italicized), as a 
cognitive unit of meaning and a unit of knowledge. According to the classical view, 
concepts objectively exist by themselves, characterized only by their relations to 
states of affairs in the real world. However, Embodied Cognition theory holds that 
most concepts are defined and understood only through human embodied experience 
in given cultures (Johnson 1987). In my research, in order to distinguish the different 
use of this term by the classical view and Embodied Cognition theory, I hereafter use 
italicized concept(s) and/or embodied concept (s) to represent the cognitive unit of 
meaning and the unit of knowledge directly grounded in bodily experience.   
Embodied concepts refer to concepts which are based on our bodily experience 
without employing any imagination, through perceiving, touching and manipulating, 
involving basic-level objects, actions and relations in the physical domain, for 
instance, our understanding of chairs, tables, trees, and water, and our bodies and 
other basic-level objects in our immediate environment, for instance, sitting on a chair, 
or drinking water. Embodied concepts lead to direct understanding.  
On the basis of the term concept(s), I have synthesized and developed the 
definitions of the terms: non-embodied concepts and semi-embodied concepts. Those 
embodied concepts have the potential to extend our direct understanding to indirect 
understanding of abstract concepts, i.e. non-embodied concepts, which are not directly 
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grounded in bodily experience, or remote from the core of our embodied experience, 
and need the imaginative capacity to make sense. For instance, we cannot see electric 
current, but we can understand its concept by comparing it to the flow of water in a 
pipe. The concepts of direct and indirect understanding are put forward by Lakoff 
(1987). The embodied concept needs least mental effort for understanding, and the 
non-embodied concept requires more mental effort. Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) 
have frequently used the terms propositional concepts for embodied concepts, and 
non-propositional concepts for non-embodied concepts. However, there is a layer 
existing between the embodied concept and the non-embodied concept, i.e. the semi-
embodied concept, which is accessed and inferred from the normally embodied 
experience, i.e. semi-direct understanding. In other words, semi-embodied knowledge 
involves some kind of reflection about embodied knowledge, which can be expressed 
in words. For instance,  
 
 
How did you feel about sitting on the shiatsu massager?  Comfortable? 
 
 
The feeling of being comfortable is accessed and synthesized through the 
communicator’s bodily experience, but at a level more general and abstract than that 
of embodied concepts.     
In order to stress the essential role of communicators’ bodily experience in building 
coherence, the term, origin of coherence, is used to mean the interpreter’s relevant 
bodily experience for direct understanding  prior to interpreting. In what follows, I 
will use the terms bodily experience, embodied experience and embodiment 
interchangeably, which conform to the usage in Embodied Cognition theory. 
Experience in a broad sense is capitalized while the direct bodily experience in a 
specific sense is lowercased.    
The term coherence clue is used to represent the topic theme (Cognitive Reference 
Point/CRP) in processing a text, and the primary focus (trajector/tr.) and secondary 
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(landmark/lm) focus in processing a sentence (Langacker 2008). According to 
Langacker (2008: 83) the discourse coherence-building process is just like identifying 
a star in the sky; normally we start to locate a domain where we find the brightest star 
and then point at the target one. Likewise, communicators often direct attention to a 
perceptually salient entity as a point of reference (CRP) which helps to find some 
other entities (tr. and lm.). Each entity or element accessed is individually salient, 
forming a coherent structure. In this study the salient elements are defined as 
coherence clues in terms of CRP, trajector and landmark, and the coherence ratings 
are measured by the correspondence between the coherence clues indentified in the 
source text (ST) and the coherence clues appearing in the target text (TT). These 
details are explained in Chapter 4.               
To sum up, this chapter has provided a brief account of the theme and the 
background to this study: coherence in simultaneous interpreting from an Idealized 
Cognitive Model perspective; and it has also introduced the major areas of focus, 
including the statement of the research questions and the objectives, general research 
hypotheses, and has presented definitions of key terms. With this introduction as a 
roadmap, let us start by reviewing the fundamental notion of coherence.  
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Chapter 2 Coherence  
 
Coherence is one of the most general and most broadly discussed concepts in text 
study and discourse analysis. Halliday and Hasan (1976: 1) define the text as ‘any 
passage, spoken or written, of whatever length, that does form a unified whole’. de 
Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 3) define the text as a communicative event which 
meets seven text criteria, namely cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, 
informativity, situationality and intertextuality. These seven criteria, according to the 
co-authors, function as a constitutive principle of text studies, analyzed from the 
textual structure. Based on pragmatics, Cook (1994: 25) defines discourse as ‘a stretch 
of language in use, taking on meanings in context for its users, a discourse is a 
coherent stretch of language’ and further designates discourse analysis as ‘the study 
and the explanation of this quality of coherence’. Discourse and text are two difficult 
terms to define. For instance, Harris (1952) sees the two terms as equivalents and Hu 
(1994: 2-3) regards the two as synonyms and concludes that British and American 
theorists normally use discourse while continental European researchers adopt text. In 
this thesis, I will use text for analyzing the coherence of the written or oral material 
and discourse for coherence from the user’s perspective. 
In spite or because of its prominent position in discourse analysis or text study, the 
concept of coherence has various definitions and connotations. Common to most 
definitions is that coherence is the underlying functional (Halliday and Hasan 1976, 
1985) or semantic connectedness of a stretch of language (de Beaugrande and 
Dressler 1981; Brown and Yule 1983; Tannen 1984; Richards et al.1985; Crystal 
1992; amongst others). Therefore, researchers on coherence have focused on the 
functional or semantic properties of text, that is, how sentences or utterances are 
meaningfully linked to form larger chunks of language.  
    The notion of coherence has been explored by functional and cognitive linguists.         
In the following sections, I will review three theories on coherence, they are 
respectively the Functional Linguistics view on coherence proposed by Halliday and 
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Hasan (1976, 1985), in Section 2.1; the cognitive knowledge-based approach to 
coherence in Section 2.2, including the theories of de Beaugrand and Dressler (1981), 
Brown and Yule (1983), together with those that are stereotype based, in terms of 
frame (Minsky 1974; Fillmore 1975) and script (Schank and Abelson 1975), and 
finally, in Section 2.3, the mental models theory of coherence of Johnson-Laird (1983, 
2001). I review the three theories because they are widely used for analyzing 
discourse coherence due to their influence and they are representative in the field of 
discourse analysis, and because they show step-by-step links and development in the 
discourse analysis on coherence, and particularly because they contribute to the model 
of this research.   
 
2.1 The Functional Linguistics view on coherence  
  
Halliday and Hasan (1976: 23; 1985), the founders of Systemic Functional Linguistics 
(SFL), have suggested two types of coherence: (1) coherence with respect to cohesion, 
and (2) coherence with respect to the thematic structure, and the context of situation. 
According to Halliday and Hasan (1985: 48) ‘an important contribution to coherence 
comes from cohesion: the set of linguistic resources that every language has for 
linking one part of a text to another’. In other words, they have employed linguistic 
forms, cohesive devices, to explain how the text is coherently linked. For this purpose, 
they published their co-work (1976), in which they analyzed five cohesive devices: 
reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction and lexical cohesion.  
In order to expand the preceding scope of research, Halliday and Hasan (1985) 
classify cohesive devices into those involving non-structural cohesion, primarily the 
five cohesive devices mentioned above, and structural cohesion, which comprises 
parallelism, Theme and Rheme organization, and given and new information, or the 
thematic structure (Halliday and Hasan 1985: 82). The Theme (or topic) is what is 
being talked about, and the Rheme (comment or focus) is what is being said about the 
topic. The thematic structure is designed to analyze discourse coherence, showing the 
way in which the Theme and Rheme are linked within a text, in the form of a graded 
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structure.  
    It is worth noting that Danes (1974) has contributed to the idea of thematic 
organization, using the model of ‘skeleton of the plot’ (1974: 114) to show the three 
structure types in terms of thematic progression as follows: 
(1) Simple linear progression: each Rheme (R) becomes the Theme (T) of the next 
utterance: 
  T1 → R1 
                                               ↓ 
            T2 → (=R1) R2 
                                                               ↓                                                                   
                                                              T3 (=R2) →R3  
                                                             
(2) Thematic structure with a constant or continuous Theme: Themes are derived from 
a hyper theme: 
   T1 →R1 
                           ↓  
                                         T2 → R2 
                                                   ↓ 
                    T3 → R3 
 
(3) These two types are designed in various combinations. For instance, types 1 and 2 
are frequently combined into a linkage pattern as follows: 
 
                                                   T1 →R1 = [T] 
                                                                        ↓  
                                                                                       T2 → R2 
 
With this thematic structure progressing, the Theme regulates the flow of given and 
new information. Given information, according to Halliday (1994: 59), refers to ‘the 
old stuff: what is presented as being already known to the listener’ while new 
information means ‘what the listener is being invited to attend to as new, or 
unexpected, or important’.      
In addition, Halliday and Hasan have combined text study on coherence with the 
context of situation (1985: 12). They assume that the context of situation, constituting 
the field, the tenor and the mode, helps to account for the social context of a text, i.e. 
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‘the environment in which meanings are being exchanged’ (1985: 12). The three 
features of the context of situation are identified as follows: 
(1) The field of discourse: this involves the nature of the current social action: why or 
for what purpose do the participants communicate? What is going on? 
(2) The tenor of discourse: this deals with the issues: who is taking part? What roles 
and relations put the participants together for the on-going communication? 
What are the participants’ expectations, their statuses and roles?   
(3) The mode of discourse: this refers to what participants are expecting the language 
to do for them in that situation: what part is the language playing? Written or 
spoken?  
    Halliday and Hasan (1985) have combined the context of situation with tools, such 
as cohesive devices, the thematic structure to inform their analysis of coherence. The 
SFL methods are easy to operate. They have made contributions to discourse analysis 
in terms of coherence.  
Halliday and Hasan (1976, 1985) have claimed that cohesive devices are the key 
links among and within clauses; cohesion is viewed as the primary determinant in 
discourse coherence, on the grounds that ‘our interest lies in the way in which 
cohesive relations build up a text’ (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 221) in order to ‘look 
closely at the actual words and phrases that enter into cohesive ties’ (1976: 221). 
However, this viewpoint has been challenged by Enkvist (1978), Widdowson (1979), 
de Beaugrand and Dressler (1981), Brown and Yule (1983: 191) and Wang (2006: 
350-357). Halliday and Hasan (1985: 94) claim that ‘cohesive ties between sentences 
stand out more clearly because they are the ONLY source of texture’ and ‘cohesion is 
the foundation upon which the edifice of coherence is built’. Nevertheless, as Wang 
(2006: 354) points out, there is inconsistency in Halliday and Hasan’s claim: cohesion 
ties cannot be both ‘an important contribution to’ and ‘ONLY source’ of, texture.   
   Wang, as a Chinese researcher in linguistics, is more aware of other forms of 
coherence, for instance, a more content-based approach to coherence in Chinese. 
Wang challenges the basic SFL principle of text study – the key elements in 
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establishing textual links are the cohesive devices. Wang argues that this view of text 
coherence is applicable and plausible mainly to the English language, primarily 
written rather than oral, in that English language is hypotactic, where cohesive 
devices are used frequently to link sentences. Wang uses the following instance to 
support his viewpoint (2006: 354): 
  
Theories regarding the shape of the earth have changed throughout the ages. At first, it was 
believed that it was flat, although ideas about the exact shape – i.e. whether it was circular, oval, 
square, rectangular, etc. – varied. Later on this concept failed to satisfy some observers and 
eventually the evidence tending to disprove this idea grew so large that it had to be totally 
abandoned. An alternative theory was next put forward, resting on a number of observed facts, e.g. 
that the parts of a ship moving away from the observer were seen to disappear below the horizon 
in sequence – first the lower parts, then the upper parts and finally the extreme tops of the masts, 
until at last the ship disappeared from view entirely.  
 
Wang discusses the fact that the cohesive devices, i.e. the words underlined in the text 
show the sequence of narration, marking the sequencing order of information 
organization, and also demonstrative pronouns (marked by italic type) work together 
as functional cohesive ties and contribute to coherence of the text. However, it is the 
content, he concludes, that primarily puts these chunks of clauses together, and the 
cohesive devices play the cognitive role of direction. 
Widdowson (1979: 29) uses the following case to oppose Halliday and Hasan’s 
view of the role of cohesive devices: 
 
     A. That’s the telephone  
     B: I am in the bath  
     A: OK. 
 
This oral text without cohesive devices is coherent in that the semantic content leads 
to its coherence. Enkvist (1978: 110) provides another opposing case as follows: 
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(1) I bought a Ford. (2) A car in which President Wilson rode down the Champs Elysees was black. 
(3) Black English has been widely discussed. (4) The discussion between the presidents ended last 
week. (5) A week has seven days. (6) Every day I feed my cat. (7) Cats have four legs. (8) The cat 
is on the mat. (9) Mat has three letters.  
 
This text is full of cohesive devices, but cannot be considered to be coherent. In 
addition, Deane (1992: 41) uses the following sentence to oppose the role of pronoun 
in achieving coherence: 
 
   I saw headlights coming straight at me, but I was able to get out of its way. 
 
In this sentence, the pronoun, its, is not clear about its referent. According to Wang 
(2006), the text which is short of cohesive devices may be coherent, while the text 
which is full of cohesive devices might not be coherent, and pronouns are cognitively 
linked to their referents in the context. According to Cook (1994: 33, 125), cohesive 
devices are not the determinant of discourse coherence as follows: 
  
It is true that, in principle, cohesion is neither necessary nor sufficient to create 
coherence, yet, in practice a discourse of any length will employ it. That most 
coherent texts are also cohesive, however, does not imply that coherence is created 
by cohesion. Coherence is not signaled by cohesion.  
 
Therefore cohesion is considered to be only an instance of coherence (Van Dijk and 
Kintsch 1983, Cook 1993: 32 and Wang 2006: 357). Cohesive devices are important 
to establish a coherent text but not the only way. Discourse coherence should be 
studied from a cognitive perspective and discourse is based on mental coherence (de 
Beaugrande and Dressler 1981, Givón 1990, 1995; Wang 2006). In addition, with 
respect to given and new information, Mathesius (translated by Firbas 1966: 286) 
argued, on the grounds that information- presented in the text as being already known, 
might not be that which is known, nor is obvious in the given situation. Likewise, 
information delivered as important might not be new or unknown to the recipient, or 
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not previously mentioned in the text. Mathesius has used the terms marked and 
unmarked information as alternatives. Marked information means contrastive to 
expectation (e.g. This I know), while unmarked information implies that there is no 
particular reason to choose expression patterns differently in a text (e.g. I know this). 
However, I argue that important information in a text can be further analyzed from a 
cognitive perspective, in that the information focus or importance is determined by 
cognition after all. This will be discussed in Section 4.7. The challenges discussed 
above give rise to further explorations on discourse coherence from a cognition 
perspective, one of which is the knowledge-based view of coherence.  
 
2.2 The cognitive knowledge-based view of coherence  
 
As an alternative to SFL, linguistic research on coherence shifts its attention to the 
relations between knowledge or background knowledge and text for attaining 
coherence (Enkvist 1978; Widdowson 1979; de Beaugrand and Dressler 1981; Brown 
and Yule 1983; and Wang 2006, among others). 
    Before reviewing de Beaugrand and Dressler and Brown and Yule, I will briefly 
provide a chronology of cognitive knowledge-based views on coherence. Garfinkel 
(1967) maintains that daily conversations rest on endless and unsaid background 
knowledge. Hörmann (1976) asserts that the coherence building process is not simply 
the semantic sum of linguistic inputs but linked up and enriched by inferences and 
associations with prior knowledge.  
    Brown and Yule (1983) stress the importance of background knowledge for 
generating and understanding discourse coherence, through their constructive 
approach. They argue that it is not words or sentences but people who carry meanings 
which are brought to bear on the linguistic input for the interpretation of a text. 
    According to Pöchhacker (1992: 94) ‘Establishing coherence (making sense) is 
viewed as a process of providing links (relations) between units of knowledge 
(concepts) corresponding to the surface of the text’. In building coherence, knowledge 
is used not only as the starting point and end use of text but also as the prerequisite to 
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make sense of a text.  Cook (1994: 53) holds that coherence involves a combination of 
background knowledge and text information.  
    In the following section I will focus on de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) and 
Brown and Yule (1983), the most prominent and representative researchers in this 
field.   
 
2.2.1 de Beaugrande and Dressler: knowledge-based coherence 
 
de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) define coherence as the outcome of actualizing 
meanings in order to make sense, and use the term, knowledge, to assign cognitive 
content of all kinds to explain the coherence in discourse. They assume that for the 
sake of an understanding of human activities with texts, meaning and sense should be 
studied in terms of procedures for using knowledge. In doing so, de Beaugrande and 
Dressler (1981: 84-111) have discussed issues relating to coherence as follows: 
(1) Continuity. The participants’ experience and expectations relevant to the 
organization of events and situations give rise to ‘a certain amount of 
COMMONSENSE knowledge’ (de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981: 84). These text 
expressions that activate commonsense knowledge are what give the text potential 
coherence. 
(2) Activation. The causal concepts, relations and links in a mental space are activated 
through expressions in a text. 
(3) Strength of linkage. The concepts, once activated, will have their components put 
together on the basis of their relations through closeness of linking nodes. 
(4) Spreading activation. Once an item of knowledge is activated, other items closely 
relevant to it in the mental storage/memory will become active to a different degree, 
based on prominence.  
In order to activate concepts and build a coherent structure, the following conditions 
are necessary in relation to the mental storage:     
(5) Episodic vs. semantic memory. The record of one’s own experience is stored in  
episodic memory, occurring at usually irregular intervals (what happened to me?) 
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while semantic memory reflects the natural patterns or the organization of knowledge, 
for instance, the structure of events and situations (what is true about the world at 
large and how it all fits together?) .  
(6) Global pattern. Stored as complete chunks in mental space, due to their usefulness 
in conventional tasks, global patterns, such as frame and script, provide an automatic 
structure of representations to assume the type of expected information available for a 
particular situation. This aspect is further explained in Section 2.2.2.  
(7) Economy and inheritance. Economy relates to the mental effort expended in 
searching for any item of knowledge stored in a cognitive system. Inheritance falls 
under the concept of economy, assuming that, with knowledge stored in a neat 
hierarchy, in a form of classes and instances, subclasses and super classes, including 
A to B analogies, inheritance makes predictions possible in building coherence, 
saving the time invested in accessing certain knowledge (de Beaugrande and Dressler 
1981: 92).   
    Rather than separate language from everything else, de Beaugrande and Dressler 
have made an effort to build models, in which the use of language in real texts is 
explained in collaboration with the processes of cognition (Minsky 1975; Miller and 
Johnson-Laird 1976; Kintsch 1977; Rumelhart 1977; de Beaugrande and Dressler 
1981: 93). In addition, de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 98-108) have provided a 
text-world model, to show how the whole text is constructed from cognitive content - 
knowledge, on the basis of one’s beliefs about the real world. Due to the lack of space, 
I take only the opening paragraph as a demonstration for their text model (de 
Beaugrande and Dressler 1981:  98).   
 
A great black and yellow V-2 rocket, 46 feet long, stood in a New Mexico desert. (2) Empty, it 
weighed five tons. (3) For fuel it carried eight tons of alcohol and liquid oxygen.  
 
According to de Beaugrande and Dressler, it is the concepts rather than linguistic 
forms or surface expressions that are represented. All of these concepts are put into a 
coherent network according to the relations and links held among them as Figure 1 
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shows below: 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual network (de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981:100. Fig.7a) 
 
The dominate concept rocket serves as the control centre for this text, which gives 
rise to a set of additions:  attributes (marked with at. in this figure: great, black, yellow, 
and long), a specification (marked with sp: V-2), and a state (marked with st: stand), as 
well as its locations (marked with lo: New Mexico, desert); the attribute, long, has the 
quantities (marked with qu: 46 feet). According to de Beaugrande and Dressler, 
linking labels are used to show how the concepts are associated to each other as the 
arrows indicate. The mental processor proceeds from a current state to a following 
one, categorizing the type of the conceptual node to be linked. According to de 
Beaugrande and Dressler, the pro-form it is a covert node, deriving its content from 
the co-referent rocket, helping to link the new relevant concepts (empty, weigh, five 
tons) to the correct node of the co-referent (rocket). Therefore, cohesion, the pro-form 
in this sample case, helps to achieve coherence in an auxiliary way.  
    According to de Beaugrande and Dressler, concepts are micro-states, contained in a 
conceptual macro-state which gives rise to a coherent knowledge space, or a detailed 
conceptual network, as Figure 2 below shows an integrated unit of discourse based on 
a knowledge space. As mentioned above, the concept rocket is the gravity control 
underlying each stretch of text. Therefore, the additions in this text can involve 
deriving more sub-contents from the created rocket node, around which the links are 
generated as to the weight (five tons), condition (in empty) and fuel (eight tons of 
liquid oxygen). The dominant concept rocket is described in terms of states, quantities, 
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containment, substance, etc:  
 
 
Figure 2 Knowledge space with an integrated unit (de Beaugrande and Dressler 
1981:100 Fig.7b) 
 
de Beaugrande and Dressler have aimed to explore the compatibility between 
language in texts and cognition, taking a great step forward in research into coherence. 
They have attempted to use this sample case to show the procedures for building 
coherence by applying knowledge, including continuity, activation, strength of 
linkage, global pattern, economy and inheritance, all of which are put together into the 
coherence model of discourse analysis. They have made valuable contributions in 
explaining how coherence is attained by means of their knowledge-based theories. 
However, the sample case helps only partially to realize their potential attempt 
mentioned above. My argument is based on the following grounds: the concepts or 
linking labels are linked on the surface, but how is the recipient’s knowledge used to 
achieve coherence? In other words, how do the episodic (the recipient’s own 
experience) and semantic memory (the recipient’s inherent patterns of the 
organization of knowledge) or global pattern (the recipient’s complete chunk of 
knowledge) activate the links among the concepts? And how do the activated 
concepts enable the recipient further to have access to economy and inheritance (the 
recipient’s storage of knowledge)? With respect to spreading activation, de 
Beaugrande and Dressler did not specify how and what items of knowledge are more 
activated than others in mental storage, nor what concepts are more strongly linked 
than others in terms of strength of linkage. In other words, what items of knowledge 
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require greater mental effort, and what items of knowledge need less mental effort in 
processing a discourse? According to Pöchhacker (1992), de Beaugrande and Dressler 
are still confined to propositional-based bottom-up model, on the grounds that what 
they described as a coherence representation of a text is ‘little more than its 
transcription into another more or less natural language immediately reflecting the 
surface of nouns, qualifiers and predicates’ (Pöchhacker 1992: 95). According to 
Johnson (1987: 3-4) this is the typical traditional definition of proposition: something 
is proposed as a statement; a state of affairs in the world, holding between an entity 
and its predicates or among a number of entities. A proposition, according to 
Embodied Cognition theory, ‘exists as continuous, analog pattern of experience or 
understanding, with sufficient internal structure to permit inference’ (Johnson1987: 3). 
This will be further discussed in Chapter 4. The problem with the knowledge-based 
approach to coherence remains the lack in sufficient empirical evidence of cognitive 
processes in establishing coherence. In addition, the term knowledge as used by de 
Beaugrande and Dressler might appear elusive. To compensate for this, Brown and 
Yule (1983: 236-256) classify knowledge on the basis of the stereotypic approaches to 
coherence on one hand, frame (Minsky 1974; Fillmore 1975, 1982, 1985) and script 
(Schank and Abelson 1975; Ungerer and Schmid 1996/2001), and a general approach 
– Mental Models theory (Johnson-Laird 1981) on the other hand.    
 
2.2.2 Stereotypic approaches to coherence  
 
Stereotypic approaches attempt to interpret discourse coherence by providing 
conventional representations of knowledge of the world. These predictable 
representations are used to assume the type of expected information available for a 
particular situation. Frame and script are representative theories of the stereotypic 
approaches.  
 
2.2.2.1 Frame 
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Minsky (1974) gives a systematic account of Frame theory, assuming that frame is an 
information structure stored in memory, representing a specific situation with a set of 
nodes and links in the network system. Information in the frame is retrieved from 
memory as background knowledge to understand new situations. In a general frame 
there are many slots to be filled in for the specifics in a given situation. Minsky 
provides a house as an example of a frame.  A house has conventional information as 
a general frame, which is used automatically to identify a specific house in terms of 
the house frame. In the house frame, corresponding slots of the house are filled out, 
primarily including the sitting-room, bedroom, and kitchen. Further, in terms of the 
kitchen, we will fit the refrigerator, microwave, and dish washing machine in the slots. 
Therefore a frame is in a hierarchical and graded form, and the relevant frames are 
combined into a frame system.  
    Fillmore (1982: 111) explains a frame as ‘any system of concepts related in such a 
way that to understand one of them you have to understand the whole structure into 
which it fits.’ And he further concludes ‘when one of the things in such a structure is 
introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically 
available’. Fillmore’s definition of frame echoes Charniak (1980: 62), who takes 
‘comprehension to be the process of fitting what one is told into the framework 
established by what one already knows’. 
    Fillmore (1975: 124) has applied the concept of frame to linguistics to develop the 
idea of a conceptual structure or experiential space. One word could activate a series 
of experiences or conceptual structure. From a language structure perspective, he 
defines his model as a system for language choice for relevant and typical situations, 
including choice of word combination, grammatical rules, etc. On the basis of his 
previous findings, Fillmore (1982) has put forward his theory of Frame Semantics, 
which centres on an interface between knowledge, concepts and language. Later on, 
in light of research into cognitive linguistics, Fillmore (1985: 223) defines his 
theoretical model as a specific and consistent knowledge structure or coherent 
schematization of experience.  
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    Fillmore has applied his cognition-based Frame Semantics theory to lexical 
meaning and syntactical structure meaning and paid special attention to lexemes, 
especially verbs, used in cognitive processing, in that verbs are related to the whole 
situation, and can make some aspects of events more prominent and salient.  
    Frame theory is used to account for how expectation influences the discourse 
produced; as a set of structured repositories for our conventional knowledge, the basic 
concept of frame has provided a useful working model for coherence. However, 
according to Brown and Yule (1983: 240) limitations remain with the frame theory, in 
that there are many situations in which a discourse is produced where the audience 
can be intended or expected, but not guaranteed in terms of the stereotypic knowledge 
of what is to be communicated. In addition, when a text cue is to activate a frame, 
several frames may be activated. According to Minsky (1974) the frame takes 
hierarchical and graded form in mental processing, but he did not provide an account 
of how this structure is formed in a cognitive sense. Finally, the frame theory is 
suitable for a static pattern of events rather than for dynamic actions (Schank and 
Abelson 1994: 75). The other stereotypic knowledge theory is known as dynamic 
script.   
 
2.2.2.2 Script  
 
Schank and Abelson (1975) have defined scripts as structures that describe 
appropriate sequences of events in a particular context, a predetermined, stereotyped 
sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation. Abelson (1976) has used the 
concept of script to investigate the relationship between attitudes and behavior, and 
also applied his findings to text understanding, incorporating a particular analysis of 
language understanding proposed by Schank (1972) as conceptual dependency. In a 
development of the conceptual analysis of sentences, Riesbeck and Schank (1978) 
have described how our understanding of what we read or hear is very much 
expectation-based. The expectation-based analysis presents ‘a viable theory of how 
human process natural language’ (Riesbeck and Schank 1978: 290, cited in Brown 
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and Yule 1983: 244). Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 213-214) define scripts as 
‘knowledge structures that are particularly designed for frequently recurring event 
sequences’, on the grounds that our knowledge of routine activities can produce 
experimental results to support the views of Schank and his collaborators who treat 
scripts as ‘action stereotypes’ (1996: 213).  
   According to Wang (2006: 212), life experience tells us that a particular situation 
will consist of a set of actions. Script refers to a standard and idealized and relatively 
stable process in a specific activity. Script features dynamics (events in action frame) 
and process (organic association to time sequence and cause and effect relations). 
Regarding the functions of scripts, Wang asserts that scripts are used mainly to 
describe a procedure and plot pertaining to actions and events. With a script in mind 
listeners will use it as reference for understanding utterances. The script helps 
listeners to concentrate on exceptional, complex and interesting information 
processing, rather than overspend effort on the conventional and standard procedures. 
There are similarities and differences between frame and script (Cook 1994: 20, 
Taylor 2002: 203, Croft and Cruse 2004: 28, Wang 2006) as follows: 
Similarity: Frame includes script, that is, script is one part of frame. First, sequential 
events and actions take place in a particular frame. For instance, in the frame of being 
in a library the sequential events and actions would happen in such order as: going to 
the library, consulting, borrowing a book, finding a place for reading, scanning and 
skimming. Secondly, any events and actions are linked to a particular frame in a 
logical chain, for instance, the action of taking a basket in the context of in-the-
supermarket frame. It shows both conditional and procedural connection. Third, script 
is designed to show when, where and by what sequence these typical actions take 
place. Also script, just like frame, plays a functional role which involves habit, rules 
and conventions, and both frame and script are constrained by society and culture.  
Differences: script is a knowledge structure independent of frame. Charniak (1980), 
Schank and Abelson (1975: 1977) distinguished script and frame in that frame is a 
stored system pertaining to the data structure of a template theme; it is static, and it is 
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not able to reflect experience. On the other hand, script stresses operational 
experience in perception pertaining to plot knowledge; it is dynamic and designed for 
procedural and sequential structure.   
According to Brown and Yule (1983: 244) the theoretical and experimental 
findings discussed have psychological validity. However, the concept of script has 
been challenged on the same ground as frame. That is, script needs a limiting of the 
scope of conceptualizations to understand a sentence, in other words, the problem 
with the script theory remains how to constrain the expansion of any analysis which 
needs to incorporate extra-linguistic knowledge in its account of the comprehension 
of linguistic data. These stereotypic models, both frame and script, are challenged by 
Lakoff (1987), who considers them only applicable to propositional models, but not to 
non-propositional ones, in that they could not be used to explain the imagery process 
for abstract concepts; frame and script are only part of the Idealized Cognitive Model 
(ICM). This will be further discussed in Chapter 4.  
Another view of how discourse coherence and experience is interpreted has been 
put forward primarily by Johnson-Laird who has focused on mental models rather 
than stereotypic knowledge or fixed storage systems. 
 
2.3 Mental Models theory (MMT) on coherence  
 
Johnson-Laird (1983, 2001) has put forward the cognition-based theory of Mental 
Models. He emphasizes the structural aspect of mental models in research into 
discourse coherence. Mental models are assumed to be characterized as being 
comparable in structure to the state of affairs they represent as opposed to text-based 
representations. Mental Models theory aims to cover holistic aspects of language 
processing from a different perspective to those discussed above.  
According to Johnson-Laird (1983: 2-3), mental modeling itemizes representations 
at three levels in language processing, incorporating individual’s extra-linguistic 
knowledge. Mental Models theory attempts to examine how coherence is achieved 
from conceptual, local and global perspective. The first level is representations at the 
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conceptual level. Viewed as the basis of semantic structure, concepts are micro units 
of knowledge structure. From the macro perspective, verbal information is selected, 
interpreted and integrated on the basis of ‘higher-level complex and even 
conventional or habitual knowledge structures’ (Dijk, 1981: 141), in that the 
conventional knowledge structure acts as ‘ideational scaffolding’ (Anderson, et al. 
1977: 433) – a conceptual framework, which may account for the goal-directed 
purpose in language processing. 
The second level is representations at local level. As semantic molecules, 
propositions are used to represent the information of a text. A proposition with 
appropriate units may be perceived as a verbal substrate of language processing, like 
an ecological surface on which organisms grow or are attached. In a proposition, 
elementary semantic relations are formed by linking one or more arguments into a 
predicate. Arranged in a coherent order, propositions can symbolically represent the 
information content of a text. The third level is representations at the global level: a 
complex cognitive structure of symbolic tokens that represent the theme of a text is 
modeled.  
Mental Model theory lays the foundation for sense-making or coherent discourse 
by integrating verbal information and individual knowledge (Reichgelt 1982; 
Hörmann 1983). In the context of discourse, a mental model is to be understood as a 
dynamic cognitive representation of the contents of an utterance on the part of the 
recipient – the listener or reader. In the course of processing, both a model of the text 
and a model of the world are integrated into the current model of the discourse; the 
former contains a verbatim or propositional representation of verbal expressions, the 
latter provides a knowledge structure. This is assumed to be a holistic representation 
of the state of affairs conveyed by the discourse. In order to achieve discourse 
coherence, the recipient keeps validating the verbal input against their individual 
knowledge of the world (Payne, 1993). In other words, the recipient processes his 
current state of knowledge in a dynamic and creative manner. On the basis of the 
semantic information available, the recipient keeps updating his current mental 
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models and creating new semantic information above and beyond what has actually 
been said (de Vega, 1995). In this way, the recipient is specifying, differentiating, or 
modifying the information on the basis of his mental models. The mental modeling 
proceeds like a snapshot of actual proceedings against a motion picture in procedural 
aspects; the snapshot means an impression of the state of affairs as a definite point in 
time while the motion picture means a series of stills played onwards in rapid 
succession (Xu 2004). In order to represent the course of an event, a mental model 
which represents the initial state of affairs is constantly transformed into a model that 
represents the final state. At any intermediary stage, the outcomes of previous stages 
of processing provide the context for the forthcoming modeling development.  
Mental Models theory emphasizes two non-verbal aspects in discourse coherence. 
The first aspect concerns the situation, or the integration of information from various 
sources, and the second concerns inferencing. The situation in mental modeling 
includes nonverbal elements or elements which are hard to verbalize. As well as 
linguistic information, non-linguistic information, such as slides, diagrams, 
animations, and any elements available and relevant to the topic in question, will 
contribute to the construction of mental models. This non-linguistic information helps 
to construct a coherent representation of some state of affairs; in other words, the non-
linguistic situational elements assist in coordinating objects or relations that go 
beyond a particular verbal utterance. With respect to inferencing, making sense and 
establishing coherence involves not only an exclusively interpretive process but also a 
constructive process. Inferencing is crucial to the mental modeling.  
Mental modeling allows for a richer representation than the stereotypic versions 
found in frames and scripts. However, the practical details of mental models remain 
elusive (Brown and Yule 1983: 254); some fundamental issues have not been 
discussed in detail yet. For instance, what specific knowledge should be accessed to 
ensure comprehension of the current discourse? How are propositional representations 
of the verbal expression processed in the mental model? In addition, Mental Models 
theory puts forward the concept of local and global coherence in discourse, but my 
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critical view is that it has not built up a systematic and practical model for coherence 
yet. Mental Models theory ignores the fundamental point of cognition: cognition is 
based on bodily experience; and it is bodily experience that is the origin of coherence- 
building process. The so-called holistic structure of discourse coherence proposed by 
Mental Models theory is not substantial in its content. Like any of the traditional 
theories reviewed, the notion of concepts and propositions in Mental Model theory 
were reduced to a set of literal symbols and signs, ‘not tied to any of the bodily 
aspects of human understanding’ (Johnson 1987: xiv). Therefore, their patterns and 
connections remain disembodied, in terms of philosophical and methodological 
assumptions. This will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
 
2.4 Concluding remarks  
 
This chapter has presented a literature review of linguistic theories relevant to 
coherence, including Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), the knowledge-based 
view of coherence, stereotypic models, and Mental Models theory. These theories 
reviewed show the development in research into discourse coherence, each with its 
strong and weak points. The weak points of theories reviewed have gradually become 
prominent, on the grounds that they have not touched on the primary interface 
between the representation and the world: it is the communicator’s interactive bodily 
experience that links the two parts to achieve coherence. 
However, their strong points, which are to be applied to the model of this study, 
concern functional and cognitive approaches. First, the tools and ideas of SFL, such as 
thematic progression and cohesive devices are used to analyze the experimental text 
in terms of cohesion and coherence. I intend to continue to study the role of cohesive 
devices in the embodied cognition context as an extension of this study (see Section 
7.2.2). Next, the cognitive knowledge-based theory of de Beaugrand and Dressler 
contributes to this research, in terms of the procedures for using knowledge in a wide 
range of tasks, including continuity, activation, strength of linkage, spreading 
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activation, episodic and semantic memory, global pattern, economy and inheritance. I 
will apply these concepts to build up the coherence model in SI and also to analyze 
the data. Third, the stereotypic knowledge-based frame and script are applied to 
analyze the data, in terms of how expectation influences the discourse coherence. As 
structured repositories for our conventional knowledge, frame and script provide a 
useful working model for coherence. Finally, the theory of Mental Models sheds light 
on this study’s model in terms of its basic principle of representation of the state 
affairs at the three levels: conceptual, local and global coherence. The relationship 
between all these theories and models, and the way in which they can contribute 
solutions to problems that are the theme of this study will be further explored in 
chapter 4.    
At this point, I have reviewed the relevant theories on coherence, which will serve 
as a platform for this study. In the following chapter, I will move on to the topic of 
simultaneous interpreting (SI), and provide an account of how the reviewed theories 
on coherence can help researchers in interpreting with their analysis of coherence in 
SI, and also of how relevant SI theories and findings contribute to this study.  
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Chapter 3 Simultaneous interpreting (SI) 
 
This chapter will provide a literature review on simultaneous interpreting (SI) theories 
primarily relevant both to coherence and to this study. The literature is selected on the 
basis of two considerations: a) how the theories on coherence, discussed in Chapter 2, 
have helped researchers in interpreting with their analysis of the process of SI, and/or 
b) how the reviewed literature on SI contributes to this research. Amongst the 
literature reviewed there are two SFL-based analytical frameworks for coherence; one 
is the text linguistic framework of Hatim and Mason (1990), and its relevant empirical 
researches, in Section 3.1.1, and the other is the General Theory of Translation and 
Interpreting (GTI) of Pöchhacker (1992, 1994), in section 3.1.2.  
Like any other academic disciplines, philosophical methodologies determine basic 
assumptions, models, values and standard methods and the research approach to SI 
academic field; this is referred to as the paradigm (Kuhn 1996). Three different 
paradigms-based SI researches are reviewed in this chapter: (1) empiricism-based 
versus (2) rationalism-based paradigms; and (3) the paradigm combining empiricism 
and rationalism. According to Pöchhacker (1994: 67-80), the empiricist view relies on 
factual evidence, observation and professional experience while the rationalist 
position is more in favor of theorizing than data-based evidence. The paradigm 
combining empiricism and rationalism attempts to combine the two methods. It 
focuses on the professional experience and uses computational approach to analyze 
and synthesize the data available. However, the three paradigms belong to the 
philosophical category of Objectivism, as discussed in Chapter 1, which 
fundamentally ignores those functions of bodily experience or embodiment and the 
imagery capacity. The empiricism-based paradigm is represented by the Interpretive 
Theory of Translation (IT) (théorie du sens) (Seleskovitch 1968, 1975 and 1981; 
Lederer 1981; Seleskovitch and Lederer 1986), in section 3.2; and the rationalism-
based paradigm involves two theories: (1) the Cognitive Processing paradigm (CP) of 
Gerver (1971, 1975, 1976) and Moser (1978) in Section 3.3.1; (2) the Effort Model of 
 33
Gile (1985, 1991,1995) in Section 3.3.2. The paradigm combining empiricism and 
rationalism is represented by the Computational Linguistics Approach to SI 
Coherence of Dillinger (1989, 1994) in Section 3.4. Finally, in Section 3.5, 
Pöchhacker (1992) is discussed as a signpost for the next chapter.  
 
3.1 Functional linguistics -based research on coherence in SI 
 
The following section will review the two functional linguistics-based works: the text 
linguistic framework and its findings in SI coherence and then the General Theory of 
Translation and Interpreting (GTI).   
 
3.1.1 Text linguistic framework and the findings on coherence in SI 
 
As mentioned above, Hatim and Mason (1990), on the basis of Functional Linguistics 
(FL) (Section 2.1) set up a text linguistic framework for coherence in translation and 
interpreting, comprising features such as cohesion, thematic progression and context 
situation. For instance, they (1990: 224-235) chose as their sample text the opening 
paragraph of Rousseau’s Emile*, to show these features. Hatim and Mason (1990) 
analysed this French philosopher’s work written in the eighteenth century, from a 
contextual situation perspective (1990: 228):   
 
Field: social/educational philosophy  
Tenor: formal addressed to educational reader on an equal to equal basis, authoritive 
discourse   
Mode: written to be read reflectively, but reminiscent of spoken mode as in sermons, etc.   
     
Hatim and Mason (1990) further analyze this discourse coherence in translation from 
the thematic progression perspective as follows (1990: 234): 
 
*Source text: Tout est bien, sortant des mains de l’auteur des choses: tout dégénère entre ‘les mains de l’homme. 
Il force une terre à nourrir les productions d’une autre ; un arbre à porter les fruits d’un autre. Il 
mutiles son chien, son cheval, son esclave. 
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*Target text: God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil. He forces one                       
soil to yield the products of another, one tree to bear another‘s fruit. He mutilates his dog,                    
his horse and his slaves  
 
 
Figure 3 Thematic progressions in translation (Hatim and Mason 1990:234. Fig.11.12) 
 
According to Hatim and Mason (1990: 217) ‘if theme-rheme analysis is to have any 
relevance to translators, it must provide an account of thematic progression in the 
service of particular rhetorical purposes’. They conclude that it is necessary for 
researchers in translation and interpreting to analyze thematic progression in different 
languages over a range of text types, in that this is an aspect of texture, i.e. a unified 
whole, which is of crucial importance to the translator and interpreter.  
    On the basis of Hatim and Mason’s framework, Taylor (1997), Consorte (1999), 
Shlesinger (1995), and Tebble (1994) undertook empirical experiments in interpreting 
and their findings are reviewed in this section. Taylor (1997) attempted to show 
Theme as the interpreter’s path indicator through the unfolding text. Taylor selected a 
speech by Bill Clinton during his presidential campaign as the testing material, and 
recruited five professional simultaneous interpreters as subjects. He analyzed the 
function and linkage of Themes in the speech from a dynamic perspective. His 
analysis shows that Theme does appear to serve as path indicator. The findings are 
meaningful for interpreter training, for instance, the need for situation as pre-theme 
should be valued, and the activities of guessing either thematic segments or rhematic 
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portions for testing expectations help the interpreter to build up linkage of the text and 
achieve coherence.  
    Consorte (1999) also attempted to show the important part that Theme may play 
both as a guide to the understanding of the given information and as an orienter to the 
new information. The experiment involved thirty-seven subjects, who were asked to 
guess the Rheme for the Theme presented and vice versa and subsequently interpreted 
simultaneously the text related to these Themes and Rhemes. Consorte checked the 
results and concluded that Theme acts as an indicator of the direction that the 
following portion of text is likely to take and as an orienter to the message.   
    While Taylor and Consorte contribute to coherence in SI from a Theme-rheme 
analysis, Shlesinger (1995) does so through a study of shifts in the types and density 
of cohesive ties in SI. Thirteen advanced students of interpreting were asked to listen 
to an eleven-minute recording of an authentic impromptu speech in English and to 
interpret it into Hebrew. In her method, several items in each category were selected 
at random from different segments of the experimental text, so as to access a cross-
section of the different types of cohesive devices in the corpus. In other words, not all 
cohesive devices in the outputs were analyzed. Her study shows that ‘shifts do occur 
in all types of cohesive devices’ (1995: 193), ranging from those conceived as not 
essential to the informational content of the text, to devices whose reorganization 
requires knowledge which is not available to the interpreter.  
I include Tebble (1994) in the literature review. Although Tebble carried out her 
empirical research into consecutive interpreting rather than simultaneous interpreting 
as the previous three researchers, her research will contribute to this study in terms of 
an understanding of the interrupter’s mental effort in processing textual structure in 
achieving coherence. Through her examination of real-life interpreted consultations 
and role-plays, Tebble has created a model of discourse structure for the interpreting 
trainees, in order to show how the interpreter makes her way through the various parts 
of the structure of consultation, activating proper expectations about the function of 
each new element, and appropriately distributes her amount of mental effort in each 
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part, according to the importance of the information in the overall structure.  
To describe a typical context and situation in consultation, Tebble uses her term 
prototypical contextual configuration. She attempts to outline the representative 
context and structure of consultation in dialogue interpreting. She presents her 
prototypical contextual configuration for interpreting professional consultations as 
follows (1994: 172):  
 
Field:  presenting a problem which needs to be defined, and for which a solution is required 
Tenor: role relationships – hierarchical: professional, super ordinate; client/patient: 
subordinate; interpreter: independent; social distance: maximum.  
Mode: Constituted by two languages. The process of creating the discourse is via spoken 
medium, written medium, non-verbal communication, through the channel: phonic, 
graphic, signed.     
    
Tebbel further separates the consultation into different and sequential stages: (a) 
greetings and introductions stage, (b) stating/eliciting problem stage, (c) ascertaining 
facts stage, (d) diagnosing facts stage, (e) stating the resolution stage, (f) client’s 
decision stage, (g) clarifying remaining matters, conclusion, and farewell stage. On 
the basis of her observations, Tebble suggests that, the interpreter distributes her 
mental effort in a parabolic shape: slight mental effort from stage a to b, and 
increasing mental effort from stage c to e, with e as the peak in the process, and 
decreasing  mental effort from stage f to g.  
    Inspired by FL, Tebble used her contextual configuration model to help the 
interpreter to predict the important elements of the structure of the discourse, and 
distribute her mental effort. However, due to the limitation of SFL (Section 2.1), 
Tebble has not been able to point out why and how some parts are more effort 
consuming than others. To do this, a cognitive approach might be the better choice.  
    To sum up, from Hatim and Mason to Schlesinger and Tebble, the researchers have 
combined SFL to study coherence in interpreting, with respect to thematic progression, 
cohesive devices and the textual structure. Their methods have useful applications for 
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quantitative analysis of SI. However, due to the limitations of the SFL framework, 
discussed in Section 2.1, further efforts are needed to analyze discourse coherence 
from a cognitive approach. As Hatim and Mason (1990: 218) have claimed ‘the 
associations (between themes and rhemes) is often perceived on cognitive grounds as 
part of text comprehension’. Further, according to Pöchhacker (2004: 146) more 
cognitive analysis needs to be done for various textual parameters so as to progress 
the study of discourse coherence.  
 
3.1.2 General Theory of Translation and Interpreting (GTI) 
 
The other FL-based framework on SI coherence is the General Theory of Translation 
and Interpreting (GTI) which was based on Allgemeine Translationstheorie (ATT), 
formulated by Reiss and Vermeer (1984). ATT is a skopos-oriented theory to study 
coherence in translation and interpreting. Its primary assumption is that ‘a translation 
must be coherent, first and foremost in itself, and as far as possible, with the original’ 
(Setton 1999: 44). The term skopos comes from Greek, meaning aim, function and 
purpose. Skopos involves factors, including communicative needs, expectations of the 
target audience, its situational context and social-cultural environments, and these 
factors, according to Vermeer (1989/2000), determine the role of skopos theory as the 
basic principle of translation and interpreting.  
    ATT assumes that the intended purpose of the participants involved determines the 
cognitive process in achieving a goal, by linking causal concepts. Basically the 
purpose or the anticipated outcome dominates participants’ decision-making and 
inferencing in choosing appropriate actions within a range of strategies, in the 
communicative process. Meanwhile, decision making and inferencing are 
indispensable for the knowledge which gives rise to the contextualization and 
actualization of the action. However, there are varying degrees of ambiguity and 
uncertainty about the knowledge in question. At this point, the purpose serves to make 
the state of conditions coherent in a particular environment, especially in terms of a 
perceived set of situations and conditions. The interpreter uses the motivation, 
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purpose or goal orientation to set up the control centre of the topic, accessing the 
specific knowledge required for comprehension and coherence. 
    On the basis of a SI corpus derived from a three-day international conference 
against the background of the event and local discourse situations, Pöchhacker (1994) 
has constructed his SI model and named it General Theory of Translation and 
Interpreting (GTI). According to Pöchhacker (1992, 1994), translation serves as an act 
of communication, which is set in a coherent web of structured elements. Skopos 
theory is a holistic approach to analyzing SI, in terms of its interactional, situational 
and textual features. GTI provides a general framework for SI, from a skopos 
perspective.  
    Applying skopos theory to SI, GTI covers a three-level framework, regarding roles 
and factors in a SI interaction network. The first level of the SI conference is mission, 
from which the purpose is specified. The situation at the first level is envisaged in a 
more cognitive sense, and it exists in the mind’s eye of the communicators in the 
interaction. In other words, communicators make sense and achieve coherence, by 
mediating between the on-line communication and the situation, and assessing 
continuously the intentional orientation conveyed in other communicators’ behaviour. 
This interaction involves the communicators’ knowledge, social-cultural background, 
and motivation, emotional attitude and expectations.           
    At the second level is in-conference interaction at a given place and time. 
According to GTI, the situation develops around a model of the Speaker(s), the 
listener(s) and the interpreter. The crucial element for the interpreter is knowledge, 
which determines her comprehensibility and coherent outputs in SI. On a third level in 
the GTI framework for the interactional process and the product of SI is a semiotic 
gestalt-based text, which consists of not only acoustic or phonemic information but 
also the auditory and the visual channel; the Speaker’s overhead slides serve as part of 
the interpreter’s source text (ST) as much as his gestures, smiles or intentional 
patterns.   
    However, regarding the second level, according to Setton (1999: 44-45), there is a 
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problem with GTI, in terms of coherence: how to evaluate the equivalence of 
messages between the inputs and outputs. It is difficult to reliably determine the 
hearer/interpreter’s knowledge and orientations; these are ‘volitional variables’ 
(Setton 1999: 44-45). In addition, according to Pöchhacker (2004: 77) the skopos-
based theories on SI have been carried out with insufficient empirical research within 
this functionalist school. Following this point, I will make an attempt to find out, 
through an empirical study involving the role of bodily experience, how much of the 
Speaker’s knowledge the interpreter should share to ensure coherence; the design of 
this is explained in Chapter 5, and the results are reported in Chapter 6 and discussed 
in Chapter 7.  
The following section reviews the literature involving three different paradigms in 
viewing SI, as mentioned above. I start with the empiricism-based Interpretive Theory 
of translation (IT) (Théorie du sens).  
 
3.2 The empiricism-based paradigm: Interpretive Theory of translation  
 
The Interpretive Theory of translation (IT) (théorie du sens), founded by Seleskovitch 
and Lederer (Seleskovitch 1968, 1975, and 1981 and Lederer 1981 and Seleskovitch 
and Lederer 1986), is referred to as the ‘bootstrap paradigm’ by Pöchhacker (2004: 
69), who has claimed IT as a pioneering but limited effort to lead interpreting studies 
to ‘a scientific and academic discipline’ (2004: 69). Seleskovitch and Lederer started 
by using an essential cognitive analysis of interpreting, viewing interpreting as a 
knowledge-based process to make sense, rather than a code-switch operation between 
languages. In other words, interpreting is a process of making sense and building 
coherence by establishing links and relations on the basis of cognitive complements. 
They view discourse interpretation as a natural process, in which the synthesis 
between the semantics of an utterance and knowledge relevant to it generates ‘states 
of consciousness’ which correspond to the message, or the sense (Seleskovitch 1986: 
272; Setton 1999: 39). 
    The IT account rests on two concepts for discourse analysis: making sense and 
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vouloir-dire (speaker’s intended meaning) (Seleskovitch and Lederer 1986, translated 
by Wang 1990). The IT asserts that making sense is the aim of translation, and also 
the key element in communication. Simple or complex, the sense is what translation 
intends to achieve, in that communication has a purpose, which makes necessary such 
particular instances as listening, speaking, reading, writing and translation and 
interpreting.    
      According to the Interpretive Theory of translation (IT), from the perspective of 
understanding, the interpreter is the listener, and regarding the interpreter’s role in 
making the audience understand the target language (TL) the interpreter is the 
Speaker. The interpreter sets out to make sense of utterances by getting at the 
intended meaning of the Speaker and then faithfully re-expresses the meaning/sense 
to the listener. IT asserts that the production of a meaningful unit (unit of sense) starts 
with parsing information, and is followed by combining the fresh input with relevant 
knowledge to make sense. The parsing of information means the analysis of how a set 
of grammatical rules and a lexicon of words and phrases are put together and 
transmitted into well-formed sentences. Next, the exact moment of making sense 
depends on knowledge, and is therefore assumed to vary between different 
interpreters working on the same discourse. As the discourse advances, the synthesis 
of sense units increasingly rests on information from prior discourse.         
    In order to achieve an understanding of the intended meaning, IT has turned to 
cognition and formulated the concepts of the context and the situation. The context 
comprises cognitive context (contexte cognitif), cognitive bank (bagage cognitif) and 
relevant knowledge (savoir pertinent). IT separates context into verbal context and 
cognitive context. The former corresponds to the immediate memory and surface of a 
meaningful unit, the latter corresponds to the sense in cognitive memory, which is 
activated from the start of the conversation.   
    IT attaches importance to the context and situation. The situation falls into both 
visible and invisible categories, including what we see, i.e. gestures and facial 
expressions, and all the factors relevant to the speech and all elements perceived and 
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imagined or inferenced in the conference. IT explains that the situation puts the 
Speaker, the interpreter and Addressees in the same picture. The interpreter can 
inference the elements and signs, which are indicative of the Speaker in terms of his 
intended meaning. For instance, what is the conference type? Is it an international 
conference, or a special committee meeting of an institution, or a corporate board 
meeting? What are the purpose(s) of this conference? Where does the conference take 
place? What are the shared interests and conflicts existing between and among the 
concerned parties? Regarding the Speaker, the interpreter will keep asking: where 
does he come from? What is his motive? And who is he addressing? What might he 
expect? The interpreter can use her creative potential to anticipate any possible ideas, 
directions and terms of the speech. This anticipation will help the interpreter to build 
up her cognitive context.           
    The specific and current situation is also significant to the interpreter. Seleskovitch 
(1986; translated by Wang 1990: 50) provided an instance for this point. While 
projecting the slides the Speaker said to the electrician “Lumiere, s’il vous plait” 
(Light, please).  If it was dark in the hall, the electrician would turn on the lights. 
When the conference ended, the same utterance was repeated; the electrician would 
turn off the lights. The situations help determine different senses and verbal context, 
eliminating the ambiguity of the language.  
    Cognitive context is started up from the beginning of speech, being activated and 
developed along with the communication process to a clear and consistent status. In 
other words, the interpreter might be initially limited to literal interpreting due to a 
lack of cognitive context, but gradually move into a smooth track of interpreting, free 
from any verbal obstacles. IT argues that cognitive context differs from cognitive 
bank in terms of retention time. Cognitive context helps to retain the immediate 
message and lasts just long enough to understand the forthcoming speech. Cognitive 
bank is the knowledge stored in the long-term memory. The relevant knowledge 
(savoir pertinent) is stored in the cognitive bank and activated by what is being heard.  
On the basis of the theories above, IT proposes that the interpreter goes through the 
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following stages to make sense: first, limiting the scope of semantic potential in terms 
of verbal context; second, making sense from the current utterances via cognitive 
context, finally, accessing her knowledge to make sense. IT asserts that in order to 
make the above-mentioned stages possible, three elements are involved. First, the 
interpreter should have access to the whole situations. Next, the interpreter is able to 
recall and retain the elements of the utterances in the cognitive context. Third, the 
interpreter has required relevant knowledge of the topic. On the basis of the 
descriptions above IT further postulates three stages in SI: (1) perception and mental 
complement, (2) conceptualization, (3) expression. 
(1) Perception and mental complement. Oral speech flow progresses at full speed in a 
series of interactive and vibrating sounds with different frequencies. In spite of this, 
the listener has no difficulty in understanding his /her own native language within 50 
to 20000 hertz. The listener will not need to make any effort to make sense of the 
message and emotions from the series of organized and meaningful sounds (Lederer 
1986, Wang 1990: 178). However, in terms of understanding a non-native language a 
complementary mental capacity is needed to compensate for her deficiency in 
decoding incoming information. A simultaneous interpreter must be acute in listening, 
but the listening skill involves both language proficiency and background knowledge. 
Language competence and background knowledge are complementary and 
indispensable as well. More background knowledge means more mental complement 
to facilitate the sense making process. 
    In order to further address the relation between the background knowledge and 
language competence, the Interpretive Theory of translation (IT) shifts its attention to 
target language (TL), in which there are numerous layers of knowledge, ranging from 
the easy (e.g. ladies and gentleman at the beginning of speech) to the difficult(e.g. 
figures and subject matters in the speech). This hierarchical knowledge structure 
requires the interpreter to distribute her attention among corresponding layers. The 
listening skill is complemented by background knowledge, without which the 
reception will be incomplete, even unintelligible. So SI hinges on knowledge of the 
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world (Seleskovitch 1976; Lederer 1990). 
(2) Conceptualization. The cognitive combination of background knowledge and 
language will give rise to conceptualization. In the SI process, making sense is a 
series of mutually conditional processes, in other words, once the current action stops, 
the following action starts. The interpreter starts listening in order to retain sounds, 
and then actualizes semantic meaning, and finally makes sense and achieves 
coherence. This is an overlapping process in parallel, that is, the listening skill and 
background knowledge work together all the time.  
(3) Expression. On the basis of perception and mental complement and 
conceptualization, the simultaneous interpreter will have the capacity for pre- 
comprehension and maintain synchronic expression.  
     As this study is technical conference based and SI research and training oriented, I 
would like to review IT with respect to how students can be prepared for interpreting 
the technical conference to make sense and achieve coherence. Lederer (1986) defines 
knowledge in terms of what one can do and what one can understand. Her assumption 
is that, it is difficult for the interpreter to master all the subject matters of specialists in 
all given fields, but the basic requirement for the interpreter who is to interpret either 
for a general or a technical conference is to be able to understand what is being talked 
about, i.e. making sense and establishing coherence. Without understanding the 
subject, the interpreter would be stuck in a code-switch deadlock, and she would be 
unable to interpret properly. However, according to Lederer, understanding the 
subject does not mean being able to perform in that field; and that the interpreter does 
not need the profound knowledge of a technical specialist. What she needs is the 
knowledge, which enables her to process information.  
At this point, Lederer put forward suggestions on how to obtain this kind of 
knowledge as follows. First, interpreting students are guided to keep asking not only 
how but also why, about what they take for granted in terms of the seemingly familiar 
devices used in daily life, for instance, TV and microwave wave stores. Initially, 
students of interpreting are instructed to be aware of their ignorance of what seems 
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familiar, and led to further exploration and improvement of their knowledge to the 
functional level which enables them to follow the flow of ideas of the technical 
specialist. According to Lederer we use numerous scientific and technological devices 
in daily life, which involve the specialized knowledge for the interpreter to make 
sense of a technological topic, but interpreting students are apt to ignore the channels 
to this kind of knowledge. For instance, students of interpretation can find out such 
things as: how is a car driven? What is its driving mechanism? If they know, then a 
further question: what are the working principles of an internal combustion engine 
and the gear box? Still further: how are they manufactured? On what kinds of 
machines are they machined? How are they cast into the moulds?  The questions can 
go on. Lederer asserts that cultivation of curiosity and exploration for this kind of 
seemingly familiar technical item of knowledge is the primary principle for SI 
teaching and training, and that curiosity and exploration should become second nature 
for interpreting trainees.   
Next, interpreting students are taught how to make sense and establish coherence of 
technical knowledge. According to Lederer there are a few basic principles in all 
disciplines of human knowledge, and many scientific rules can be compared to what 
is observed in daily life. Inference can be used to link and develop the knowledge 
system. She also suggests that students of interpreting should read books of popular 
science to expand their relevant knowledge of the subject matter. Finally, on the basis 
of the coherent and comprehensive knowledge, interpreting students are guided to 
gain an understanding of the technical terms, in particular to activate the links among 
the terms. Technical terms can not be isolated from the context. 
The Interpretive Theory of translation (IT) has studied the process of making sense 
and establishing coherence in interpreting, and provides theoretical and 
methodological directions for SI research and training. IT has used cognitive concepts, 
such as cognitive context, cognitive bank, and relevant knowledge to explain how the 
simultaneous interpreter makes sense and establishes coherence in the SI process. In 
addition, IT has put forward the theory of information gradation and effort 
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distribution. However, there are some questions which IT has not answered clearly. 
For instance, IT claims that there are different layers of knowledge, some of which are 
easily activated but some are not. So which layers of knowledge are more easily 
accessible than others? How are the layers of knowledge structured from a cognitive 
perspective, say, in terms of a technical conference of SI? And further how can an 
empirical analysis be carried out to identify these layers of knowledge? In addition, in 
what ways can comparison with what is observed in daily life help us to understand 
scientific principles? For instance, in what respects can water be compared to electric 
current?  IT postulates that the interpreter makes a specific effort to resist interference 
from the forms of source language (SL), to which self-monitoring must be specially 
attuned (Setton 1981: 105). However, the resistance from the SL forms is challenged 
by Newmark (1982: 98), who comments as follows: 
 
        The basis of Seleskovitch’s theory is unsound. Translation and interpretation have 
to be based on words, sentences, linguistic meaning because they have no other 
material foundations. Meaning does not exist without words.  
 
Besides the questions mentioned above Gile (1995) pointed out that IT is not 
‘scientific’ (1995: 55) due to the fact that it is only based on professional observation 
and experience; in particular, it lacks in cognitive psychological research. Therefore 
this research classifies IT under the empiricism-based paradigm.      
 
3.3 The rationalism-based SI paradigm  
 
As an opposite view to the Interpretive Theory of translation (IT), the rationalism-
based SI paradigm in this research consists of two frameworks: Cognitive Processing 
(CP) including the Effort Model of Gile and the paradigm combining empiricism and 
rationalism is represented by a computational linguistics approach to coherence in SI. 
There are two primary rationales to review these two SI paradigms. The first lies in 
the fact that both paradigms aim to explore how comprehension and coherence is 
attained in SI, and therefore each of them contributes to this research. The second is 
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that my research is derived from a different source to the two paradigms mentioned, 
in that my theory is based on the second generation of cognitive science and theirs is 
based on the first generation work. There are two conceptions of cognitive science, 
defined by different philosophical commitments: the first-generation cognitive science 
ignores the role of bodily experience, viewing thought and language as only the 
mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols, while the second generation of 
cognitive science stresses the role of bodily experience, asserting that thought, 
understanding and language are essentially embodied, that is, they are based in the 
way our bodies experience the world. This is further discussed in Chapter 4. The two 
SI paradigms were formed in this context – basically drawing on the information 
theory and cognitive psychology on the basis of the first-generation cognitive science. 
With a view to the SI frameworks in this context, according to Pöchhacker (2004), 
interpreting was conceptualized through a particular set of abstract symbols – digital 
data processing operations. Just like a computer processor, the interpreter was 
assumed to perform a number of cognitive skills, such as speech recognition, memory 
storage and verbal output, and the combination of the respective operations would 
expect to explain the complex task of interpreting. This concern with cognitive 
information processing skills is the most widespread paradigm in interpreting studies 
to date (Pöchhacker 2004:  53).  
 
3.3.1 The Cognitive Processing paradigm  
 
The Cognitive Processing paradigm (CP) of SI was introduced by Gerver (1971, 1975, 
1976), and Moser (1978). Gerver (1971: viii) viewed interpreting as ‘a fairly complex 
form of human information processing system involving the reception, storage, 
transformation, and transmission of verbal information’. His research into interpreting 
has three main themes: (a) the information processing system; (b) the possibility of 
dividing attention among multi-tasks, and (c) the structure and function of memory 
components. To make the complex interpreting task suitable for experimental study, 
he further broke down the language processing into subtasks, or component skills, 
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including phoneme, lexical recognition, syntactic processing and knowledge-based 
inference  
    Gerver conducted a few experiments with professional interpreters. On the basis of 
the results, he proposed (1975) a sequential SI model of mental processing in 
interpreting. This SI model is focused on a short-term storage system for the different 
stages in text processing. According to Gerver, the source text (ST) was stored in an 
input buffer, from where it proceeded for further processing. With a segment of the 
input text stored in the input buffer, the processor was busy processing a current 
segment. Then the processed segment was transmitted into output via an output buffer, 
where it proceeded for recognition processing. 
    Gerver assumed that the actual text processing was performed in co-operation with 
long-term memory (LTM), which activated the current linguistic units. LTM is 
‘everything a person knows and remembers’ (Kintsch 1998: 217). However, Gerver 
has not specified in his model which segments in the process are performed by 
working memory, nor has he considered working memory either to be a structural or a 
functional entity (Gerver 1975). Working memory is conceptualized as a tripartite 
system, in which the online interaction between fresh input and knowledge stored in 
LTM is seen as mediated by short-term storage and processing resources (Pöchhacker 
2004: 122).  
    Another cognitive process model of SI was proposed by Moser (1978), who shifted 
her attention to the role of working memory. Unlike Gerver, Moser was more explicit 
as to specific process segments. Moser used a different term, Generated Abstract 
Memory (GAM), but it was equivalent to short-term memory (Moser, 1978). 
According to her model, working memory should have both structural and functional 
components. GAM performed several important tasks. It stored processed chunks of 
text through lexical, syntactical and semantic levels, and it also performed a recoding 
task in co-operation with a conceptual system, which helped to transform the 
linguistic units. GAM was linked to long-term memory, which stored all concepts, 
lexicons, syntax and grammatical rules, etc.  
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The concepts of short-term storage/GAM, long-term memory and working memory 
serve as groundbreaking work in interpreting studies, which can help to analyze the 
way in which new inputs activate the long-term memory, building up the links in the 
online interaction net. However, the fundamental problem of this rationalism-based 
cognitive paradigm lies in the basic philosophical assumption that it ‘ignores any 
ways in which those functions arise from the body and brain’ (Lakoff 1999: 75-76). In 
addition, the way the human processor processes information is different from that 
used by a computer primarily because human thinking is overlapping in parallel rather 
than a step by step process; this rationalism-based cognitive paradigm has not 
addressed the property of cognitive processing – fuzziness. This will be discussed in 
Section 4.3. Finally, according to Setton (1999: 38), the CP community has yet to 
present a corpus in support of its theories. In order to find a new way out for CP, Gile 
proposed his Effort Models theory (1995) for SI comprehension. 
 
 
3.3.2 The Effort Model  
 
According to Gile (1985, 1991,1995), the interpreter’s mental effort may be reduced 
when she makes sense of the Speaker’s utterances, while her mental effort may be 
taxed heavily due to such factors as her knowledge deficit, or slowness in lexical 
retrieval, suggesting that she has difficulty in building coherence. The amount of the 
interpreter’s attention to be distributed is determined by the density and difficulty of 
the information in the source language. If the interpreter distributes more attention to 
the particular difficult information, she may have less attention to process the rest of 
the information. On the basis of these observations, Gile (1995) proposed his theory 
of the Effort Model. 
    The Effort Model comprises three basic mental efforts: (1) listening and analysis 
(L/LA), (2) production (P) and (3) memory (M). Gile has assumed that the 
simultaneous interpreter has a limited amount of mental energy, or rather processing 
capacity, available for her processing effort in SI; therefore the sum of the three 
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efforts cannot exceed the interpreter’s processing capacity. Based on these three 
efforts, Gile added the coordination effort (C) to his models, and proposed a set of 
formulas as SI = L+P+M+C. This means that SI processing capacity should be 
minimally equal to the total requirement for the four skills.   
    Gile proposed his next formula: TR = LR+MR+PR+CR. The total processing 
capacity requirements (TR) refer to a sum of individual processing capacity 
requirements. Where LR = capacity requirements for L, MR = capacity requirements 
for M, PR = capacity requirements for P, and CR = capacity requirements for C.  
The effort requirement standard varies due to the comprehension of speech content 
and the flow of current speech. The effort pattern may change over a few seconds. If 
the interpreter is expected to proceed without difficulty, she must meet the five 
conditions: (1) LA ≥ LR; (2) MA ≥MR; (3) PA ≥ PR and (4) CA ≥ CR. In short, the 
capacity available for each effort must be equal to or larger than its requirements for 
the task in process; and (5) TA ≥ TR: total capacity available should be at least equal 
to total requirements.  
The Effort Model is designed to describe the way the interpreter selects the 
appropriate strategy, enabling her to distribute appropriate mental attention to 
information of varying degrees of difficulty. The Effort Model has been used to 
account for a number of processing difficulties and failures, including such problem 
triggers as proper names, numbers and compound technical terms, which may lead to 
sequences of failure and require special coping tactics (Gile 1995). The Effort Model 
can be used to explain the failures as Gile claimed in SI performance, however, it 
cannot serve as panoramic view of SI, in that it is not a structured model of SI, nor is 
it a flow chart of information processing (Feng 1997: 53-56). Gile has not conducted 
an empirical study to show how the mental effort is reflected in the information 
structure in SI, nor did he explain in what conditions his formulas work.  
There is another SI paradigm, which attempts to combine the empiricist and 
rationalist approaches discussed above – the computational linguistics approach to 
coherence in SI.  
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3.4 The paradigm combining empiricism and rationalism: a computational 
linguistics approach to coherence in SI  
 
The initial foundation of this computational linguistics approach to SI research was 
laid by Dillinger (1989, 1994), who has assumed that the brain uses some kind of 
computational approach in processing information, and he has used a numerical 
computation in investigating the process. According to Dillinger, the interpreter’s 
mental processes are all axiomatically defined and indexed to texts and their elements, 
whose forms can be abstracted. This computational linguistics approach to coherence 
in SI sheds its light on this study, in terms of (1) the selection of subjects, (2) 
experimental materials, (3) the manipulation of data, (4) design of the experiment as 
follows:  
(1) The selection of subjects: Dillinger attempted to address his research question: 
whether there exist qualitative differences in processing between novice and 
experienced interpreters? He (1994) recruited 16 subjects, with two contrastive groups; 
one had eight experienced interpreters, and the other eight bilinguals without any 
interpreting experience. The interpreting subjects were instructed to simultaneously 
interpret English texts into French. 
(2) Experimental materials: Dillinger used two texts with 580 words as experimental 
materials; one was narrative and the other procedural. He controlled the two 
experimental texts to assure equivalence at various levels from lexical, syntactic, 
propositional and cohesive layers, and had the experimental texts read out onto 
audiotapes. The texts were read at a rate of 145 wpm, deliberately faster than the 
comfortable range of 100 to 120 wpm as proposed by Selskovitch (1965) ‘in order to 
generate deviations’ (Dillinger 1989, 1994; Setton 1999: 31).  
Dillinger (1994) compared the outputs of the two contrastive groups in terms of 
three categories: syntactic, propositional and frame processing. He analyzed how the 
interpreting subjects made sense and built coherence, on the basis of information 
density and importance. Syntactic processing is designed to examine the effect of 
syntactic structure on the interpreter’s understanding, on the basis of simple or 
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complex sentences. Proposition generation is designed to see if the density of 
propositional information units in the segment has any effect on the interpreter’s 
understanding. Frame processing is designed to examine how propositional 
information units are linked into frames, scripts or schemas, to help the interpreter to 
make sense and build coherence.   
(3) The manipulation of data: Dillinger assessed the degree to which the response 
protocols (the transcriptions of the subjects’ translations) match or mismatch the input 
text. He assumed that this is the essential measure of generating data from the 
observations in SI. Rather than matching entire propositions, Dillinger fits the 
individual slot-pairs that make up each proposition. According to Dillinger (1989; 
1994), stimuli and responses are quantified indexes, on the grounds that texts 
constructed with their units or segments are all axiomatically defined and indexed to 
the interpreter’s mental processes. He perceived meaning-changing responses as 
indexes in semantic processing, and regarded paraphrased responses as an indicator of 
synthetic processing and proposition generation. He used the following ordinal scale 
of similarity for statistical results (1994: 163-164): 
 
       0 point: if the slot-filler pair was not present in the segment, i.e. absent; least similar. 
1 point: if there was a change of meaning in either the slot or the filler, i.e. semantic 
change. 
2 points: if there was change in surface form of either the slot or the filler, without a 
change in meaning, i.e. paraphrase. 
3 points: if the slot-filler pair appeared in the segment verbatim; most similar.  
 
Dillinger designed a database for each of the experimental texts, using Microsoft 
Excel, in which each record (row) corresponds to a text proposition, and each field 
(column) fits information about the linguistic properties of the text.               
(4) Design of the experiment: Dillinger (1994: 160-161) acknowledges the six 
deviations from standard interpreting practice as follows:  
 
 52
a) The interpreting experiment was decontextualized, in other words, the text was not 
interpreted in the context of a particular audience, on a particular social situation, such as 
a conference of specialists.  
b) The speaker was invisible or available, on the ground that there are no differences in 
accuracy between interpreting with or without a view on the proceedings.  
c) The interpreters were not prepared either for the interpreting or for the topic.  
d) There was no audience. 
e) The subjects were not paid. 
f) The production process was not studied.    
 
    On the basis of his finings, Dillinger (1989) has formulated his model, ‘a 
computational counterpart to the serial, clause-based clause-processing hypothesis in 
psycholinguistics’ (Setton 1999: 31). This computational model of SI constitutes three 
stages for making sense and building coherence. In the first stage, words and phrases 
are put together to form sentences, and propositions are generated for semantic 
interpretation. At the second stage, the cognitive processor processes propositions 
(predicate-argument structure), establishing internal links among the elements by 
inferencing, tracing anaphoric antecedents and prior knowledge. This leads to the 
third stage: new propositions and propositional components are generated and further 
linked into a larger conceptual structure.  
According to Dillinger, making sense in interpreting is characterized by all of the 
same components processes as listening; coherence in SI is not a specialized ability, 
but the application of an existing skill only under more unusual circumstances of 
conferences. He further concluded that interpreting experience has a weak 
quantitative effect on interpreting overall. The difference between the interpreting 
professional and the novice may be that the former may have learned to be more 
selective in the surface information than the latter.  
Dillinger put forward some implications from his research on coherence and 
comprehension, which are opposed to those of other researchers. For instance, 
Selskovitch and Lederer assume that the interpreter only needs the relevant 
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knowledge sufficient to understand the topic (Section 3.2) while Dillinger claims that 
the interpreter has to have the same level of knowledge as presupposed by the Speaker. 
He recommends greater specialization of interpreters and the inclusion of specific 
domain knowledge in their training, therefore, the Speaker/writer should design the 
text which the interpreter, rather than the Speaker’s knowledge peers, can understand. 
Another instance, Herbert (1978), Mackintosh (1999) and Peng (2006) assert that 
interpreters are made not born, on the grounds that practice makes perfect, while 
Dillinger takes opposite stance, i.e. interpreters are born not made, with innate 
aptitudes; at most, interpreting skill is a function more of general text processing 
ability than of specific training. More evidence is needed either to support or 
controvert these ideas through empirical experiments.       
    Dillinger’s study is significant to SI research on comprehension and coherence 
(1989, 1994). According to Lakoff (1987: 348) the computational approach 
incorporates an important insight into the study of mind. ‘There is flow of thought. It 
is not just a mushy flow, but rather a highly structured flow. The view of thought as 
algorithmic computation is presently our best model of a highly structured flow of 
thought’.  However, Lakoff also points out its weak link as the ‘lack of what we have 
called conceptual embodiment’, i.e. ignorance of bodily experience in cognition. 
Dillinger does try to explore the importance of linking together propositional 
information units into frames, scripts and schemas – the more complex information 
structures that characterize texts, rather than sentences. However due to the lack of 
conceptual embodiment in his experimental design, his research on this aspect can not 
explain how the frame, script or schema could be generated without situation or 
context, nor does it reveal what is behind the slots and fillers in cognitive terms.  In 
addition, Dillinger did not back up his model by means of any neurolinguistic 
experimentation; it remains speculative.  
   Dillinger used a proposition score to study the interpreter’s comprehension 
processes, based on comparison between the source text (ST) and the target text (TT). 
This verbal transfer method is basically fundamental and reasonable in that ‘words 
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contain meaning and serve as the elementary building blocks of a language’ 
(Pöchhacker 2004: 54). However, in terms of Dillinger’s data manipulation, his 
ordinal scale of similarity for statistical results is problematic. The segment verbatim 
or word for word interpreting is given the highest rating in the scale while paraphrase 
(change in surface form without changing the meaning) is given a lower rating. 
According to IT (reviewed in Section 3.2), though, the former normally indicates that 
the interpreter is stuck in the code-switching condition, unable to follow the idea 
thread while the latter signals that the interpreter has got rid of the confinement of 
language surface structure, interpreting properly.  
        Due to the difficult access to authentic texts (see Section 5.7) Dillinger used 
simulated or ‘artificial’ texts (Dillinger 1994: 158). Although the test texts were not 
excerpted from real-life conference proceedings, Dillinger argues ‘no one knows what 
the differences are (if there are any) between the texts used here and the sorts of texts 
found in actual conference situations’ (1994: 159). Dillinger believes that criticism of 
the use of simulated texts is ‘not only unsupported by any evidence, but also seems 
entirely implausible’ (1994: 159). However, these responses can do nothing to deny 
the significance of the authentic texts used in real-life conference interpreting. 
Dillinger’s use of simulation as opposed to authentic text allows for greater control of 
stimulus conditions, as well as comparison and generalizations across data. 
      There are other limitations in Dillinger’s study. For instance, Dillinger did not 
provide adequate data as examples, which made it impossible to justify the validity of 
his type-classification of responses or indexes. He supplied neither examples nor any 
part of the interpreting output protocols, nor an example of evaluation of the 
responses/indexes to discuss his assumptions. Values were computed statistically for 
the texts overall without reference to local processing or linguistic events. The basis 
for calculating inference load is not specified. These weak points are also discussed 
by other researchers (Setton 1999; Gile 1994). 
To sum up, the three approaches to interpreting studies reviewed so far are 
influenced by first - generation cognitive linguistics, whose philosophical assumption 
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is that thought is disembodied, ignoring the consideration of bodily experience or 
physical interaction which has shaped the first generation cognitive linguistics. This 
disembodied view is the fundamental limitation of rationalism-based view on 
interpreting.  
At this point, it is necessary to find a new way to explore coherence in SI. For this, 
the work of Pöchhacker (1992) serves as a roadmap for this research.   
 
3.5 From Knowledge to Text: Coherence in Simultaneous Interpreting 
 
Pöchhacker in his General Translation Theory (GTI) (Section 3.1.2) shows the 
inadequacy of functional text-bound measures of quality in that the notion of 
functionality in texts is not specified clearly enough to compare equivalence between 
inputs and outputs. In order to address this issue, Pöchhacker (1992) set out to adopt a 
knowledge structures approach to coherence in SI to discuss interpreters’ use of 
knowledge structure, and he has studied how SI inferencing is made on the basis of 
cognitive models to achieve coherence and finally how mental models of message 
contents are built.  
Pöchhacker picks up Gile’s question (1991: 15) ‘How does interpretation work?’ 
and points out that the view of Seleskovitch and Lederer (1976, 1986,1989, reviewed 
in Section 3.2) – SI hinges on  knowledge of the world – was hardly ever followed by 
a systematic look at what such knowledge is like, let alone how it could be described. 
Pöchhacker decides to look at SI not from the word out but from the conference 
assignment in, not only in terms of micro-level cognitive process but also in terms of 
the interpreting course of action and its product, that is, his GTI (reviewed in Section 
3.1.2). Following this, he further focuses on knowledge, which he sees as the crucial 
component of the interpreting model in the most general sense of the word, 
knowledge. Pöchhacker attempts to specify the knowledge, required of the interpreter 
in terms of socio-cultural knowledge and competence (1992:  90): 
 
a) General knowledge and competence (of members of a particular culture), 
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b) Specialized knowledge and competence (of a given professional or other group) 
c) Individual knowledge and competence (of a particular person), and  
d) Contextual knowledge and competence (gained in the course of the communicative 
interaction, i.e. conference). 
 
Pöchhacker has continued to look to cognitive sciences for coherence in SI, He has 
proposed a theoretical integrated approach to coherence in SI, which consists of the 
building blocks of knowledge described above, frame (reviewed in Section 2.2.2.1) 
and script (reviewed in Section 2.2.2.2), and finally the Idealized Cognitive Model 
(ICM) derived from the concepts of Embodied Cognition (Chapter 4) which, he 
claims, is ‘a new and promising path’ (Pöchhacker 2004: 203). According to 
Pöchhacker (2004), the embodied cognitive paradigm, which has proved fertile in 
education and training, rejects the concern with mental plans and symbolic structures 
as put forward in the rationalism-based view (reviewed in Section 3.3), and stresses 
interactive bodily experience with a particular environment and social context, 
perceiving the person and the environment as parts of ‘a mutually constructed whole’ 
(Pöchhacker 2004: 203). In terms of the role of the ICM for SI coherence, according 
to Pöchhacker (1992: 94) ‘The embodiment of concepts and image-schematic models 
are irresistible from a psychological point of view’; meanwhile he has pointed out the 
potential difficulties (1992: 94): ‘how to make them work for the purpose of empirical 
description and assessment of knowledge use in the comprehension?’ Therefore, he 
has pointed out ‘This is where we are made painfully aware of the issue of 
coherence.’ Finally he concluded (1992):  
  
What is sufficient coherence – do we know? I’m afraid the answer must be 
negative. […] we are hardly in a position to answer the central question of 
SI practice and theory on an empirical basis. 
 
Pöchhacker has shown a brief roadmap for SI coherence – the ICM; I will follow this 
roadmap to start my exploration – coherence in SI, from an ICM perspective, through 
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empirical research although it requires painful efforts.  
    Pöchhacker provided a specific knowledge structure (1992). However, like any 
theories reviewed so far, Pöchhacker did not answer the question relating to the 
concept of knowledge, raised by Lakoff (1987: 297): ‘What does it mean to know 
something and how is knowledge possible?’ The answer is ‘The best example of 
knowledge is things that we know about basic-level objects, actions, and relations in 
the physical domain’ (Lakoff 1987: 297), and our basic-level perceptions further help 
us to attain an understanding of the abstract concepts or knowledge by means of our 
imagery capacity. This will be discussed in the following chapter.  
 
3.6 Concluding remarks  
 
This chapter has summarized the theories which are relevant both to coherence in SI 
and to this study. First of all, in terms of the two SFL-based research and findings on 
SI coherence, the General Theory of Translation and Interpreting (GTI) helps to build 
this study’s model and allows me to analyze the data through its view: the SI situation 
revolves around the purpose/skopos with a model of the speaker, the listener (s) and 
the interpreter. Meanwhile I use an empirical study to implement the framework of 
GTI. The text linguistic framework and its relevant findings provide the theme-rheme 
structure methods to examine the data of this study from the set of thematically 
central concepts and various types of cohesive ties. Tebble’s model of contextual 
configuration sheds light on this research into the interpreter’s mental effort in 
processing information contained in the textual structure.     
    Second, the empirically-based Interpretive Theory of translation (IT) provides this 
research with its principle of making sense and establishing coherence in SI as 
cornerstone of this research. IT’s theory of cognitive elements, such as cognitive bank, 
relevant knowledge, the situation and the context in SI helps to build up this SI 
coherence model. IT’s cognitive procedures in SI help to set up the design and 
analyze the data of this research, which include a) perception and mental complement, 
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b) conceptualization, c) expression. IT’s theory of information distribution is used to 
help to build up the model of this research into the mental effort, by means of 
matching the ICM structure and the information pattern. IT also contributes to this 
study in terms of its basic SI principles and preparation for SI scientific and 
technological conference.  
Third, with a view to the computer processing analogy based rationalist framework, 
the Cognitive Processing paradigm’s concepts of the short-term memory, and long 
term-memory and working memory are used to analyze failure and success in the data 
and reveal how the interpreting subjects achieve coherence. The Effort Model, 
combined with the information distribution theory of IT as mentioned above, is used 
to formulate the model of coherence pattern pertaining to the mental effort in a 
technical conference interpreting context. In other words, I use the Effort Model to 
extend the research into the mental effort which is reflected in the textual structure of 
the target text (TT), analyzed from the ICM perspective. Dillinger’s computational 
linguistics approach helps to set up the experimental section in terms of data 
manipulation, design and analyses. In this research, I combine the computational 
approach with Embodied Cognition to bridge the gap between the two theories. The 
gap between the two was identified by Lakoff, but has not been solved yet (1987). 
According to Lakoff (1987: 343) the experientialist approach (outlined in Chapter 4) 
will ‘mesh better with an empirically responsible computational approach’ (1987: 
343), but how to combine them remains a problem. This study will provide an 
integrated model of the experientialist and computational approach, explained in 
Chapter 5, and summarized in Section 7.5.               
Finally, Pöchhacker (1992) provides this study with a theoretical ‘new and 
promising path’ (2004: 203), i.e. the Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM). Following this 
way-marker, I will introduce the ICM in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4 ICM: an interactive embodied approach to mental coherence  
 
The Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM)-based approach to coherence, developed in this 
study, draws on Embodied Cognition theory (Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Lakoff and 
Turner 1989; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Langacker 1991, 2008 and Wang 2006). 
Embodied Cognition theory has been derived from the second generation of cognitive 
science based on the embodied mind. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 78), 
‘the distinction between first generation and second generation cognitive science is 
not relevant to the age of any individual or the time when one happened to enter the 
field’; the distinction lies in disembodied or embodied cognition and the difference is 
one of philosophical and methodological assumptions. As introduced in Chapters 1 
and 3, Objectivism claims that rational thought is independent of the understanding of 
any particular embodied organism; therefore rational thought only involves the 
manipulation of abstract symbols, whose meanings could be accessed through a 
correspondence with things in the external world. The first generation of cognitive 
science is based on the traditional view Objectivism. By the mid-to late 1970s, an 
increasingly prominent view of cognitive science, based on Experientialism, 
developed into embodied cognition theory, challenging the fundamental tenets of the 
traditional cognition theories. On the basis of a series of empirical studies, the 
experientialists assert that thought primarily grows out of embodiment, i.e. experience 
involves individuals and communities in the interaction with both physical and social 
environments. Experientialism rests on two kinds of evidence as follows (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999: 77):  
 
(1) A strong dependence of concepts and reason upon the body and  
(2) The centrality to conceptualization and reason of imaginative processes, 
especially metaphor, imagery, metonymy, prototype, frames, mental spaces, 
and categories.   
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The experientialist view can be summed up by the following six key points (Lakoff 
1987:  xiv-xv). In the first place, thought is embodied.  Our bodily experience gives 
rise to the mental structure which is used to hold our conceptual systems together, 
enabling us to make sense and build coherence. In essence, our conceptual systems 
are fundamentally and directly grounded in our perception and body movement via 
perceptual organs, such as our eyes, legs and arms, and physical and social experience. 
‘The term Body is used as a generic term for the embodied origins of imaginative 
structure of understanding’ (Johnson 1987: xv) (Section 4.2.5). 
    In the second place, thought is imaginative. For those concepts which are not 
directly grounded in our bodily experience, or which go beyond the literal mirroring, 
or representations, of external reality, metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery are 
applied to understand them. According to Lakoff, it is this imaginative capacity that 
enables us to make sense of abstract thoughts and takes the mind beyond what we can 
see and feel. Meanwhile the imaginative capacity is also embodied indirectly, on the 
grounds that metaphors, metonymies, and images are basically based on our bodily 
experience. Thought is also imaginative in a less obvious way: every time something 
is categorized in a way that does not mirror nature straightforwardly, imaginative 
capacities are being applied.      
    Thirdly, thought has gestalt properties and it is not atomistic but holistic. Concepts 
have an overall structure that goes beyond merely putting together conceptual 
building blocks by general rules. Fourthly, thought has an ecological structure, and is 
far more than the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols. With respect to 
learning and memory, the efficiency of cognitive processing depends on both the 
overall structure of the conceptual system and what the concepts mean. Conceptual 
system has its own ‘internal compulsive force’ (Johnson 1987: 2) (see Section 4.2.5). 
Next, a conceptual structure can be described using the ICM that has the properties 
mentioned above. Finally, the theory of cognitive models inherits and incorporates 
what was right about the traditional view of cognition, including categorization, 
meaning and reason, while accounting for the empirical data on categorization and 
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fitting the new view overall.   
Within this experiential framework, the ICM is employed and developed to analyze 
the understanding process and discourse coherence, due to the fact that the ICM 
involves the properties listed above. In this chapter, Section 4.1 will introduce the 
ICM theory, on the basis of the ICM principle: interactive embodiment and mental 
coherence. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 will provide an account of how the ICM is structured 
and of what properties the ICM has in processing information structure. Sections 4.4 
and 4.5 will deal with the way the ICM works in cognitive process to help 
communicators to build coherence. Section 4.6 will summarize the role of an ICM in 
building discourse coherence, and Section 4.7 will present the ICM-based methods for 
tracking coherence clues.   
 
4.1 An introduction to the ICM  
 
According to Lakoff (1987: 68), the ICM comes from four sources: Fillmore’s frame 
semantics (discussed in Section 2.2.2.1); Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphor, 
(to be discussed in Section 4.2.3) and metonymy (to be discussed in Section 4.2.4); 
Langacker’s cognitive grammar (to be discussed in Section 4.7) and Fauconnier’s 
theory of mental spaces (to be discussed in Section 4.4). The ICM is not only 
postulated as a mental structure about a certain field but also a general theory about 
minds. The ICM has the property of an entity as in a frame and script, and further 
leads to an understanding of abstract concepts through metaphor and metonym in the 
mental space. The ICM theory is concerned with how knowledge is organized and 
understood on the basis of bodily experience and imaginative capacity, and how 
concepts are organized into a structural model. According to Wang (2006), ‘the ICM 
refers to an abstract, unified and idealized understanding of experience and 
knowledge in relation to a certain field, in a particular cultural context’ (2006: 206, 
translation my own). The ICM theory has provided a hermeneutic, ‘complex 
structured whole, a gestalt’ (Lakoff 1987: 68). The word idealized means universality 
and adaptability; in other words, the ICM might not fit what is true of the world all the 
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time and ‘one would need to allow background conditions to fit partially and to allow 
partial contradictions’ (Lakoff 1987: 202). The ICM has become a prominent concept 
in the field of linguistics, and is used to analyze discourse coherence. Figure 4 below 
shows a panoramic view of the relations between the ICM and coherence in cognitive 
processing:     
                                             
 Reality →← interactive embodiment → image schema → categorization → conceptualization → meaning →← Language  
               ↓ Sensation/perception/image   ↓ metaphor/ metonym                   ↓proposition/reasoning/inferencing    
               ↓ Propositional model                     ↓ CMs 
                                                                         ↓ ICM 
                                                          
Figure 4 ICM and coherence in cognitive processing   
 
According to Embodied Cognition theory, the cognitive process starts with interactive 
embodiment via sensation, perception and image leading to image schema – ‘a 
recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that 
gives coherence and structure to our experience’ (Johnson 1987: xiv). The basic-level 
concepts which are directly grounded in our perception belong to the propositional 
model (Lakoff 1987: 285), in which the elements in the cognitive network are basic-
level concepts – entities, actions, states, properties. Much of our knowledge structure 
is stored in the form of propositional models; the propositional/embodied concepts are 
the best elements for understanding, on the ground that they are actual mappings or 
projections of the external world, without the need for imagination to specify the 
elements, the properties, and the relations holding among the world affairs. The 
propositional model has the same structure as the properties of the elements and the 
relations linking the elements. 
To access more complex and abstract concepts, or rather the non-propositional/non-
embodied concepts, metaphoric and metonymic processing is used to build up a 
model covering all the stored cognitive representations of all relevant knowledge, 
which belong to a certain field. This is how a cognitive model is built. A cognitive 
model comprises situations and contexts, helping to recognize ideas and objects, i.e. 
              Origin of coherence                    → ← Global coherence                           →  ← Local  coherence  
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categorization, and to build up a coherent unit of the relevant knowledge, relating to 
the ideas and objects, i.e. conceptualization. The relevant cognitive models will 
constitute an Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM), on the basis of which concepts and 
propositions are organized, and meaning or sense is made out of language. ‘A 
proposition exists as a continuous, analog pattern of experience or understanding, 
with sufficient internal structure to permit inference’ (Johnson 1987: 3).  
The ICM, formed in the communicator’s mind, helps to determine coherence via 
reasoning and inferenceing, in terms of three levels: origin of coherence, global and 
local coherence. Figure 4 shows how coherence is achieved in this embodied context. 
A communicator starts with his interaction with the reality – both physical and social 
environments. His direct and bodily experience helps him to access an optimal 
understanding of the embodied concepts, and this is where the origin of coherence 
takes place. His repeated bodily experience gives rise to mental structures of what is 
experienced – image-schema, in terms of frame and script. On the basis of his 
embodied experience, the communicator will carry on to understand more relevant 
abstract or non-embodied concepts. This is where global coherence takes place when 
he is processing a communication (see particular sections 2.3; 4.1; 4.6.3; 4.7 and 7.5). 
The ecological overall structure determines efficiency of cognitive processing by 
reasoning and inferencing, effectively facilitating the communicator. This is how local 
coherence takes place (see relevant sections 2.3; 4.6.3; 6.4 and 7.5).  Figure 5 below 
shows a brief picture of an ICM structure and will be discussed in Section 4.2 in detail:  
 
 
Figure 5 ICM structure  
As discussed above, the ICM structure assumes that we get to know the world with 
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our eyes, noses, ears, and all of such sensory pathways. On the basis of our interactive 
and bodily experience we form actual mappings or projections of the external world 
without any need to employ imagination. In other words, when we have done 
something or have had bodily experience we will have a mental picture and then find 
it easy to remember, or give an account of what was going on. This leads to the actual 
concepts. The propositional model helps to specify elements, their properties and the 
relations holding among them. According to Lakoff (1987: 297) ‘the things we feel 
we know best are those that can be most closely related to basic-level experience’. On 
the basis of this propositional model we have somewhat more abstract and generalized 
concepts, that is, the image schema, which is the interface between the physically 
embodied experience and the abstract concepts. This term, image schema, speaks for 
itself, in that it contains image on one hand and schema on the other. In other words, 
when we are doing things involving sensation and perception, we will have an 
essential impression of what is going on, and if we do it over and over again we will 
form a recurring and dynamic pattern of daily experience, that is, a schema, which 
also gives coherence and structure to our experience and discourse.   
When we need to understand more abstract and rational concepts we will use 
analogy, or rather metaphors. For instance, we cannot see how electric current moves 
but we could compare it with water flow in some aspects. When we have sufficient 
understanding of something, one word will activate the entire cognitive network to 
make sense and build up coherence. This is one part standing for a whole, which is the 
metonymic model in the ICM. The non-propositional concepts are indirectly 
understood, requiring more mental effort for their activation.  
In summary, the perceptual experience gives rise to the gestalt structure of the 
things; and the further we are from the perceptual bodily experience (the propositional 
concepts) the more abstracted (the non-propositional concepts) we are from the world, 
and the more effort we  invest for understanding.  
The ICM fits our perception and is reflected in our understanding discourse 
coherence. According to Lakoff (1987: 455) ‘our perception and our mental images 
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are structured by image schemas and the schemas associated with lexical items are 
capable of fitting the schemas that structure our perceptions and images’. According 
to Wang (2006), in order to understand discourse coherence in relation to the ICM, 
interactive embodiment and mental coherence can be used as two basic principles. I 
will use these two principles as guides to explore discourse coherence in SI. 
Furthermore, I will investigate how the interpreter’s mental effort reflects the textual 
structure, analyzed from the ICM perspective. Ultimately I will build up an ICM-
based theoretical framework on coherence in SI. 
 
4.1.1 Interactive embodiment   
 
Embodiment:  Embodied Cognition theory takes a primary position in both cognitive 
science and the philosophy of mind, emphasizing the role that the body plays in 
shaping the mind and believing that the nature of the human mind is largely 
determined by the form of the human body, that is, all aspects of cognition, such as 
ideas, thoughts, concepts, categories and understanding are shaped by aspects of the 
body. These aspects include the perceptual system, the intuitions that underlie the 
ability to move, activities and interactions with our environment. 
    According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999) the embodiment hypothesis entails that 
our conceptual structure and linguistic structures are shaped by the characteristics of 
our perceptual structures. According to Wang (2006: 288) embodied cognitive 
linguistics uses bodily experience as a starting point, conceptual structure and 
meaning as its research focus and employs cognitive models and knowledge structure 
for a unified cross-disciplinary linguistic description, aiming to reveal the cognitive 
patterns behind languages. Wang (2006: 288) asserts that embodiment is the corner 
stone for embodied cognitive linguistics, involving three questions: a) By what do we 
experience?  b) What do we start experiencing? c) How do we experience? These 
three questions help to conceptualize not only the nature of embodied cognition 
relating to understanding but also the origin of coherence. a) By what do we 
experience? We experience the world by our body, sensation and perception. b) What 
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do we start experiencing? It is space that we first start experiencing, including 
location, direction and movement. c) How do we experience? It is in an interactive 
way that we experience the world. These three points not only point to the origin of 
concepts but also of discourse coherence. In other words, cognition is built primarily 
on the basis of interactive embodiment and an understanding of space. The cognitive 
process proceeds from the near to the far, the specific to the abstract, the bodily and 
the spatial to the cognitive model, which facilitates understanding and prediction of 
communication.   
To sum up, we use the cognitive process to learn about the world and its contents 
interactively, and make sense by categorizing, conceptualizing, reasoning and 
inferencing. At the time of perception and embodiment, body and space take the 
foremost positions, and then other basic cognitive representations of the world 
(cognitive models) are gradually formed, on the basis of interaction, giving rise to a 
variety of basic concepts and propositions, from which meaning is generated by 
inference and coherence is established.  
 
Interaction: The interactionist view of embodied cognitive linguistics emphasizes the 
role of subjective initiative in understanding the world, and maintains that language is 
the outcome of subjective and objective interaction. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 90) 
have expressed the idea of embodied organism-environment interaction – at the core 
of embodied cognition is our physical engagement with an environment in an ongoing 
series of interactions. Further, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 90) ‘here is a 
level of physical interaction in the world at which we have evolved to function very 
successfully, and an important part of our conceptual system is attuned to such 
functioning’. 
    Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 90) further discuss the relations between interaction and 
meaning: ‘Meaning comes, not just from “internal” structures of the organism (the 
“subject”), not solely from “external” inputs (the “objects”) but rather from recurring 
patterns of engagement between organism and environment’. Regarding the links 
among interaction, meaning and semantic representations, according to Langacker 
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(2008: 28) cognition is non-insular but rather grounded in perception and bodily 
experience. The skills and knowledge acquired are adjusted to the socio-cultural 
surroundings due to the fact that mental development is stimulated and guided by 
social interaction. In addition, the conceptualizations taking place in the brain are 
internal, but reach beyond the brain in that it conceptualizes certain facets of the 
world. Langacker points out that ‘the world includes both the real world and the 
mental world we construct, as well as the body and even our mental experience itself 
to the extent that we can reflect on it, as opposed to merely undergoing it’.    
de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) put forward a procedural approach to discourse 
understanding by interactive embodiment, emphasizing that the reader has to turn to 
his or her own experience to activate relevant knowledge and make inference and 
interpret his/her reading according to the context. The role of the reader’s experience 
in actively building the world of the text is crucial in procedural approaches 
(McCarthy 1991: 27). Based on his/her experience of the world and how states and 
events are characteristically manifested in the text, the reader has to activate relevant 
knowledge, constantly inferring and interpreting the current text in the light of the 
situation and the theme of the text. This is a mental coherence based process.  
 
4.1.2 Mental coherence 
 
Embodied cognitive linguistics maintains that discourse coherence can be explained 
plausibly from cognition. According to Givón (1990: 914) ‘the grammatical devices 
that code referential coherence under various discourse conditions can be interpreted 
as mental processing instructions’, implying that discourse coherence cannot be 
achieved by either cohesive devices or discourse structures but mainly by mental 
coherence or ‘the coherence in mental text’ (Givón 1995: 61).  
    As discussed in Section 2.2.1 de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 85, 88) assert that 
discourse generation and the apprehensive process should be explained by cognitive 
process and activation of relevant knowledge. McCarthy (1991: 27) also stresses 
‘making these cognitive links in the text’ on the grounds that  ‘if we take a text which 
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is cohesive in the sense described above, we can see that a lot more mental work has 
to go on for the reader to make it coherent’. Ungerer and Shmid (1996) see situation 
and context from a cognitive perspective rather than the functional perspective taken 
by Halliday and Hasan (reviewed in Section 2.1). Situation refers to some state of 
affairs in the real world or the embodied interaction between objects in the real world; 
context is defined as ‘the set of background assumptions that are necessary for an 
utterance to be intelligible’ (Ungerer and Shmid 1996: 45), and as a mental 
representation associated with related knowledge stored in long-term memory.  
Situation and context are indispensible in an Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM).  As 
the introduction of this chapter explains, cognitive models comprise a variety of 
situations and contexts and are designed for categorization and conceptualization, and 
the relevant cognitive models will constitute an abstract, unified and idealized model 
of understanding knowledge relevant to a certain field, on the basis of the embodied 
experience and structure. Applying these concepts, Ungerer and Schmid have 
provided a sample case to illustrate how mental coherence is achieved via an ICM 
(1996: 48-49). The sentence which they used is as follows:    
 
The boy was building a sandcastle with his bucket and his spade. 
 
In this sentence the situation consists of four objects: a boy, sandcastle, a bucket and 
spade, and the four objects are linked, interacting through the activities of the boy. 
When the recipient processes this example sentence, s/he will evoke the 
corresponding cognitive categories through the words, and activate the mental 
conceptual links of the objects in the real world. In addition, the recipient forms 
cognitive representations of the interaction between the concepts; this is how the 
context is set up; building a sandcastle can be characterized as the context for the 
example sentence.  
    Each situation, context or its cognitive representation is not an isolated mental 
experience, but involves related bodily experience and knowledge stored in long-term 
memory. The recipient has access to context-specific knowledge about the relevant 
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categories. For instance, the recipient will turn to the cognitive selection from bucket 
to plastic bucket as the most typical member of the context and from spade to 
children’s spade as the most conventional member of the context-dependent category 
spade and so on. Meanwhile, the recipient will activate the immediate context from 
long-term memories via experiences about other aspects of sand and sand-castles, 
therefore, more concepts such as water, hands, shells, turret or moat and relevant 
corresponding interactions like digging sand and shaping turrets will also be activated 
for such related contexts. 
In terms of a variety of phenomena, the recipient, through daily life experiences, 
has stored a large number of interrelated contexts. Cognitive categories involve not 
only the current context, in which they are immersed but also this whole bundle of 
contexts that are relevant to it, which is referred to as gestalt. In this way mental 
coherence is achieved via cognitive models.  
According to Ungerer and Schmid (1996) cognitive models are open-ended. The 
context, building a sand-castle, can be set in the cognitive model on the beach and 
further extended into more contexts which are relevant and selective, as Figure 6 
indicates. According to Ungerer and Schmid, cognitive models are interrelated. Figure 
6 illustrates how the categories people, sea, sand and others thread through various 
contexts, which are put into the model - On the Beach: 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Schematic illustration of the cognitive model on the beach (Ungerer and Schmid 
1996:48. Fig. 1.14) 
The stored cognitive representations of people, sea and sand on this occasion are 
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closely related to the model On the Beach. Figure 7 below shows a network, where 
various cognitive models are linked through multiple connections:  
 
 
Figure 7 Exemplary network of the cognitive model (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 49. Fig. 1.15) 
 
According to Ungerer and Schmid, cognitive models are omnipresent. When meeting 
with a completely strange object, situation or new knowledge, we will call up our 
similar experiences as a cognitive model for making sense and building coherence. 
For example, the teacher of chemistry normally explains to his pupils the orbit model 
of the atom consisting of nucleus and electrons, by comparing the arrangement of 
nucleus and electrons with the interaction between the sun and the planets. 
    An ICM applies to an understanding of scientific knowledge.  According to Lakoff 
(1987: 297-299), scientific theories are coherent with our basic-level perceptions; 
making sense of scientific knowledge largely depends on the technological extension 
of basic level conceptions. In other words, much of our technology is designed to 
expand basic level experience, such as telescope, microscope, photography, and 
television, which all extend basic-level perception in the visual domain. When 
scientific knowledge becomes part of our knowledge, it is like ‘ordinary knowledge’ 
(Lakoff 1987: 299). Scientific knowledge is also based on a basic-level understanding 
of experience. This cognitive process for comprehension of science and technology is 
open-ended, interrelated and omnipresent as discussed above. This point of view 
provides a more cognitive focus on how to understand scientific and technological 
matters to complement the view of the Interpretive Theory of translation (IT) (Section 
3.2).   
    At this point, it is necessary to pick up the questions on the definition of knowledge, 
raised by Lakoff (1987: 297), and discussed in Section 3.5: ‘What does it mean to 
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know something and how is knowledge possible?’ Simply speaking, ‘we get our basic 
knowledge of our immediate physical environments, from our basic-level interactions 
with the environment, through perceiving, touching, and manipulating’; the things we 
know best are ‘those that can be closely related to our basic-level experience’ (Lakoff, 
1987: 297). This is the concept of knowledge, defined from the Experientialism 
perspective, different from any of the Objectivist theories reviewed in previous 
chapters.    
To sum up, cognitive models are put together into an ICM, which gives rise to an 
abstract, unified and idealized understanding of the world, including science and 
technology, and discourse coherence. Therefore, in the process of understanding 
discourse, we will access embodied experience, the ICM and background knowledge 
for global coherence, which further determines the local coherence. The following 
section will give an account in detail of the constituents of the ICM.  
 
4.2 The constituents of an ICM  
 
The ICM is constructed on the basis of the four cognitive models (Lakoff, 1987: 68, 
113, Wang 2006: 206) as Figure 4 above indicates: the propositional model, the image 
schematic model, the metaphoric model, and the metonymic model. The propositional 
model is objective in relation to the contents derived from embodied interaction with 
the environments and the other three are subjective in relation to their imaginative 
capacities for an abstract and unified understanding. The first two models are 
designed to explain the contents and foundation of the ICM while the latter two 
models are used as extensions of the ICM. All four models provide the orientation for 
this study.  
 
4.2.1 The propositional model  
 
The propositional model is the most fundamental among the four cognitive models 
and is developed on the basis of Minsky (1974) and Fillmore (1975, 1982, and 1985) 
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and the script theory of Schank and Abelson (1975), who all give an account of the 
propositional structure of the coherence of basic-level concepts (reviewed in Section 
2.2.2). According to Lakoff (1987: 285) much of our knowledge structure is stored in 
the form of propositional models. The propositional model is defined as the actual 
mappings or projections of the external world; in this process, imagination is not 
needed to specify elements, the properties, and the relations holding among the world 
affairs. In other words, the propositional model has the same structure as the 
properties of the elements and the relations linking the elements.  
The elements in the cognitive network may be either basic-level concepts – entities, 
actions, states, properties, etc. or they may be abstract concepts, indirectly grounded 
in bodily experience and characterized by cognitive models of other types. 
 
4.2.2 The image schematic model 
 
The image schema is formed via interactive embodiment with the objective world, by 
sensation, perception and image. Sensation and perception are based on the immediate 
on-line elements and properties. Image is the impression made in the mind without the 
presence of objective elements, in other words, the image of the elements and 
properties can be called up through imagination without any presence of the actual 
things. The mental process develops from image to schema. The schema refers to the 
conventional and cognitive structure processed and organized on the basis of 
experience and information, stored in long-term memory.  
    According to Lakoff and Johnson (1987: xix) the image schema is the conventional 
recurring pattern projected through embodied interaction with the objective reality 
and the image schema primarily has an abstract function. As the term suggests, image 
schema contains both image and schema. On one hand, image suggests dynamic, 
specific, and embodied mental representations (Fillmore, 1975: 123; Croft and Cruse, 
2004: 44; Wang 2006: 175), on the other hand, schema suggests that it is not limited 
to a specific experience or activity and is focused on generalization, abstractness and 
convention of the image; it is not associated with the context and it is not conscious. 
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Therefore, the image schema helps to construe our bodily experience by analogy and 
also non-bodily experience by metaphor, and also by indefinite cognitive models, 
categories, concepts, meaning and mental coherence (Lakoff, 1987: 453, Wang 2006: 
175). The propositional model and the image schematic model are primary models for 
the rest.    
According to Lakoff (1987: 267) image schemas are relatively simple structures 
that constantly recur in our everyday bodily experience, giving coherence to our 
experience and discourse as well. Image schemas function primarily as abstract 
structures of images. According to Johnson (1987: xix) ‘Human bodily movement, 
manipulation of objects, and perceptual interactions involve recurring patterns without 
which our experience would be chaotic and incomprehensible’. There are a range of 
properties of the schema (Lakoff 1987), but the most basic five are reviewed here as 
follows (Lakoff 1987: 272-275): 
 
(1) The container schema: throughout our lives, we experience things both as 
containers and as things in containers. The internal structure of a container is 
inherently arranged in a way to generate a basic logic: everything is either inside 
or outside a container. The container has structural elements, such as exterior, 
interior, boundary, hierarchical and graded.  
(2) The part-whole schema: throughout our lives, we experience things as wholes with 
parts. In order to get around in the world, the basic-level perception has evolved 
so as to tell apart the fundamental part-whole structure. This gives rise to 
structural elements: a whole, parts, and a configuration.  
(3) The link schema: through bodily experience, things as string, rope, or any other 
means of connections are used to secure locations or two things related to one 
another. This leads to structural elements: two entities, A and B, and a link 
connecting them.  
(4) The centre-periphery schema: the centres are more important than the peripheries, 
for instance, the heart versus hair, the root of a tree versus its trunk, showing the 
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relations of structural elements in terms of an entity, a centre, and a periphery. 
(5) The source-path-goal schema: throughout our lives, we experience departure 
places to start from, places to wind up at, sequences of next locations linking the 
starting to end points, and a direction. The term destination is used as opposed 
to goal when a specifically spatial end point is determined. This gives rise to the 
structural elements of a source (starting point), a destination (end point), a path 
(a sequence of adjoining locations linking the source and the destination), and a 
direction (toward the destination).  
 
According to Lakoff (1987), image schemas provide particularly important support 
for the assumption that abstract reason is a matter of two things: a) reason based on 
bodily experience, and b) metaphorical projections from the concrete to abstract 
domains. The image schema theory is designed in such a way to explain not only how 
we perceive and organize the world cognitively but also how we establish discourse 
coherence and grammatical structure as well.  
 
4.2.3 The metaphoric model  
 
The metaphoric model involves mappings from a propositional or image-schematic 
model in one domain to a corresponding structure in another domain. This model is 
used for conceptualization, inference and understanding for a wider ranger of events, 
especially abstract concepts.     
    According to embodied cognitive linguistics, metaphors are conceptual, not 
linguistic. A metaphoric mapping involves a source domain and a target domain. The 
source domain is assumed to be structured by a propositional or image-schematic 
model. The mapping is typically partial; it maps the structure of an entity in the source 
domain onto a corresponding structure in the target domain. The metaphoric model 
serves as an inferential mechanism. Rather than one part of rhetoric, metaphor is 
fundamentally a cognitive process. It plays an important role in shaping categorization, 
conception, and inferencing. Metaphor is viewed as a cognitive tool and outcome; it is 
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not confined to the concept of similar comparison between two entities. According to 
Langacker (2008: 98) the term entity is defined as anything, including ideas and 
concepts, relations, quantities, sensations, changes, locations, dimensions, and so on. 
In metaphoric processing, a conceptual domain is mapped and projected into another 
conceptual domain by cognitive entities through inferencing, and different entities are 
linked to each other to access an understanding of the world and knowledge in 
question. In this way sense is made and coherence is established.  
    Metaphors are what we live by (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), and ubiquitous in 
science (Boyd 1993; Ungerer and Schmid 2001: 147). Metaphors have primarily been 
introduced not only for explanatory but also for constitutive purposes. With respect to 
the former, this appears true of most metaphors used in computer science. For 
instance, many user-friendly programs provide a surface screen which establishes a 
metaphorical link with the category of office. The screen is a desktop that can be 
tidied up; there are folders to file items, a clipboard for items to be temporarily stored, 
windows to be opened and closed, and trash bins into which unnecessary items are 
dropped. With respect to the latter, constitutive purpose, according to Kuhn (1993: 
538), there are fields of natural science where metaphors seem constitutive not just for 
popular or explanatory, but also for scientific models. As the example shows in 
Section 4.1.2, by virtue of the metaphor, the orbit model of the atom, consisting of 
nucleus and electrons, can be naturally explained by comparing the arrangement of 
nucleus and electrons with the interaction between the sun and the planets; the atom is 
a miniature solar system. The explanatory function of metaphors and their constitutive 
function in scientific theories are evident. 
 
4.2.4 The metonymic model 
 
According to Lakoff (1987: 41, 288) the metonymic model means that the part which 
is easy to perceive in the same cognitive domain is used to understand the whole or 
another part. For instance, a typical member in a category is used to explain the whole 
category. A metonymic mapping occurs within a single conceptual domain, which is 
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structured by an ICM. Given two elements, A and B, in the ICM, A may stand for B. 
The stand-for relation is represented structurally by a source-path-goal schema. If B is 
a category and A is member, or subcategory of B, the result is a metonymic category 
structure, i.e., A is a best example in the cognitive status, and referred to as 
metonymic prototype (for example, Shakespeare stands for literature). This 
metonymic model is not only comparable with discourse analysis in terms of the 
concept of inheritance and economy (de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981: 90-91, 
discussed in section 1.2.1) but also provides a framework for the two concepts.  
    At this point, a question is arising from the account of ICM constitutes: how does 
the propositional structure change into a non-propositional one to generate meaning 
and make sense? The answer is explained through the concepts of direct 
understanding, indirect understanding and compulsive force, according to Johnson 
(1987) and Lakoff (1987).   
 
4.2.5 Direct understanding and indirect understanding  
 
Johnson (1987: 2-4) gives an account of this by ‘compulsive force’ schema (1987: 2), 
which ‘exists as a continuous, analog pattern of, or in, a particular experience or 
cognition’ (1987: 3-4). He compares this compulsive force to the perception of a jet 
aeroplane being forced down the runway, and further to the understanding of forces 
acting on continental plates, and furthest, abstractly or metaphorically to the felt sense 
of being forced by peer pressure in competition. Johnson provides the figure as below 
to show his point:  
 
 
Figure 8 Compulsive force (Johnson 1987: 2. Fig.1) 
 
Figure 8 shows that meaning and understanding, concepts and propositions come 
from bodily experience (the solid arrow), and are processed through image schema 
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(bracket), and changed into abstract concepts through metaphorical and metonymic 
processing. Therefore, the cognitive processing has bodily experience as a compulsive 
force vector which leads to ‘a more abstract pattern that can be manifested in rich 
images, perceptions, and events’ (Johnson 1987: 2).  
Lakoff (1987: 292-294) uses direct understanding and indirect understanding to 
describe this understanding process. Direct understanding requires characterizations 
of directly understood sentences and directly understood situations; the kinds of 
information experienced bodily and directly are more understood than those less and 
least experienced on the ground that some aspects of cognition are more prominent 
and salient than others: 
 
- A sentence is directly understood if the concepts associated with it are directly meaningful.  
- Aspects of particular situation are directly experienced if they play a causal role in the 
experience. For instance, one could not directly experience everything in the room s/he is 
sitting in: the chair is put together by glue; s/he directly experiences the chair but not the 
glue. The chair plays a causal role in his/her experience. The glue’s causal role involves 
the chair, but not his/her direct experience of the chair. It also shows that some aspects of 
cognition are more prominent and salient than others.   
- An aspect of a directly experienced situation is directly understood if it is pre-conceptually 
structured.   
 
Lakoff (1987: 294) concludes that the direct understanding of the sentence accords 
with the direct understanding of the situation via basic perceptions. However, 
sentences and situations are not all understood directly. Indirect understanding of 
sentences and situations is more difficult and needs more explanation. Metaphors are 
used to understand abstract thoughts and knowledge, but more research is needed to 
give a full account of how we understand situations indirectly  
In summary, the propositional, image schematic, metaphorical and metonymical 
models are used to analyze how information is processed so as to make sense, and 
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build up coherence.  A further question is arising from this stage: what properties does 
an ICM have in processing a chunk of discourse so as to build up coherence? And 
further what underlies these properties?   
 
 
4.2.6 Five properties of an ICM  
 
The ICM is the cognitive process of categorizing information, characterized by five 
properties, respectively (1) idealization, (see Section 4.1), (2) fuzziness, (3) gestalt, (4) 
hierarchy, and (5) gradience. The five properties of an ICM are reflected in processing 
the structure of texts.    
Fuzziness: the cognitive boundaries of neighboring categories are not separated by 
rigid boundaries, but merge into each other (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 19); in the 
case of a graded category, concepts of different categories merge into each other 
(Lakoff 1987: 454). The cognitive model is idealized in that the basic level categories 
have fuzzy boundaries centred on their best examples – prototypes. According to the 
ICM theory the discrete and homogeneous categories can be established by an act of 
definition, classifying things or concepts according to their established natural 
relationship, i.e. taxonomies. According to Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 83) even if 
ordinary taxonomies are inconsistent, they can be set up by an act of definition, by 
consciously selecting one or several attributes which are established as salient.         
Gestalt: according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987: 489-490), 
categorization has two stages: perceiving an object or event as a whole is the first step, 
and decomposing the perceived whole into individual properties or attributes is a 
second step. Such a gestalt can be represented by an ICM. The ICM is understood as 
being psychologically simpler and more entire than its parts, hence the term gestalt. 
Hierarchy: the cognitive categorization of the knowledge of the world is divided into 
up-down classes (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 61). According to Langacker (2008: 207) 
‘Constituency is observed in symbolic assemblies when a composite structure at one 
level of organization functions in turn as component structure with respect to a higher 
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level’. There is hierarchical organization in every area of human cognitive functioning, 
in perceptual grouping, in the apprehension of whole-part hierarchies, including the 
mental analysis of discourse.   
Gradience: Most cognitive categories are matters of degree, with graded concepts 
characterizing degrees along some scale with different layers in structure. The 
cognitive model characterizing a concept contains a scale (Lakoff, 1987). 
At this point, following questions arise: how does the ICM work in cognitive 
processing to help to establish coherence? How is the structure of an entity in the 
source domain mapped onto a corresponding structure in the target domain for 
making sense? The answer is Mental Space Blending theory.  
 
4. 3 The ICM in cognition:  Mental Space Blending Theory 
 
The Mental Space Blending theory (Fauconnier 1985, 1994; Fauconnier and Turner 
2002) is used to explain discourse construal and coherence. Fauconnier put forward 
Mental Space theory in 1985, aiming to find out how utterances activate the semantic 
frames, how representations and the reality-based knowledge space is related, how 
language is connected in different spaces, and how knowledge floats in the different 
spaces. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) developed the Mental Space theory into Mental 
Space Blending theory or Blended Space Theory. The Mental Space Blending theory 
sees language as a series of complicated cognitive processing triggers, which gives 
rise to generation of meanings and coherence. This theory explores the way cognition 
works in processing information in communication. Figure 9 below shows that the 
Blended Space theory postulates four spaces: two input spaces, one generic space, and 
one blended space. The cognitive entities process the selected pieces of information 
from the two input spaces and these are matched in generic space and projected into 
blended space. The generic space contains all shared frame structures to ensure the 
mappings or projections needed to process without any effort. The blended space 
accesses the corresponding links with those from the two input spaces and further 
integrates the relevant events into a more complicated and unified structure:  
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Figure 9 Mental Space Blending (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 7. Fig.3)   
 
The blended space is the platform where the internally linked spaces are organized 
and developed. Inside blended space is the emergent structure, from which can be 
produced new information and meanings, and emerging knowledge, which is not 
available in the previous input spaces. The four mental spaces are linked to each other 
through a series of mappings and projections, and further constitute a Conceptual 
Integration Network (CIN). Language is the outcome of concept blending. For 
instance, to make sense of the notion of electric current, the embodied knowledge on 
water flow in the pipe, stored in the source space (input 1), is projected into the target 
space (input 2), where the non-embodied concept of electric current is contained. The 
shared elements between the two concepts are linked in the generic space, and a 
derived understanding of the term, electric current, is attained in blending their 
comparable features.   
The Mental Space Blending theory is designed to construe mental processing 
spaces for understanding. The mental spaces of inputs 1 and 2 can also be used to 
represent communicators, who apply their ICM – assumptions about the given context 
in the generic space, and process the current information in the blended space. The 
ICM consisting of contexts and pragmatic elements, such as roles, motivations, 
purposes, attitudes, and relations of participants in the generic space, are all involved 
to generate sentences and utterances with the proper concepts and meaning in the 
blended space. I argue that the blended space plays a role of reactor in the chemical-
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change-like cognitive process. The raw material (interactive embodiment) and semi-
raw material (image schema) are initially stored in the generic space, and the local 
coherence elements, concepts and propositions are reacted via inferencing in the 
blending reactor of the whole plant, and finally conveyed into the output. For this 
viewpoint, an exemplary case is provided in Section 7.1, Figure 23. 
 At this point, this study uses the Immersed Experiencer Frame (IEF, Zwaan 2004, 
2005) to explain further how the blending space functions to achieve discourse 
coherence.   
 
4.4 The ICM in discourse: Immersed Experiencer Frame (IEF)  
 
Zwaan (2000, 2004, and 2005) has built up the Immersed Experiencer Frame (IEF) 
model for language comprehension and coherence. IEF is based on embodied 
cognitive linguistics, and centres on interactive embodiment to comprehend the 
process of discourse construction. According to IEF, in order to establish coherence 
the situational representations are simulated, renewed and retrieved in a continuous 
cyclical way, in processing the text. IEF sees apprehension of language input as 
indexing clues and representations of bodily experience via meshing and sequence 
tracing. Meshing means the process of associating words and phrases in terms of the 
potentially interactive relations between the body and the objective matters to 
constitute a coherent action model. For instance, the word chair suggests its purpose 
of a seat on which one sits. To the comprehender, language is a set of clues to help to 
simulate what is experienced in the sense of context. The comprehender is an 
immersed experiencer.  
IEF separates the comprehension process into three basic elements: activation, 
construal and integration. The three elements correspond to linguistic categories in 
three processing units: (1) language processing unit, (2) representation unit and (3) 
reference unit. This is illustrated in Table 1: 
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Table 1 The three elements corresponding to the language in three units 
              3 elements  
3 units       
Activation  Construal  Integration  
Language processing  Word/phoneme Clauses /Intonation   Discourse  
Representation  Functional web Meshing net Sequencing  web  
Reference Object and action  Events Events sequence  
 
According to Zwaan (2004, 2005) the processing of the three elements does not take 
place sequentially but in parallel, to a large extent; however, given the purpose of 
operational research, cognitive processing is divided into the three stages as Table 1 
shows.  
    The following section will move on to the way the three elements correspond to 
three units of a language and particularly how coherence is established. 
 
4.4.1 Activation  
 
Input words will activate the functional web. In other words, this functional web is 
activated when the words are associated with the referents. The functional web 
spreads through the whole cerebral cortex, accessing the preliminary sensory zone. 
Therefore, the initial activation is dispersive and the activated functional web is multi-
overlapping, in other words, the word will not only activate its own experience (for 
instance, the word, chair suggests its purpose for seat in sense of audio-visual 
experience) but also any relevant experience of the referent (for instance, the chair is 
used as a weapon to beat someone, involving the audio-visual and touch experience). 
In short, language input activates the traces and reconstructs the experience model.  
 
4.4.2 Construal  
 
Construal is the multi-functional web meshing process for the psychological 
simulation of a specific event. The grammatical unit in the construal operation 
involves the intonation. Zwaan sees language comprehension as attention adjustment 
for the events in question. In the construal, the representations of events are generated 
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through the initial activation of functional web. Construal is an immediate and 
compounding process.  
Every construal comprises a time frame and a space frame for processing in the 
brain. In the time frame is a perspective. Normally perspective means the perception 
of the protagonist. Every construal also includes focal entity and relational 
background entity, and the entities might have explicit features. Therefore, entities, 
time, space, perspective, and features constitute the elements of construal.  
 
4.4.3 Integration  
 
Once a representation of an event is construed, the mental process moves on to the 
next one. The previous relevant construed element will be turned into a part of 
working memory, and affect the current construal along with the functional web 
activated by the current words. Integration means transfer from one construal to 
another. IEF assumes that the transfers are based on bodily experience. 
     Zwaan draws on Langacker‘s attention frames (Section 4.7.3) for language 
comprehension and coherence, and views language as attention control for what is 
described of the event. Therefore the match between language and experience, the 
prospective and retrospective degree of matching, prediction and coherence indexing 
clues on the basis of the ICM will all affect the integration from the beginning to the 
end.  
    Zwaan speculates that input words would activate the functional web based on the 
communicator’s bodily experience. His Immersed Experiencer Framework (IEF) 
shows a speculative but plausible scenario for mental processing in language 
comprehension, to illustrate a possible mechanism for this theory. This research will 
provide some supporting evidence, by using his IEF for the experimental framework.   
At this point, I review the theory of the cognitive world theory proposed by Wang 
(2006), on the grounds that this theory attempts to make the ICM more complete in 
analyzing discourse coherence.   
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4.4.4 The ICM+ Background knowledge = Cognitive World  
 
On the basis of Lakoff (1987, 1989, and 1999), Wang puts forward his Cognitive 
World theory to present a complete picture for discourse coherence, which is 
separated into the following two parts (2006: 360-361): 
 
(1) The Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM). The ICM is bodily experience based, which leads 
to an understanding of discourse coherence in that discourse coherence primarily depends 
on embodied perception and recognition of the reality. Knowledge contained in an ICM is 
conventional and prototypical, setting up a framework for discourse coherence.      
(2) Background knowledge: this refers to unconventional and specific knowledge, not 
necessarily universal or representative, either mutually shared knowledgeable or acquired 
through the on-line and immediate communication, changeable and dynamic in a specific 
context to compensate and confirm, or adjust, modify and even change both the 
communicators’ assumed knowledge and the course of the current communication.  
 
The Cognitive World theory attempts to explain discourse coherence on the basis of 
the conventional (ICM) and background knowledge. Wang refers his Cognitive World 
to general knowledge, acquired via interactive embodiment, internalized and stored in 
mind and background knowledge, either shared or accessed from the current discourse. 
According to Wang (2006: 360) this Cognitive World theory is consistent and 
plausible and it is the pre-requisite for discourse coherence. When the information in 
question is activated in the mind, a consistent and plausible cognitive world is recalled 
correspondingly via both the ICM and background knowledge so as to make sense of 
the discourse and establish coherence.  
    In a communication, coherence depends primarily on the access to the Cognitive 
World: ICM + background knowledge. Conventionalized phenomena and prominent 
information will stand more chance of being activated, becoming topics, and also will 
narrow the scope of concepts to be activated. In other words, concepts which might be 
activated are on different levels in terms of salience: the concepts at frontier and 
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remote levels are less likely to be activated than those at a prominent level. In addition, 
communication has complex scenarios due to the fact that it is changing all the time, 
not always predictable, so the background knowledge is used for the unexpected 
discourse.  
Wang’s Cognitive World theory echoes the findings on the analysis of discourse 
flow (Bartlett 1932; Chafe 1986): the discourse navigation process is often guided by 
a schema, some familiar pattern that provides a path for a speaker to follow. It may 
also be driven, alternatively or simultaneously, by the less predictable interaction 
between conversational participants (Chafe 1994: 120-36). 
 At this point, the descriptions of the ICM above point to the question: exactly how 
does the ICM play its role in achieving coherence in discourse?   
 
4.5 The role of the ICM in achieving coherence  
 
Three roles of the ICM are summarized: 1) activating the cognitive world to fill in the 
missing links, 2) mapping iconicity, and 3) achieving local coherence.   
 
4.5.1 Activating the cognitive world to fill in the missing links  
 
Knowing more than one is told is a characteristic of human communication (Lindsay 
1963: 219). When looking at an object, we cannot see its back surface, but we can use 
our ICM to guess what it is like and we are sure of our guesswork. This phenomenon 
is referred to as default values. In other words, default values are ‘values for a slot that 
are used if no specific contextual information is supplied’ (Lakoff 1987; 116), (for 
instance, frames and scripts are equipped with default values, reviewed in Section 
2.2.2). Communicators cannot normally deliver their ideas as fully as it is, they will 
have to make selection out of the whole information and express it mostly in verbal 
form. In other words, the listener turns to his cognitive world to access relevant 
information by activating some elements of the utterances, and further understand the 
whole discourse. The default values also show the feature of metonymy/economy in 
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communication (Section 2.2.1), in that utterances connote more information than the 
literal meaning and default values help the listener to construct cognitive models for 
understanding discourse and access various coherence clues. 
Discourse coherence relies on the cognitive world – the ICM and background 
knowledge. For instance, when a certain word activates a certain frame and script, the 
relevant information is retrieved to supply the default values to access the whole 
discourse meaning. As discussed above, the amount of information expressed by 
language is less than that required of communication; communicators put linguistic 
forms into a given cognitive world for mental processing and compensate for what is 
lost out of the default information through activation of the cognitive world to 
maintain introspective and retrospective bridging for coherence.  
According to Wang (2006), although apparently irrelevant on the surface, some 
utterances are linked mentally to form an integral semantic whole. In other words, the 
utterances have different degree of omission in communication due to the principle of 
language metonym and economy. Take Widdowson’s case (1979: 96) for an instance: 
 
     A: Can you go to Edinburgh tomorrow? 
     B: B.E.A. pilots are on strike.  
 
The two utterances are linked by activation of an ICM as Figure 10 shows below:  
 
 
Figure 10 Activating the cognitive world and filling in missing links (Widdowson 1979; 96. Fig 1)   
 
The verb go uttered by Speaker A might activate an ICM, relevant to go: either on 
foot or by transport vehicles, such as coach, train or airplane. The word pilots uttered 
by Speaker B might activate an ICM of flight. Between go to and pilots are two small 
circles, indicating the default values to achieve links, that is, transport and aeroplane, 
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the two utterances are connected by mental coherence. According to Widdowson, 
Speaker A will get at the meaning of Speaker B through inferencing: a) Pilots are on 
strike and aeroplanes stop taking off, and/or b) aeroplanes stop taking off, B could not 
go to Edinburgh tomorrow. In terms of default values in neighbouring utterances, 
more default values mean more mental effort. In this case, coherence is affected 
negatively, giving rise to incoherent or unintelligible utterances. According to Wang 
(2006: 367), theoretically any word in a clause may activate any information relevant 
to the cognitive world and turn out to be a starting point for the following utterances 
to achieve discourse coherence. Due to the fact that communication is restricted to the 
existing ICM in the communicator’s mind, and social, cultural and experiential 
contexts and situations, some items of information are more prominent and salient, 
and tend to be more easily activated than others. Based on the notion of 
salient/prominent information, this study classifies different levels of concepts in the 
source text into sections including embodied, semi-embodied and non-embodied 
knowledge. Further, within each section, concepts in Subsection A are assumed to be 
more salient than those in Subsection B (see Section 5.2). This role of activating the 
cognitive world can be further explained by the iconicity theory.    
 
4.5.2 Mapping iconicity  
 
The ICM gives rises to iconicity: similarities between the structure of language and 
the structure of the world (Ungerer and Schmid 2001: 251). Iconicity plays the role of 
reference for both the objective world and language structures, including world 
structure, conceptual structure and embodied experiential structure. According to 
Wang (2006: 544-562), when a kind of mapping similarity between objective 
externals and mental internals is matched, the discourse coherence will emerge 
automatically in the chunk of discourse or a group of sentences; this is iconicity. 
According to Sperber and Wilson (1986), iconicity helps communicators to access the 
desired maximum relevance in the current utterances, serving the requirement of 
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cognition processing: ‘the greater the processing effort, the lower the relevance’ and 
vice versa (1986: 124). Sperber and Wilson (2001: F32) argue that coherence mostly 
depends on relevance; only relevant utterances can be coherent. This is further 
discussed in Section 8.6.6.   
    The cognitive process is imprinted in natural language forms and structures the 
former (cognition) is reflected in the latter (language) like the trees reflected in the 
pond nearby, but the reflective process is more active and more kinetic rather than 
passive and static. Iconicity, from an embodied cognitive linguistics perspective, 
stresses that language forms are outcomes of a variety of external and internal 
integrations of embodiment, cognition, semantics and pragmatics; ‘as a primary 
instrument of thought and communication, language is grounded in both cognition 
and social interaction’ (Langacker 2001: 261). Sperber and Wilson (1986: 227) have 
made these thought-provoking remarks on iconicity: ‘in appropriate conditions, any 
natural or artificial phenomenon in the world can be used as a representation of some 
other phenomenon which it resembles in some respects’. On the basis of  this, they 
have concluded that ‘Utterances can be used as representations in another way, too: 
not in virtue of resembling some phenomenon, but in virtue of having a propositional 
form which is true of some actual or conceivable state of affairs’.  
Regarding the research into iconicity, this study will focus on iconic sequencing 
similarity between language sequence and the thinking process. Several previous 
experiments on sequencing iconicity have been carried out. For instance, Clark and 
Clark (1968), from their experiment, concluded that information, organized according 
to natural language sequence, is easier to remember. The data of Smith and Mclin 
(1970) showed that subjects tend to analyze and store events according to the natural 
sequence. The principle of iconic sequencing is confirmed by the experimental data. 
Sentences, which are organized according to natural sequence or the storage process, 
are easier to retrieve relevant information from, in that it takes less cognitive process. 
On the other hand, when sentence sequences go against the natural action sequence, 
the sequential information will not be accessed straightforwardly from memory 
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because it has difficulty in converting the language sequence to a different time 
sequence, and it also requires more mental effort invested in time and inference. In 
addition, the unmatched sequences will give rise to errors or misunderstanding of 
action or event sequence.  
    In summary, this section has explained how the ICM-based cognitive framework 
helps to understand a stretch of discourse, in that the mental structures in the form of 
mappings or projections give rise to global coherence, and further to local coherence 
as reasoning and inferencing are brought into play in the context.  
 
4.5.3 Determining local coherence  
 
In order to explain how local coherence is achieved, two linguistic terms are discussed 
here: bridging reference and bridging inference. Bridging means connecting or 
reducing the distance between concepts. Bridging reference (Clark 1977) refers to the 
cognitive and pragmatic process in determining the referents or antecedents through 
inferencing. Bridging inference is the process to associate the referents or antecedents 
for pragmatic interpretation. Examples are cited for the two terms (He and Ran 2006: 
490):  
 
I went into the room. The window was open.  
 
We can understand these two sentences by bridging reference: the narrator entered 
into the room, that room’s window (referent) was open. In this way, the concepts in 
the two clauses are linked by expending a little mental effort. Another example is 
taken for bridging inference (He and Ran 2006: 488): 
 
I met a man yesterday. The nasty fellow stole all my money.  
 
There are no syntactic or semantic links between a man and the nasty fellow; their 
association is built through inferencing the particular context, investing a little more 
mental effort than the case above. Coherence building is proportional to cognitive 
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distance: the closer the cognitive distance in bridging the concepts in pairing 
utterances, the shorter the time to trace the propositional references.   
 
4.6 ICM-based methodology  
 
So far, this research has provided the ICM theory relevant to coherence from a top-
down approach, i.e. comprehension of the topic from the larger units of relevant 
general description – from a global to local perspective. The following sections will 
deal with the method for discourse coherence, from a bottom-up perspective, to show 
how the coherence is realized, or rather materialized in the discourse. Bottom-up 
processing means employment of smaller units to fit in the frame of larger units, i.e. 
from local to global. There are three ICM-based methods, derived from Langacker’s 
cognitive grammar (2008), including (1) Cognitive Reference Point (CRP), (2) 
Trajector-Landmark, (3) Current Discourse Space (CDS), all of which are used as 
tools for tracking coherence clues in data  (Section 5.6). 
 
 
4.6.1 Cognitive Reference Point (CRP)  
 
According to the centre-periphery schema explained in Section 4.2.2, our bodily 
experience tells us to locate the control centres not only in daily life but also in 
discourse. According to Langacker (2008: 64), the Reference Point Principle is a 
fundamental cognitive ability, universally existent in life experience all the time. The 
world is conceived as being populated by countless objects of diverse characteristics. 
Langacker takes salience of stars in the night-time sky as illustration: some stars are 
immediately apparent to the viewer, while others become apparent only if special 
efforts are made for this purpose. That is, if the viewer knows that a non-salient object 
lies near a salient one, he can find it by directing his attention to the latter and 
searching in its vicinity. This common sense can be used for Reference Point 
Principle as Figure 11 shows below:  
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Figure 11 Reference point relations (C: conceptualizer.  R:  reference point. D: domain T: target. 
Langacker 2008: 64. Fig. 3.14.) 
 
In the cognitive world are numerous mental entities and concepts, where once one 
concept in the cognitive world is determined a corresponding domain is laid out. 
According to Langacker (2001: 21), to establish a mental contact (dotted lines in the 
diagram above), a cognitive reference point (CRP) is initially located, and further the 
domain is narrowed to access a concept (target). In linguistic terms, normally once a 
descriptive scope is determined, the cognition processing moves to the contents inside. 
This theory is applied to analyze coherence in discourse. In terms of a chunk of 
discourse, a theme is determined as a reference point, serving as a central control. A 
discourse or a chunk of utterances, either spoken or written, will focus on one or more 
than one theme to achieve the central role.    
 
4.6.2 Trajector and landmark 
 
In addition to the centre-periphery schema, the source-path-goal schema and the link 
schema (explained in Section 4.2.2) give rise to the trajector and landmark. Cognitive 
reference point (CRP) is further reduced into trajector (tr.) and landmark (lm.) to 
analyze individual utterances/clauses. According to Langacker (2008: 70), as we 
profile a relationship of participants, we start looking for the most prominent and 
salient ones. The most prominent participant is called the trajector (tr.), which is the 
entity construed as being located, evaluated, or described. It can be characterized as 
the primary focus within the profiled relationship. Often some other participant is 
made prominent as a secondary focus; this is called a landmark (lm.). For instance 
(Langacker 2008: 211): 
 
           a) Alice (tr) → admires Bill (lm);                         b) near (tr) the door (lm).  
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He concludes that expressions can have the same content, and profile the same 
relationship, but differ in meaning because they make different choices of trajectors 
and landmarks. In Figure 12 as below, trajectors and landmarks in clause and 
utterance (Langacker 2008) are illustrated. Figure 12a shows an utterance, in which 
point A represents a trajector (tr.), normally acting as the subject in the sentence for 
its primary focus and B, the landmark (lm.), as predicate for its secondary focus. 
Figure 12b and 12c represent a chunk of utterances where trajectors and landmarks 
are processed in a linear and constant form:  
   
 
Figure 12a  
 
                    Figure 12b                                                        Figure 12c 
Figure 12 Trajector and landmark in clause and utterance (Langacker 2008:72. Fig.3; 10) 
 
However, according to Langacker (2000: 331, 359; 2008: 68-69) an expression 
structure is a cognitive construal, mental focus or prominent concept rather than 
logical or grammatical elements that are involved in analyzing the discourse. In other 
words, mediating the shift in profiling a discourse is a cognitive domain by 
establishing some connections between and among the entities. During this cognitive 
processing, metonymy (Section 4.2.4) makes itself felt due to the fact that ‘A single 
expression is susceptible to any number of metonymic extensions, reflecting different 
associations’ (Langacker 2008: 69). Langacker uses this theory to analyze the 
individual utterances/clauses from a cognitive perspective and shed a cognitive light 
on the formalist sentence patterns.  
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In summary, cognitive reference point (CRP), trajector and landmark are used as 
coherence clues. The application of these concepts will be laid out in Chapter 5 and 
combined with current discourse space for analysis of discourse coherence  
 
 
4.6.3 Current Discourse Space (CDS)  
 
According to Langacker (2001; 2008) a discourse, consisting of series of utterances, 
developing in linear form, provides new information by completing and regenerating 
the ICM and supplementing background knowledge. The discourse semantic flow is 
in constant dynamic cognitive motion, which determines dynamic strategy for 
discourse analysis. Based on this concept, Langacker (2001) has put forward the 
concept of CDS for discourse analysis. A clause in actual discourse corresponds to a 
space in the mind; each mind space represents the scene and action, in which the 
recipient is involved on the special occasion. Accordingly, an actual discourse 
consists of continuous spaces, which clauses are fitted into. With actual discourse 
developing linearly, in a forward direction, mind spaces keep renewing as Figure 13 
shows below:  
 
 
Figure 13 A brief overview of CDS (Langacker 2001: 18. Fig.1)   
 
When the listener follows the Speaker’s output in linear form, he will find new 
information coming out and into the given information. According to Langacker, 
individual utterance corresponds to mind space and new information, with clause as 
unit, enters into the mind space for processing, so the visual space could be separated 
into three discourse frames according to time sequence as Figure 13 above shows: a 
minus frame, corresponding to input, in the middle CDS and being processed or 
renewed, is the focus frame, or zero frame; a third is called the plus frame. The focal 
information, once processed as discourse develops, will turn out to be given 
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information. With continuous utterances being renewed, the listener will follow the 
information from the minus frame to the current zero frame, via integration and store 
the complete information in memory. In the light of the cognition-based time 
experience, Langacker proposes the CDS flow process as a dynamic description of 
discourse coherence. A chain of trajectors and landmarks as a unit enter into the zero 
frames for processing, and once the process is finished, each will flow into the plus 
frame as given information and thus utterances in minus frame will follow into the 
current space, in an introspective and retrospective process.  
Langacker’s concept of Current Discourse Space (CDS) shares the view of 
conceptual activation of Chafe (1987/1994: 25) on discourse analysis. Chafe classifies 
his concept of conceptual activation into three forms: an active concept, a semi-active 
concept, an inactive concept. An active concept refers to the information in the focus, 
which is being processed. A semi-active concept refers to a concept between the 
activated and the inactivated status, stored on the brink of consciousness, which is 
available in the short-term memory. An inactive concept refers to a concept, which is 
out of focus and beyond the brink of consciousness, stored in the long-term memory. 
According to Chafe, when a discourse is generated, a given concept is chosen as the 
starting point in order to elicit the new and inactive information, which will enter into 
the focus to be activated. As the discourse develops, more information will enter into 
the active focus. However, due to the limitation of the capacity of memory storage, 
some of the given information will be reduced into semi-active status, and finally 
move out of the active status. The interpretation of discourse proceeds in this 
sequential order as an introspective and retrospective process.  
Up to this point, this chapter has provided a whole picture of the ICM. 
Philosophically and fundamentally, the ICM, derived from Embodied Cognition 
theory, emphasizes the interactive embodiment approach to mental coherence in 
analyzing discourse coherence. According to the ICM theory, our best understanding 
is the embodied concepts, i.e. the direct understanding while non-embodied concepts 
involve more mental effort for processing. Interactive embodiment is used as platform 
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for analyzing coherence of discourse. The distinction of the different layers of 
propositional concepts and non-propositional concepts, direct and indirect 
understanding, is used as guidance to classify the test material in terms of the textual 
structure. The ICM plays a crucial role in helping to achieve discourse coherence, 
activating the cognitive world and filling in missing links.  
 
4.7 Summary of the underlying theoretical framework of this research 
 
At this point, it is necessary to show how all the key elements of these models, 
theories or approaches, reviewed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 are related to one another, and 
fitted into the ICM-based theoretical framework. The puzzle for a reader might be that 
this theoretical framework is complex, involving several subject areas with diverse 
and apparently competing theories. Although this concern might be justified, the 
nature of interpreting studies requires an exploration by convergence, an 
interdisciplinary approach (Pöchhacker 2004; Munday 2006) inevitably making the 
research into interpreting more complex. Pöchhacker (2004: 197) points out that the 
study of interpreting is becoming increasingly convergent and researchers should be 
encouraged to forge interdisciplinary ties with other fields like cognitive psychology 
and neurophysiology, while maintaining a sense of identity for their own field.  The 
study of interpreting is a small and specialized field, at an early stage in its 
institutional development; growth is initially a matter of growing together rather than 
growing apart. The construction of an interdisciplinary methodology is not 
straightforward (Munday 2006: 189), in that a wide range of subject areas with 
different theories, models and approaches has to be applied to explain interpreting 
phenomena.   
Following the concern above, more specific confusions might arise: how is the 
origin of coherence, related to global and local coherence for an interpreter?  How are 
the cognitive and textual coherence linked with this methodology to be adopted?  
How does the interpreter control her EVS/synchronicity? In what ways do the 
techniques of SI benefit from the presence of the ICM? To summarize these issues, I 
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use a graphic representation, Figure 14 below, illustrating how this integrated model 
is formulated to explain how coherence is achieved in the embodied context: 
 
 
Figure 14 An integrated map of the theoretical framework  
 
An interpreter starts with her interaction with the reality – both physical and social 
environments in which she is engaged for her interpreting task. This existing direct, 
bodily experience helps her to access embodied concepts to the best of her 
understanding. This is where the origin of coherence takes place, and her bodily 
experience gives rise to mental structures of what is experienced – image-schema, in 
terms of frame and script. On the basis of her embodied experience, the interpreter 
will carry on to understand more relevant abstract or non-embodied concepts. This is 
where global coherence takes place when she is interpreting. The overall ecological 
structure of thought and knowledge determines the interpreter’s efficiency of 
cognitive processing through working memory, facilitating the interpreter in 
managing her EVS, anticipating the forthcoming information, making a final, 
appropriate choice of the message (judgment), using contextual or topical knowledge 
to summarize (compensating), and dividing attention  (coordinating ), as discussed in 
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Chapter 1. This is how local coherence takes place. The ICM provides a platform for 
functionalist linguistic theory (reviewed in Chapter 2), and the SI paradigm (reviewed 
in Chapter 3). Functional linguistics focuses on the textual structure, adopting notions 
of theme, rheme and thematic progression to study the coherence of a text; embodied 
cognitive linguistics provides a cognitive approach to analysis of a discourse, from a 
user’s perspective. The embodied methods of achieving coherence (CDS, CRP, 
trajector and landmark) are complementary to those described by functional 
linguistics. The SI paradigms have contributed some constructive work to coherence 
in SI, but their problem is that they have not got down to the core of the issue of 
understanding and coherence-building process: it is bodily experience that underlines 
cognition, and gives rise to coherence in text and discourse. (I will use text for 
analyzing coherence of written or oral material and discourse for coherence from the 
user’s perspective).     
    The immersed Experiencer Frame (IEF) has suggested the procedures for an 
interpreter to achieve discourse coherence – activation, construal and integration –
which will be used as the framework for the experimental procedures. The ICM-based 
concepts, CRP, CDS, trajector and landmark are used as makers to trace the 
coherence clues achieved by the interpreter. In terms of the text, tools based on 
functional linguistics, such as theme, rheme, and thematic progression, are used to 
analyze local coherence in the form of textual structure.  
 
4.8 Concluding remarks  
 
So far, all the elements discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 have been put into the ICM-
based framework, but a transitional, fundamental question occurs:  ‘how to make the 
ICM work for the purpose of empirical description and assessment of knowledge use 
in comprehension?’ (Pöchhacker 1992: 94; reviewed in Chapter 3).  In other words, 
how is the ICM, the interactive embodied approach to coherence, applied to SI? And 
how is the ICM used to analyze the interpreter’s mental effort? In the following 
chapter, I will combine theories relating to the ICM and SI to design the method.  
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Chapter 5 Method  
 
This study aims to investigate coherence in SI from an ICM perspective, by observing 
two points: a) the role of the interpreter’s relevant bodily experience in helping her to 
achieve coherence in the source text (ST) and target text (TT); b) the interpreter’s 
mental effort, expended in achieving coherence, reflecting the textual structure of the 
source text (ST). The principle of the methodology is based on the ICM overview of 
discourse analysis – the interpreter’s exposure to interactive embodiment is the 
cornerstone for her to achieve coherence, and influences her mental effort in 
interpreting. The method is designed to address the two points, by formulating two 
relevant research questions and positing the hypothesis in Section 5.1. 
    In order to answer these questions, the theoretical framework constructed in the 
previous chapters is applied to set up the method of the experimental sections. To 
examine the role of the interpreter’s interactive embodiment in helping her to achieve 
coherence, a test material which in some of its aspects engages the subjects in 
personal bodily experience was devised (Section 5.2), involving the interpretation of a 
demonstration of a shiatsu device. Thirty selected subjects were divided into 
experimental group and control group for the comparison; the former underwent the 
bodily experience of installing the shiatsu massager, whereas the control group did 
not (Section 5.3). The experimental procedures (Section 5.4) are designed on the basis 
of the Immersed Experiencer Frame (IEF) (reviewed in Section 4.5), which separates 
cognitive processing into four sequential stages: (1) accessing previous bodily 
experience, (2) activating working memories, (3) construing and (4) integrating the 
mental structure of the bodily experience and memory. To mirror the IEF framework, 
the experiment is divided into four procedures: (1) an interactive embodiment stage in 
which the subjects in the experimental group will engage in installing the shiatsu 
massager, for direct understanding (Section 5.4.1); (2) an activation and construal 
stage in which the subjects in the experimental group will recall their cognitive 
procedures, by filling in concepts/slots and relations/fillers in the propositions 
 99
(Section 5.4.2), to activate the working memory; (3) an integrating stage in which 
both experimental and control groups start interpreting the testing material (Section 
5.4.3). Additionally, (4) the undergraduates in the control group will interpret the test 
material for a second time, to examine the contribution of the interpreter’s full 
preparation where there is no previous embodied experience. In other words, two 
kinds of familiarization are compared, one involving bodily interaction, the other 
based on preparation via previous exposure to the text and diagram (Green 2011, 
personal communication) (Section 5.4.4).  
On the basis of the collected interpreting recordings, a corpus is structured with 
transcriptions, annotations and analysis (Section 5.5). Specifically, the tools of 
embodied cognitive linguistics are used to track coherence clues, by means of 
cognitive reference point (CRP), trajector (tr) and landmark (lm), and discourse 
current space (DSP), (reviewed in Section 4.7). Finally, Dillinger’s traditional 
computational approach to coherence in SI (reviewed in Section 3.4) is used to 
manipulate and analyze the data. The data and findings in the corpus demonstrate both 
the role of the interpreter’s bodily experience and the interpreter’s mental effort 
invested in building coherence.      
In order to examine initially the feasibility and validity of the theoretical framework 
and the experiment mentioned above, a pilot test was previously conducted as a trial 
experiment, described below in Section 5.6, where the consistencies and variations of 
the present main study versus the pilot test are presented. Finally, looking back at the 
experiment, the deviations of the research method from standard interpreting practice 
are evaluated (Section 5.7).  
    With respect to the methodology of interpreting research, according to Gile (1994: 
39-54), special attention should be given to three items, namely test materials, 
subjects and experimental conditions and procedures. Section 5.1 will lay out the 
research questions and propose a hypothesis. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 will give an account 
of the selection of the materials and subjects respectively. Section 5.4 will show how 
the ICM-based framework, reviewed in previous chapters, is used to design the 
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experimental conditions and procedures, and further to format the corpus (Section 
5.5), and design and manipulate the data (Section 5.5.1). Section 5.6 will give an 
account of the present main study versus the pilot test. Section 5.7 evaluates the 
deviations of the research method from standard interpreting practice. 
 
5.1 Research questions and hypotheses  
 
Figure 15 below shows how the research questions are formulated: 
 
                                                                Increasing mental efforts  
                                            
Embodiment - origin of coherence 
                  Figure 15a ICM                                           Figure 15b Textual structure    
 
The role of embodiment is the cornerstone of the ICM in the embodied cognition 
theory, as opposed to any traditional view on cognition, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
The communicator’s exposure to bodily experience gives rise to the initial link among 
the concepts, so I will use the term origin of coherence to describe the interpreter’s 
bodily experience prior to her interpreting. The first research question is: 
 
(1) Does the interpreter’s relevant bodily experience help her to achieve coherence in 
following the source text (ST) and hence in producing target text (TT)?  
 
This exploration is conducted to find out if the interpreter uses her bodily experience 
to achieve coherence in the ST and TT, by means of the embodied, semi-embodied 
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and non-embodied knowledge. According to Lakoff (1987) (reviewed in Chapters 1 
and 4), the propositional model is used to analyze the propositional concepts, which 
are based on bodily experience without employing any imagination, through 
perceiving, touching and manipulating. The propositional concepts are immediately 
grounded in direct understanding, involving basic-level objects, actions and relations 
in the physical domain. I prefer to use the term embodied concepts instead of 
propositional concepts. Lakoff (1987) has used metaphor and metonym to analyze the 
non-propositional/abstract concepts, while I use the term the non-embodied concepts 
instead of non-propositional concepts. I have synthesized and developed its definition 
as: those concepts which are not directly grounded in bodily experience or remote 
from the core of embodied experience, including the subject matter-based knowledge. 
However, I have found that there is a layer existing between the embodied concepts 
and the non-embodied concepts, which consists of the concepts whose meaning is 
accessed and inferred from the normally embodied experience, for which I would use 
the term semi-embodied concepts.  
    According to Lakoff (1987) and Wang (2006) (reviewed in Chapter 4), 
embodiment gives rise to direct and best understanding, suggesting that the 
communicator’s mental effort will take an uphill direction in the stages beyond 
embodiment, as Figure 14 shows. Therefore the following question is formulated:  
 
 (2) How does the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence reflect 
the textual structure of the source text (ST)?   
 
From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistics, Tebble (1994) (reviewed in 
Section 3.1.1), has tried to show how the interpreter needs to activate proper 
expectations about the function of each new element, and distribute the amount of 
mental effort in each part of the overall textual structure. However, Tebble does not 
offer an analysis of the way the interpreter distributes her mental effort into the 
different sections of the discourse structure. Next, the Interpretive Theory of 
Translation (IT) (reviewed in Section 3.2) provides the concept of the interpreter’s 
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mental effort in processing an information structure, claiming that there are different 
layers of knowledge, some of which are easily activated but some are not, but IT did 
not explain what and how some layers of knowledge are more easily activated than 
other layers of knowledge. The Effort Model (1995, 1997, 2002) (reviewed in Section 
3.3.2) has been used to account for a number of processing difficulties and failures, 
including such problem triggers as proper names, numbers and compound technical 
terms, which can affect the interpreter in attaining coherence. According to Feng 
(2002: 458) the Effort Model could be used to explain the failures in SI performance, 
as Gile admitted (1995), but cannot serve as a panoramic view of SI, in that it is 
neither a structured model of SI nor is it a flow chart of information processing. This 
second question is designed to compensate for these deficiencies in the theories of the 
interpreter’s mental effort, from the ICM perspective. On the basis of theories of Gile 
(1995) (reviewed in Section 3.3.2) and Sperber and Wilson (1986) (reviewed in 
Section 4.6.2), relating to coherence and mental effort, we can make this assumption: 
coherence ratings stand in an inverse ratio to the interpreter’s mental effort – more 
coherence clues’ score, less mental effort, vice versa. The coherence rating is 
measured by the correspondence between the coherence clues indentified in the 
source text (ST) and the coherence clues appearing in the target text (TT).     
    On the basis of the previous discussions in this literature review concerning the 
theoretical framework, the following hypotheses are postulated as follows: 
(1) The interpreter’s relevant bodily experience helps her to achieve coherence, on the 
grounds that coherence stems from interactive embodiment, which is the origin of 
coherence. The ICM which the interpreter has stored in her mind helps her to fill in 
missing links and access the cognitive world, to realize coherence.  
(2) The interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence reflects the 
textual structure of the source text (ST). A higher number of coherence clues stand in 
inverse ratio to the mental effort; more coherence clues suggest less mental effort in 
the interpreting performance, and vice versa. The embodied concepts (that is, those 
units of knowledge directly grounded in bodily experience) are directly understood, 
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and the interpreter is expected to achieve the highest coherence clues score with the 
least mental effort in the section of text, which primarily represents embodied 
knowledge, followed by the section which represents semi-embodied knowledge, and 
finally by the section which represents non-embodied knowledge.  
With the research questions and hypothesis laid out, the following sections will 
deal with the topics of the test material (Section 5.2), subjects (Section 5.3) and the 
experimental procedures (Section 5.4), and corpus (Section 5.5).   
 
5.2 The test material  
 
An episode of my own bodily experience helped me to devise this test material. Due 
to much time sitting at a desk for my PhD work, I had bought a shiatsu massager 
cushion, made by Hömedics Company, from John Lewis in Edinburgh. When I 
started to read the installation instructions, I found the literal descriptions vague. But 
when physically installing the parts of the shiatsu device while referring to the 
installation instructions, I felt my understanding of the descriptions was getting clear, 
in that the concepts of the parts and actions are naturally linked. This bodily 
experience suggested to me an understanding of a text, so I used the installation steps 
of the original Installation Instruction of the shiatsu device (sentences 9 to 15 in the 
test text), for the subjects’ immersion into the physical actions (Zwaan’s term, 
reviewed in Section 4.5), so as to examine the role of their bodily experience for 
direct understanding.  I used the section of Warnings in the Instruction (Sentence 16 
to 19) and simulated other sections of the text, so as to observe the subjects’ indirect 
understanding. The direct understanding is based on the interpreter’s bodily 
experience, basically comprising embodied knowledge; and the indirect 
understanding contains the knowledge which is not based on direct bodily experience. 
In other words, in the case of understanding the text concerning the shiatsu device, the 
embodied knowledge makes use of specific remembered body movements and 
sensations to perform some task (such as assembling the shiatsu parts), and the non-
embodied knowledge involves warnings against misusing the shiatsu device, and 
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some special technical terms. My further classification shows that, between the direct 
understanding and the indirect understanding lies a semi-direct understanding, or 
semi-embodied knowledge, which  involves some kind of reflection about embodied 
knowledge, which can be expressed in words (such as feeling of the massager’s 
comfort) (Green 2011; personal communication) (Sentences 5 to 7). In each section 
representing the embodied concepts, semi-embodied and non-embodied concepts, 
there are two subsections A and B, where the contents in Subsection A are closer to 
the core of the interpreter’s bodily experience-based actions than Subsection B. It is 
assumed that the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence will 
reflect the textual structure in the ST. The text is classified in terms of these basic 
attributes (direct understanding versus indirect understanding) (see Sections 4.2.5) 
    The situation and context of the ST which I devised is as follows: Mr. Craig,  the 
sales manager from Hömedics promotes a new product, the Shiatsu Massage Cushion, 
to an audience of potential customers at Guangzhou International Trade Fair. Mr. 
Craig first greets the audience and introduces himself (S1-S3), then establishes the 
purpose – promoting the product, a Shiatsu Massage Cushion (S4). He goes on to 
explain the meaning of word, shiatsu (S5) and its purposes (S6). In order to achieve 
an interactive response from the audience, he asks the potential customers for their 
feelings about the product after their bodily experience (S7). Following this, he 
concentrates on three points: the structure of the appliance (S8), installation 
procedures (S9-15) and warnings about storage (S16-19). Finally he ends his 
promotion, with another sales strategy – offering a favorable price (S20), and inviting 
the potential customers to try the shiatsu massager again (S21) and thanks the 
audience (S22).  
The invited speaker, an English native, playing the role of Mr. Craig, rehearsed his 
performance before the interpreting recording, read from a script while making his 
speech sound oral and natural, and had his speech recorded into the tape in the audio-
visual room. The speech lasts 4.5 minutes with approximately 100 words per minute, 
a comfortable input rate and speed (Seleskovitch 1965) (reviewed in Section 1.1). For 
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the purpose of this study, the 450-word English ST was divided into 22 sentences and 
44 segments (Appendix 3 Transcript). Segmentation of the ST was carried out 
according to both syntactic constituents of the source text and the comprehension of 
the interpreter (Goldman-Eisler 1972).  
This test material fits in the theme of interpreting English for science and 
technology (EST). According to Trimble (1985: 10-21), an EST communicator 
basically uses a special process or rhetoric (1985: 10) in choosing and organizing 
information, in terms of 4 levels. Level A gives the purpose of the total discourse in 
the introductory section. Level B consists of broad and generalized information. The 
rhetoric of an EST discourse is best seen operating at Levels C and D. At Level C 
general functions of Level B is developed; information is concerned with physical 
structures (physical description), with the purpose of a device and how its parts work 
(function description), and with processes and procedures (process description). At 
Level D relationships are provided within and between the rhetoric units of Level C, 
and presented according to the natural structure of orders (e.g. time, space, and 
causality and result), and patterns (e.g. analogy, exemplification and illustration). 
Technical communicators have no choice but to use these rhetorical techniques 
because the nature of the material requires it. The test material shares the functions of 
EST discourse, on the grounds that it involves the physical structure of the shiatsu 
device, with its purpose of massage, and how the parts of shiatsu work, with their 
procedures. The textual structure of this test discourse fits in that of an EST discourse.    
The rationale for the selection of the EST-based experimental material is that, in 
2006 the China Education Ministry approved of the request of three universities 
(Beijing Foreign Studies University, Shanghai International Studies University, 
Guangdong University of Foreign Studies) to launch the MA programme in  
translation and interpreting, aiming to train specialized and application-oriented 
translators and interpreters. However, the challenge to this objective is how to design 
a programme and syllabus, on the basis of specialized knowledge structure, 
particularly in the field of technology and business. This study contributes to this 
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topic by designing an ICM-based interpreting programme for technical and business 
English (Section 7.4).           
 This experimental material is designed to answer the research question: Does the 
interpreter’s relevant embodied experience help her to achieve coherence? This 
material enables some of the subjects to physically and perceptually experience the 
installation process and the purpose of the machine before the interpreting task 
(Section 5.4). Therefore, this material reflects the role of interactive embodiment in 
relation to the ICM, in that it can be used to observe the way in which the subjects 
have built up propositional structures and image schemata of the fixing procedures 
via mental space blending, mostly in terms of frame and script, and also formed the 
mappings and projections of sequential iconicity of the installation steps in the mind. 
Therefore, it is a suitable tool to observe the role of the interpreter’s bodily 
experience in achieving coherence in SI.  
The textual structure of the ST is designed to address the question: How does the 
interpreter’s mental effort which is expended in achieving coherence reflect the 
textual structure of the source text (ST)? Some aspects of this test material are 
designed to show the way the interpreter processes the textual structure in terms of 
mental effort, analyzed from the ICM perspective; the section representing embodied 
concepts is analyzed from the propositional model perspective; the section 
representing semi-embodied concepts is viewed from an image schema perspective; 
and the section representing non-embodied abstract concepts is analyzed from  the 
metaphorical and metonymic model perspective, as reviewed in Section 5.1, and 
shown in Figures 15a and b above.  
In cognitive processing, the interpreting subjects will use their relevant bodily 
experience for understanding knowledge, as we have noted throughout, which 
consists of embodied concepts, together with semi-embodied and non-embodied 
concepts. This cognitive processing is made manifest in making sense, and building 
up coherence in the textual structure. It is assumed that the interpreter’s mental effort 
tends to increase from processing the embodied knowledge to processing the non-
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embodied knowledge. The embodied concepts relevant to the installation procedures 
of the shiatsu device are the control centre of understanding this text (S9-15). From 
the embodied section, the interpreter’s understanding is extended to the meaning and 
purpose of the ST (S5-6), forming the semi-embodied concepts by means of her 
sensation through massage experience, further non-embodied concepts – warnings 
about storage (S16-19) – concepts remote from the subjects’ bodily experience, and 
the abstract concepts including six technical terms and numbers (PVC, 230 V, AC main 
outlets, short circuit, 30 pounds and 69 pounds). The interpreter was predicted to spend 
mounting mental effort, which reflects the textual structure with respect to the varying 
degrees of difficulty of messages.   
   By analyzing the textual structure from the ICM perspective, this text is roughly 
divided into five sections in order: (1) the introductory section (Section 5.3.1); (2) the 
section representing semi-embodied concepts (5.3.2); (3) The section representing 
embodied concepts (5.3.3); (4) the section representing non-embodied concepts 
(5.3.4), (5) the concluding section (5.3.5). The classification of Subsections A and B 
depends on the closeness to the core of the embodied experience in the installing 
actions. The full source text (ST) used in the experiments is presented here. 
 
 
5.2.1 The introductory section  
 
The Speaker greets the audience and introduces himself (S1-S2): 
 
S1: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen 
S2: Welcome to our product promotion fair of Hömedics. I am Craig, sales manager.  
S3: I would like to recommend a good product to you.  
S4: Now look at this. This is a Shiatsu Massage Cushion.  
 
This introduction provides the contextual situation, especially the purpose, as a 
prelude to the main body of the speech.  
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5.2.2 The section representing semi-embodied concepts 
 
The related segments are presented below: 
 
S5: As you know, ‘shi’ in Japanese means finger and ‘atsu’ means pressure, put them           
together and you’ve got Shiatsu, meaning ‘finger pressure’. 
S6: In this day and age of bad backs due to much office work, labor and sitting too long for 
your studies,  
     The Shiatsu Massager is the perfect relaxation gadget for every occasion. 
S7: Just now all of you have sat on it and have had a positive personal experience. 
How do you feel about it?  
Comfortable?   
     Yes, - I think you will agree.   
 
This section, ranging from sentence 5 to 7, segment 4 to 14, is divided into two 
subsections. Subsection A (S7) includes the testing of the listeners’ feelings about the 
bodily massage, and Subsection B (S5-6) includes the explanation of the Japanese 
word, shiatsu and its purpose. The concepts here involve some kind of reflection 
about the physical actions relating to the installation. This section is used to see the 
way the interpreter processes the semi-embodied knowledge, and her mental effort 
reflects the textual structure, analyzed from image-schema perspective (Figure15).  
 
5.2.3 The section representing embodied concepts 
 
This embodied section is provided here 
 
S8: The structure of Shiatsu Massager is simple.  
      Two kneading heads, rotating, travel up and down, 
      along the PVC guides, relieving pain and fatigue on your back.  
S9: I would like to talk about how to use this Shiatsu Massager. 
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      Briefly there are six steps you should remember:  
S10: One. Attach the massage seat to almost any chair, 
      using the integrated strap at the back of the seat, 
     Ensure it is held firmly in place by adjusting the strap as necessary.  
S11: Two. Connect the power supply lead from the adapter with the corresponding lead in the 
side of the seat. 
S12: Three. Plug the adaptor into a 230V AC mains outlet T3 -and switch on.  
 By the way, remember to finish steps 1 to 3 before switching the appliance on at the 
mains.  
S13: Four. Once seated, use the remote control to operate the appliance.  
       Press the ‘Power’ button once and select the desired massage zone- to start the massage.  
S14: Five. For an intense massage, remove the flap from the back of the cushion.  
For a gentler massage, keep the flap on and you can soften the massage further by    
placing a towel between your back and seat.  
S15: Six. Press the ‘Power’ button for a second time to stop the massage. 
 
This section refers to what the subjects in the experimental group are physically 
engaged in, involving interactive bodily experience-based aspects. This section, 
ranging from sentence 8 to 15, segment 15 to 33, can be further divided into two 
subsections: Subsections A and B. Subsection A includes the fixing steps (S9-15), in 
which sequencing iconicity (Section 4.5.2) is displayed; Subsection B (S8) includes 
information about the structure of the massager, which is one part of the bodily 
experience but not so prominent and salient in terms of cognition, and needs more 
careful observation by the interpreting subjects. In this section we can observe how 
the physical actions are mapped and projected into the minds of the interpreter 
through the relevant frame and script (Section 2.2.2) and iconicity (Section 4.5.2), 
serving as the control centre for understanding the whole text; and how the process of 
the interpreter’s mental effort is reflected in processing the embodied information, 
from the perspective of the propositional model in the ICM (Figures 14).  
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5.2.4 The section representing non-embodied concepts  
 
This section is as follows 
 
S16: Always remember to store it properly.  
    Place the appliance in its box or in a safe, dry, cool place.  
S17: Water or any liquids that come into contact with the appliance are dangerous 
S18: Avoid contact with sharp edges or pointed objects which might cut or puncture the 
fabric surface.  
S19: To avoid breakage, DO NOT wrap the power cord around the appliance.  
        DO NOT hang the unit by the cord. This will cause short circuit. 
S20: Ladies and gentlemen, you could have it now at 30 pounds, in John Lewis, Edinburgh, it   
costs 69 pounds. 
      
      The non-embodied section, ranging from sentence 16 to 19, segment 34 to 43, can be 
separated into two subsections: Subsection A (S16-19): warnings on the use of the 
shiatsu device, and Subsection B: technical terms listed below. This non-embodied 
section is not embodiment based, and/or is remote from the core of embodied 
experience, including the subject matter-based knowledge. This section is used to 
study how the process of the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving 
coherence is reflected in the understanding of the non-embodied or abstract 
knowledge, from the perspective of the metaphorical and metonymic processing in the 
ICM (Chapter 5, Figures 19a and b). It is worth noting that Subsection B also includes 
the technical terms and numbers: PVC, 230 V, AC main outlets, short circuit, 30 
pounds and 69 pounds. These six items are selected and observed, on the grounds that 
technical terms and numbers cannot be isolated from the context (Section 3.2); and 
that, to activate the links among the terms and numbers, interpreters need to 
understand contexts of technical terms and numbers. This challenges the Setton’s 
assumption (1995: 253) (discussed in Section 6.2.3) that names (for instance, 
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Hömedics. Craig, in Section 5.2.), technical terms and numbers cannot be associated 
into the mental model, but this research argues that bodily experience makes a 
difference in helping the interpreter to build up the links among the concepts in terms 
of names, terms and numbers. Interpreting them (names, terms and numbers) needs 
more mental effort (Gile 1995) (Section 3.3.2). This will be discussed in Sections 
7.2.1 and 7.2.3.   
      
      5.2.5 The concluding section  
 
The Speaker ends his speech with sentence 21-22: 
      
    S21: If you are interested, feel free to try the Shiatsu massager again before you buy it.    
          S22: Thanks.  
    
    The structure of this test material reflects cognitive properties in processing and 
categorizing information from the ICM perspective: idealization, hierarchy, gradience, 
fuzziness and gestalt (reviewed in Section 4.3), which also influences the interpreter’s 
mental effort. Idealization means that the textual structure does not fit into the ICM 
structure either perfectly or all the time (see Figures 15a and b; Section 5.1). 
Fuzziness means that there is not a rigid boundary in the case of a graded category. 
The boundary between the embodied, semi-embodied and non-embodied sections is 
not clear cut. For instance, in the section representing embodied concepts emerge the 
semi-embodied and/or non-embodied concepts, and vice versa. Another obvious 
instance is that, in this test text there are some basic technical abstract concepts, such 
as high voltage and short circuit, emerging in the embodied section. In spite of 
fuzziness of the distribution of the embodied, semi-embodied and non-embodied 
concepts, they can be categorized according to the attributes of direct and indirect 
understanding. Hierarchy means ‘a composite structure at one level of organization 
functions in turn as component structure with respect to a higher level’ (Langacker 
2008: 207). Gradience means that categories contain a scale or degree, with graded 
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concepts characterizing degrees along some scale with different layers in structure 
(Lakoff 1987). This test text shows hierarchic and graded layers from the embodied 
concepts as the foundation, and further upon which are built up the semi-embodied 
and non-embodied concepts. Gestalt means that categorization has two stages: 
perceiving an object or event as a whole as the first step and decomposing the 
perceived whole into individual properties or attributers as a second step. The 
installation procedures of this test text (S9-15) were initially used for the interpreting 
subjects to have a bodily experience so as to acquire a whole perception for the first 
step, and then put the perceived whole into individual properties by filling in the two 
cognitive diagrams with slots and pairs, this is described in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2.     
       To sum up, this text displays both textual and cognitive structure, which starts with 
the introduction, gradually progresses to the sections representing semi-embodied, 
embodied and non-embodied knowledge, and finally ends with farewell and 
conclusion. The experimental text is intended to make it possible to observe these 
effects when it is interpreted: (1) the role of bodily experience in achieving coherence; 
(2) the interpreter’s mental effort invested in achieving coherence reflecting the 
textual structure in the ST (Figures 14a and b), analyzed from the ICM perspective. 
The findings of the interpreters mental effort provides a case for the contextual 
configuration model (Tebble 1994) (reviewed in Section 3.1.1), and a flow chart for 
the process of the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence 
reflecting the textual structure of the ST, in contrast with the Interpretative Theory of 
translation (Section 3.2) and the Effort Model (Section 3.3.2).   
     
   
  5.3 Subjects 
 
This section gives an account of the selection of the subjects, involving their related 
background information, and provides the rationale for their selection. Thirty 
interpreting subjects were recruited for this experiment, from the School of Foreign 
Languages, Lanzhou University of Technology (LUT), based in Lanzhou, China. 
These thirty subjects were divided into two contrastive groups: one was the 
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experimental group who were to undergo bodily experience, and the other the control 
group who were not. Each of the two contrastive groups comprised 15 subjects with 
five teachers, five postgraduates and five undergraduates. The five teachers in the 
experimental group are labeled T+1 to T+5, the five postgraduates PG+1 to PG+5, and 
the five undergraduates UG+1 to UG+5; while in the control group the five teachers are 
labeled T-1 to T-5, the five postgraduates PG-1 to PG-5, and the five undergraduates 
UG-1 to UG-5. There were 7 male subjects and 23 female subjects. The average age 
was 33 for the teacher’s group, 25 for the postgraduate group, and 22 for the 
undergraduate group. Here are the detailed background of the selected subjects and 
the rationales for their selections.   
 
5.3.1. Teacher’s group 
 
Tables 2a and 2b provide a background description of the teachers in the groups. This 
combination represents a full academic echelon team within the institutional structure 
– in both the experimental group and the control group, there are two associate 
professors, two lecturers and one teaching fellow:   
 
Table 2a  Background information of the five teachers in the experimental group   
Subject Date of birth   gender academic status  
T+1  1968 Female Associate professor  
T+2  1969 Female  Associate professor 
T+3  1973 Female  Lecturer  
T+4  1980 Female  Teaching fellow  
T+5   1977 Female Lecturer  
 
Table 2b  Background information of the five teachers in the control group  
Subject Date of birth  gender  Academic  status 
T-1  1970 Female  Associate professor 
T-2  1980 Male Lecturer 
T-3  1969 Female  Associate professor 
T-4  1983 Male Teaching fellow 
T-5  1980 Male Lecturer 
   
They all have some practical interpreting experience and teach interpreting courses, 
mostly consecutive interpreting. All these teachers from the same academic echelon 
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would therefore be expected to have a similar high level of language proficiency. 
   
   5.3.2 Postgraduate group  
 
    
  Tables 3a and 3b present the background of the postgraduate group. The ten 
postgraduates were second year MA students in interpreting and translation. They 
each were admitted by the ratio 50:1 as candidates through the China National 
Postgraduate’s Entrance Examination in 2006. They all have some interpreting 
experience; the precise selection of who went into either of the experimental or 
control group is based on his/her entrance examination score at an equal level, i.e. the 
groups consist of candidates with matched scores:   
 
Table 3a Background information of the five postgraduates in the experimental group  
Subject Date of birth  gender  Academic status  
PG+1  1983 Male Second year MA 
PG+2  1984 Female  Second year MA 
PG+3  1983 Female  Second year MA 
PG+4  1982 Female  Second year MA 
PG+5  1984 Female  Second year MA 
 
Table 3b Background information of the five postgraduates in the control group  
Subject Date of birth  gender  Academic status  
PG-1  1984 Female  Second year MA 
PG-2  1983 Male Second year MA 
PG-3  1982 Female  Second year MA 
PG-4  1983 Female  Second year MA 
PG-5   1984 Female  Second year MA 
 
 
5.3.3. Undergraduate group  
 
Tables 4a and 4b provide the background of the two contrastive undergraduate groups. 
The ten undergraduates were fourth-year students in English language, selected 
according to their scores of the Test for English Majors (TEM) (see Appendix 2), Band 
4, their commitment to an interpreting career and the recommendation of the 
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interpreting teachers regarding their potential. TEM is mandatory for English majors in 
Chinese universities. For these students, passing the TEM at Band 4 is a graduation 
requirement. As with postgraduate students, the composition of the experimental and 
control groups is matched for examination scores (see appendix 2): 
 
Table 4a Background information of the five undergraduates in the experimental group  
Subject Date of birth   gender  Academic status  
UG+1  1987 Female  Fourth year student  
UG+2  1987 Female  Fourth year student  
UG+3  1985 Female  Fourth year student  
UG+4  1987 Female  Fourth year student  
UG+5   1986 Female  Fourth year student 
 
Table 4b Background information of the five undergraduates in the control group  
Subject  Date of birth gender Academic status  
UG-1  1986 Male Fourth year student  
UG-2  1986 Male Fourth year student  
UG-3  1987 Female  Fourth year student  
UG-4  1987 Female  Fourth year student  
UG-5  1986 Female  Fourth year student 
 
In addition, the five undergraduates in the control group in Table 4b were asked to 
interpret the ST for a second time, considering that a further observation of the role of 
bodily experience was to be carried out, in the context where the subjects were not 
physically involved in the experience. The five undergraduates in the control group, 
engaged in the second interpreting, were labeled UG-1-1 to UG -5-5. 
The sample T test is used to examine whether the means of the undergraduates’ 
scores both in the experimental group and the control group on some outcome differ. 
On the basis of the TEM achievements of the selected undergraduates, the sample T 
test was conducted to ascertain the difference as Table 5 shows below: 
      
     Table 5 The sample T test to evaluate the effects of language proficiency on interpreting 
                           Score 
Subject       
TEM 4:Exp  TEM 4 control 
mean  70.5 70.6 
Standard deviation 7.5256 < 5.466  
T value                        -0.04105< 2.604,             p<0.01 
Difference No No 
 
With respect to the sample T test, a comparison of this sort aims to evaluate the 
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effects of the intervention of language proficiency upon the two comparative groups. 
The t-value is compared to determine whether the t-statistic reaches the threshold of 
statistical significance. The sample T test in Table 5 above suggests that the two 
groups of undergraduates have a comparable level of English language proficiency; 
therefore observation can focus on the role of bodily experience to achieve 
comprehension and coherence.   
The rational for the division of the two contrastive groups is provided from the 
perspective of the research and design method: the experimental group underwent the 
bodily experience and received instruction and training in the use of the shiatsu device, 
whereas the control group did not. This experiment had a one-way design, in that it 
had one related measures independent variable (IV). An IV is the event manipulated 
independently by the experimenter; the dependent variable (DV) is the result we 
observe. This IV thus basically has three levels: embodied, semi-embodied or non-
embodied. This one related IV gives rise to the number of coherence clues of the 
discourse, interpreted by the subjects, in terms of the DV. This experiment has 
controlled the selection of the subjects in the different groups in order to hold other 
factors (e.g. academic background and experience, age) constant across the conditions 
so that any relevant elements cannot account for any changes observed in the DV. In 
this way, it ensures both external validity and internal validity; the former refers to 
the relevance of the findings to situations beyond or external to those used in the 
study, that is also referred to as generalizability; the latter means the extent to which 
we can relate changes in the DV to the manipulation of the IV.  
    There are other rationales for the selection of the subjects. Firstly, this study is 
interpreting education and training oriented, as Gile (2000) claimed that interpreting 
education and training is one of the most important fields in the world of conference 
interpreting research. The actors in interpreting education and training are teachers, 
postgraduates and undergraduates in interpreting studies in universities. According to 
Mu (1999: 88), the teachers in translation and interpreting in Chinese universities are 
commonly engaged in translating and interpreting research and practice, translating 
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academic works for publication as well as interpreting for the local governments, 
enterprises and other economic entities. The teachers in translation and interpreting 
studies are the main force in China’s interpreting market; also they form so called 
academic echelon teams according to professional posts and ages, in applying their 
theoretical and practical knowledge to teaching the students of interpretation.  
Next, the China Education Ministry made the interpreting course compulsory for 
undergraduates majoring in languages in Chinese universities in 1999. This 
stipulation aims to meet China’s fast-growing development in exchange with other 
countries in the fields of science and technology, the economy, culture, and 
international affairs. According to Mu (1999: 61-82), there is increasing doubt on the 
feasibility of offering undergraduate courses or programmes in interpreting due to 
their deficiency in second language proficiency. But according to the Interpretative 
Theory of translation (IT) (reviewed in Section 3.2) background knowledge can be 
used to compensate for this weakness. Also according to Mu (1999), language majors 
in language schools of Chinese universities are trained mostly in consecutive 
interpreting, scarcely ever in simultaneous interpreting (SI) which is considered to be 
impractical, and SI becomes a challenge for interpreting training. There is, therefore, 
an immediate need for research on SI, in order to inform the development of 
interpreter training. Mu argues that the interpreting course and program is necessary 
for undergraduates in languages, on the grounds that interpreting training can help 
them to acquire the interpreting skills and psychological competence as well, which 
they would have to spend longer accessing in their future career otherwise. I argue 
that empirical research is needed to confirm if it is feasible to engage undergraduates 
in languages in SI training, in the context where embodied experience can help 
interpreting trainees to compensate for their language insufficiency, as IT asserts 
(Section 3.2), and that the researchers into interpreting should not take the hypothesis 
for granted, but rather, like those engaged in any other academic fields, conduct 
experiments to testify any point. Therefore, the outcomes of the two undergraduate 
groups will be significant when compared not only with each other but also with those 
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of the postgraduates and teachers.   
Finally, according to Dillinger’s experimental outcomes (1989; 1994) (reviewed in 
Section 3.4), interpreting is not a specialized ability regarding comprehension and 
coherence, but the application of an existing skill under more unusual circumstances 
and also, comprehension in interpreting is characterized by all of the same 
components process as listening; second language proficiency is crucial in 
interpreting performance. It is assumed that the teacher subjects are more 
academically competent than student subjects in both English language and 
interpreting. We will see if bodily experience makes any difference to the subjects, 
given their interpreting and academic background (including their English language 
proficiency). In terms of gender difference, only three percent of the subjects are male, 
confirming the fact that most of interpreters are female; this study will not involve 
gender effects on interpreting. The category of age also points to the factor of 
academic and interpreting background – there is an 11 year difference between the 
average ages of teachers and the undergraduates, and an 8 year difference between the 
teachers and the postgraduates. This section is designed to eliminate the variables in 
the subjects’ academic background and interpreting skills, by ensuring these elements 
are approximately equal, so that the effect of the interpreter’s bodily experience is 
foregrounded. As for the question: should the interpreter acquire a comparable level 
of knowledge of the topic to the Speaker?  This will be addressed in Sections 7.2.3.  
Having explained the selection of the test material and subjects, the following 
section will describe design conditions and procedures of the experiment.   
 
5.4 Procedures  
 
The subjects’ equipment was a standard laboratory with SI booths used for teaching 
SI. The subjects had interpreting lectures and slots in the lab, and they were familiar 
with this environment which thus had no negative effect on them. This experimental 
procedure is based on the framework of the Immersed Experiencer Frame (IEF) 
(Zwaan 2000, 2004 and 2005) (reviewed in Section 4.5). According to the IEF 
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framework, comprehending the processing of discourse construction and coherence 
needs to start with the communicator’s bodily experience, further separating the 
comprehension processing into three steps: activation, construal and integration. 
Activation means that a language input will activate its relevant traces to construct the 
communicator’s experience. Construal means the psychological meshing process for 
simulating a specific event. Integration means previous relevant construed elements 
which are turned into a part of working memory. On the basis of the IEF framework, 
the experiment is divided into four procedures: (1) interactive embodiment stage in 
which the subjects in the experimental group will engage in installing the shiatsu 
massage (Section 5.4.1); (2) activation and construal stage in which the subjects in the 
experimental group will recall their cognitive procedures by filling in concepts/slots 
and relations/fillers in the propositions, and construing their ideas by role-play 
(Section 5.4.2), (3) integration stage in which both experimental and control groups 
start interpreting the test material (Section 5.4.3). Additionally, (4) the undergraduates 
in the control group will interpret the testing material for a second time to examine the 
interpreter’s full preparedness without embodied experience (Section 5.4.4). In short, 
the experimental group goes through stages 1 to 3 while the control group only 
undergoes stage 3, and the five undergraduates in the control group undertake stages 3 
and 4.   
The subjects in the experimental group were guided to do the experiment separately, 
considering effective management and space availability as well, and in order of the 
teachers group, postgraduate group, and undergraduate group. When the subjects in 
the experimental group finished their interpreting performances, the subjects in the 
control group started to conduct their interpreting test in the same order. Finally, the 
undergraduates in the control group were asked to interpret for a second time to 
examine the effect of familiarization when preparation for interpreting was based on 
the text and diagram only.  
Before the experimentation, the experimenter distributed a diagram of the shiatsu 
device (see Fig. 16 below) and a list of assumed new words, especially technical 
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terms, to all the subjects in the experimental group and the control group, including 
shiatsu, PVC, 230Volt, AC main outlet, short circuit, and provided the subjects with 
the situation and context: a sales manager from Hömedics was to promote his shiatsu 
massager in the Guangzhou Trade Fair. The reasons for choosing the Shiatsu massage 
equipment as the vehicle for the direct bodily experience and subsequent translation 
experiments were that it was not likely to have been previously used by the subjects 
and was not likely to be too difficult in technical terms as a translation task. When 
asked if they had ever had direct, physical contact with this type of shiatsu device, 
none of the subjects in either group said ‘Yes’; when asked if they felt it would be 
particularly  difficult to understand and interpret a speech about the shiatsu product, 
all the subjects in both groups said ‘No’.  
 
5.4.1 Interactive embodiment stage for direct understanding   
 
The experimenter brought the shiatsu appliance (Figure 16 below ) into the lab, and 
organized the subjects of the experimental group to put the parts of the shiatsu 
massager together, on the basis of installation procedures (S9-15) (Section 5.2.3), 
according to the experimenter’s oral instructions in Chinese:  
 
 
Figure 16 Shiatsu massage device (The same shiatsu device was used in the pilot test and the 
present experiment) 
 
Then each subject in the experimental group sat on it and used the remote control to 
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experience the massage. The subjects were guided to discover its physical structure, 
purpose, process, installation procedures and how its parts work. The subjects were 
encouraged to ask any questions about what was going on. In order to observe the 
subjects’ cognition and motivation, the experimenter did not give any special hints. 
This is based on the IT’s method of developing the interpreter’s motivation and 
curiosity (Interpretive Theory of translation, Section 3.2), Seleskovitch and Ledere 
(1986) have pointed out that interpreting students are trained to keep asking not only 
how but also why, for what they take for granted; and that they are initially guided to 
be aware of their ignorance of what seems familiar, ultimately motivated for further 
exploration and improvement of their knowledge to the functional level which enables 
them to follow the ideas of the technical specialist. The shiatsu device is a technical 
appliance, used in daily life; it seems familiar, but needs more observation and 
understanding. The interpreting trainees need to be aware of the fact that Isaac 
Newton‘s discovery of the universal gravitation was triggered by the seemingly 
familiar scene of a falling apple.  
    Having finished the step of interactive embodiment, the experiment moved to the 
second step – activation and construal for coherence in SI.  
 
5.4.2 Activation and construal stage for the activation of working memory  
 
This procedure is designed to observe whether the interpreting subjects, immersed in 
bodily experience, had their working memory activated, construing the mental 
structure of the shiatsu device and its installation steps according to the sequential 
order, i.e. sequence iconicity (reviewed in Section 4.5.2). Having gone through their 
physical experience of installation of the parts of the shiatsu device in the open space 
of the interpreting lab, the subjects in the experimental group entered into the booths 
and sat down. The experimenter distributed the two pages of the cognitive processing 
diagrams, as illustrated in Figures 17 and 18 below, in which only the two cognitive 
reference points (CRP) were filled in, i.e., kneading heads in top row of Figure 17 and 
fixing step in the top row of Figure 18. Here are the samples of the subjects: 
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Figure 17 A subject’s sample (UG+1):  the structure of the shiatsu massager   
 
The experimenter explained the requirements: please recall what you had done with 
the shiatsu parts in terms of its installation steps, and fill in the two cognitive 
diagrams (Figures 17 and 18) with slots and pairs. The experimenter gave some 
props if necessary. For instance, with a view to the structure of shiatsu massager, the 
experimenter asked the subjects: how and where do the knead heads of the massager 
move?  Regarding the fixing steps, the experimenter asked the subjects: in which 
sequential order did you install the massager? And then the experimenter told the 
subjects to fill in the slots and fillers by recalling what they had experienced 
physically. In order to have a better understanding, the subjects were encouraged to 
use their native language Chinese, but both Chinese and English are acceptable 
according to the subject’s preference: 
 
 
Figure18 A subject’s sample (PG+1): installation procedures of the shiatsu device   
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Having filled in the cognitive processing diagrams (Figures 17 and 18) the subjects 
were given five minutes to mentally construe the items by themselves by rehearsing 
the speech in the Speaker’s role. The instruction is: if you were the Speaker in the 
Guangzhou Trade Fair, how would you promote your product of shiatsu? Please 
remember to introduce how to install the shiatsu parts based on your physical 
experience. The subjects’ rehearsal speeches were recorded. This was to enable the 
experimenter to observe how the construal activities help the interpreter to share in 
the Speaker’s mental pattern of image-schema in one domain, connected via their 
shared purpose on this occasion with shared structures and situations, chains of 
actions and events within the frame and script. The experiment was intended to 
examine how the interpreter relies on mental mappings projected from her physical 
actions to activate her working memory for understanding and coherence.  
 
5.4.3 Integration stage for coherence in SI 
 
When the subjects of the experimental group had finished the activation and construal 
step, the control group was brought in. When the subjects were sure that the recording 
was working properly, the recorded speech was played. At this point, the subjects in 
both the experimental group and the control group completed the interpreting 
assignment. The subjects’ outputs were recorded and timed on the machine, and their 
recordings were collected. 
  
 
5.4.4 Interpreting for a second time by the undergraduates of the control group  
 
Now the five undergraduate subjects in the control group were asked to go back into 
the booths for the second interpreting performance. Only this group was selected on 
the basis of the principle of sample investigation, especially due to the feasibility of 
manual annotation (Section5.6). The rationale for the second performance by the 
undergraduate subjects in the control group is that, according to the research design, 
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there are ways in which we can attempt to minimize the impact of individual 
differences upon the experiment. However, there is only one way in which we can 
actually eliminate this source of extraneous variation, or the amount of background 
that we have to cope with – variation other than that arising from our manipulation of 
the independent variable – bodily experience. This is by employing related samples, 
which means that when we use related samples, we do not compare the performances 
of different people. Instead, we compare the performances of the same people on 
different occasions. In the case of this repeated procedure, we would assess the 
interpreting performances of the undergraduates in the control group both in terms of 
less preparedness (for the first time interpreting) and full preparedness (for the second 
time interpreting), but without changing the independent variable due to the fact the 
repeating group still did not have the bodily experience. So, we can safely assume that 
any differences in performance under the two conditions cannot stem from individual 
differences in interpreting ability because it is the same person in both conditions. 
Interpreting for a second time is impossible in SI but it can be assumed that the 
interpreter has made a full preparation based on the text and diagram.  
The experiment was repeated by the undergraduate subjects in the control group 
as a way of varying the results. This aims to answer the sub-question: how does the 
preparation work without embodied experience? This will further answer the 
questions: do all interpreters need to have physical experience of everything that 
could be talked about in the conference? Which parts should be physically 
experienced? Does an interpreter draw on some sort of indirect experience?  These 
questions will be discussed in Sections 6.4 and 7.4 through the empirical data, in 
combination with the ICM.  
At this point, it is useful to summarize the sequence of events and timing in the 
experiment as Tables 6a and 6b show below:  
 
Table 6a The procedures of the Experimental group  
events 
 
1st step – interactive 
embodiment 
2nd step – activation and 
construal 
3rd step – interpreting 
  Time       10 mins → 5mins 5 mins 
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Table 6b The procedures of the Control group   
events 
 
1st step – preparation 
with diagram,  the term 
list and the given topic 
2nd step – interpreting 3rd step – second time 
interpreting performed 
by  the undergraduates 
  Time       10 mins → 5mins 5 mins 
 
After the experiment was completed, it was a time to sum up the present main study 
vs. the pilot test  
 
5.5 The main study vs. the pilot test  
 
   The pilot test was tried out first to see whether the aspects concerning the difficulty of 
the text and procedures make sense, and to expose any weak points, flaws or problems 
that might have been unnoticed at the design stage, and to modify the procedure 
generally. Pilot testing also enabled me to familiarize myself with my role as 
experimenter so that I was practiced and professional by the time I proceeded to the 
present main experiment. The pilot test helped to reveal whether I had a potential 
floor or ceiling effect in my data. In other words, the subjects would find the material 
neither so difficult that few could do it (floor effect), nor so easy that more or less 
everyone could (ceiling effect). The pilot test was carried out with the same test 
material (Section 5.2) and same experimental procedures (Section 5.4), and same 
recruitment rational as for the main study: comparing experienced simultaneous 
interpreters with the less and/or non-experienced, in the context of the interpreter’s 
bodily and/or non-bodily experience, analyzed from the ICM perspective.  Apart from 
the consistencies mentioned above, however, there are four variations between the 
pilot test and the present main study as follows:  
(1)  The scale of the study.  In the pilot test, there were only three Chinese subjects of 
conference interpreting, one PhD candidate in conference interpreting (Interpreter A), 
female, 30 years old, with 180 hours of actual conference interpreting experience, and 
two MSc trainees in conference interpreting, one male, the other female, both 23 years 
old without any conference interpreting experience (Interpreters B and C). The three 
subjects were from the Department of Language and Intercultural Studies, Heriot-
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Watt University, based in Edinburgh, the United Kingdom.  
(2) The division of the experiment group. In the pilot test, there was only one group 
subjected to bodily experience, i.e. the three subjects were physically engaged in 
installing the shiatsu device. There was no contrastive group.   
(3) The focus of the research. The pilot test was only confined to the exploration of 
the role of the interpreter’s bodily experience, involving the analysis of the effect of 
bodily experience on the interpreting skills, such as anticipation, judgment, 
compensation and coordination, as reviewed in Chapter 1. 
    In addition, I found a difference involving the motivation of the subjects. In the 
pilot test, interpreting subjects tended to follow the instruction in installing the shiatsu 
device, and tried to remember what the experimenter said, rather than actively ask 
questions.  
After the test was carried out, the questionnaire shows that the three subjects 
thought that this test material is neither difficult nor easy in terms of the degree of 
difficulty. When asked about the procedures of the experiment, Interpreter C 
suggested that each subject should be fully engaged in the installation of the shiatsus 
device so as to ‘have a deep impression of what has been done’, rather than rush 
through the procedures.    
The pilot test was presented in the International Conference on Corpus-based 
Translation and Languages Studies (ICCTS), Zhejiang University, China, September 
2008. Later on, it was adopted by Dr. Richard Xiao as a chapter in his edited book 
Using Corpora in Contrastive and Translation Studies (Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing. Newcastle. 2010: 109-142). The pilot test has been further expanded and 
refined into the present study, and comparisons between them are made. Apart from 
the consistencies there are four variations between the present main study and the 
pilot test as follows:  
(1) The scale of test. Unlike the pilot test with only three subjects, the present main 
study involves thirty subjects, as detailed in Section 5.3. 
(2) The division of the experiment group. The selected thirty subjects were divided 
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into two contrastive groups: experimental and control group, i.e. the former were 
physically engaged in installing the shiatsu device while the latter were not (Section 
5.4). The pilot test only had one experimental group who all received the embodied 
experience.  
 (3) The focus of this research. The research scope of the present study is broader than 
that of the pilot test. Both the present study and the pilot test are focused on the 
fundamental research question: does the interpreter’s relevant bodily experience help 
her to achieve coherence? However, from the result of the pilot test, I further found 
out the way interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence reflects the 
textual structure of the source text (Gao 2010).  
In terms of the motivation of the subjects, the interpreting subjects in the 
experimental group in the present main study seemed more active and keen on the 
physical engagement and in collecting information before interpreting than those in 
the pilot test. For instance, in the interactive embodiment stage (Section 5.4.1), while 
hearing the general introduction to the warnings on the usage of this device, they 
immediately asked: could you please tell us the specific warnings about the usage of 
this massager? This is used to examine how the interpreter’s curiosity and motivation 
affect her interpreting performance. After the experiment, the subjects were provided 
with their respective outcomes, with both transcriptions and analysis, in a form of text 
corpus.   
         
          
         5.6 The corpus 
           
         
         In linguistics, a corpus (plural corpora) or text corpus is a structured set of texts used 
to carry out statistical analysis for hypothesis testing, checking occurrences or 
validating linguistic rules. A corpus may contain texts in a single language 
(monolingual corpus) or text data in multiple languages (multilingual corpus). 
Multilingual corpora, specially formatted for side-by-side comparison, are called 
aligned parallel corpora. Corpus research has a number of methods, including 
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transcription, annotation, glossing, back-translation, and parsing – analysis of the 
relationship between language forms and reader/listener’s understanding.  
Considering the complexity of this study I used a small corpus for an investigation 
of the working hypothesis. This small sized corpus approach is supported by corpus 
experts. According to Leech (1991: 8-29) the corpus size is not all important: small 
corpora may contain sufficient examples of frequent linguistic features. According to 
McEnery and Xiao (2006: 72), corpora that need extensive manual annotation, such as 
semantic, cognitive and pragmatic annotation, are necessarily small. In addition, Gile 
(2000) and Pöchhacker (2004: 74) have consistently encouraged practisearchers (an 
interpreter engaging in research or a researcher engaging in interpreting practice) and 
PhD students preparing graduation theses to pursue small-scale empirical studies 
within their methodological reach. The viewpoints above are supported by the process 
of designing and annotating the present corpus, on the grounds that the annotation 
covers over fifty thousand words, and nearly five months full time work (Appendix 2). 
However, larger sized, comparable and multilingual texts can be used for future 
studies. This point will be further discussed in Section 8.4.   
 
 
5.6.1. Data design and manipulation  
 
The data design and manipulation is based on both ICM-based methodology (Section 
4.7) and the computational linguistics approach to coherence in SI for data 
manipulation (Dillinger1989, 1994) (reviewed in Section 3.4). As discussed in 
Section 3.4, Dillinger’s propositional score is measured on the basis of matching 
between items identified in the ST and those appearing in the TT. This verbal transfer 
approach is somewhat basic but reasonable to analyze the coherence-building process 
in interpreting. The method based on verbal transfer is complemented by the ICM-
based approach to discourse coherence. The concept of current discourse space (CDS) 
is used to analyze the discourse progression in a dynamic way (Section 4.6.3). The 
cognitive reference point (CRP) is used to determine the theme as a cognitive 
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commanding role in building coherence of a discourse. Trajector and landmark are 
used to track the detailed cognitive coherence clues. In coherence and comprehension 
research some assessment is made of the degree to which the response protocols – in 
this case, the subjects’ translations – match or mismatch the input text; the units of 
comparison were the individual slot-filler pairs that constitute each proposition by the 
slot (tr.) and the filler (lm), and further, in which trajector and landmark, or the 
concept (slot) and relations (fillers) are bold-typed and /or underlined rather than 
match entire propositions. This is the general approach to generate the data for the 
corpus. Two types of corpus annotation systems were designed for examination of (1) 
the subjects’ direct understanding through their bodily experience prior to their 
interpreting (Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2), and (2) their interpretations (Sections 5.4.3 and 
5.4.4).  
          
          
         5.6.1.1 The corpus for the activation and construal  
        
         
         Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 described how the subjects in the experimental group went 
through the embodied stage and how they activated their working memory and 
construed their mental structure by filling the slot (trajector) and the filler (landmark). 
As Figures 19 and 20 indicate below, the structure of the shiatsu device contains four 
frames, and the installation procedures have seven frames in the diagrams in terms of 
cognitive prominence via trajector and landmark. The top two frames where kneading 
heads (Figure 19) and fixing steps (Figure 20) are designated as cognitive reference 
points are not taken into account since they have already been presented. The three 
landmarks in Figure 19, up and down, rotating, and PVC guide, are scored one point 
each:  
 
Figure 19 The corpus annotation of the structure of the shiatsu device  
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         The six steps in Figure 20 are double scored because every frame has two slots 
(coherence clues) in the form of a trajector and landmark; for instance, attach (tr.) the 
seat to any chair (lm), in terms of concepts/slots and relations/fillers:  
 
 
         Figure 20 The corpus annotation of the installation procedures 
          
         For the installation sequences, no score is given if a step is mismatched, but the 
mismatches will be observed and analyzed in the following chapters.          
             The annotation and analysis of the activation and construal stage (Figures 17, 18; 
19 and 20) is based on the assumptions on processing information proposed by Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999: 20) (reviewed in Section 4.2.2), in that when the interpreting 
subjects conceptualize categories in this way, they envision them using a spatial 
metaphor, as if they were containers, with an interior and exterior, a boundary, and a 
part and whole. When they conceptualize categories as containers, they also impose 
complex hierarchical systems on them, with some category-containers inside other 
category-containers. In addition, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 20) 
‘Conceptualizing categories as containers hides a great deal of category structure. It 
hides conceptual prototypes, the graded structures of categories, and the fuzziness of 
category boundaries’. These assumptions underlie the information processing. The 
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filled diagrams are analyzed to find out how the subjects use the image schemas, 
including the container schema, the part-whole schema, the link schema and the 
source-path-goal schema in cognitive processing as reviewed in Section 4.2.2. This 
shiatsu device has two kneading heads mounted inside, and the heads move up and 
down, rotating in operation, along a pair of PVC guides, representing a compulsion 
schema (Figure 8), which appears as a ‘continuous, analog pattern of, or in, the 
particular experience or cognition’ (Johnson 1987: 2). This compulsion schema has 
internal structure with embodiment as force vector (Johnson 1987: 3) in terms of a 
given magnitude and direction, and develops in a coherent link and source-path-goal 
mode (see Figures 17, 18; 19 and 20). It is an example of how metaphorical 
processing works in shaping categorization, conception and inference in building 
coherence, as reviewed in Sections 4.2.2 and  4.2.3.   
 
 
5.6.1.2 Corpora for the interpretations  
 
With both the ST and the interpreted TT available, aligned parallel corpora were 
formatted (Appendix 3). The representations of the textual features are classified 
primarily in accordance with the theoretical framework as Table 7 shows below: (1) 
Coherence, (2) the Idealized Cognitive Model; these two frameworks act as the piers 
to support the bridge – Simultaneous Interpreting. The tools used for analyzing the 
corpus in terms of coherence include Theme and Rheme, cohesive devices, contextual 
situation, skopos, frame and script, and mental model theory. Theories relevant to the 
ICM involve propositional model, image-schema model, metaphorical model and 
metonymic model as the macro framework, and further the cognitive reference point, 
trajectory and landmark. With a view to simultaneous interpreting, relevant strategies 
involve anticipation, compensation, coordination, inference, and also some symbols 
are used as labels for pause, information loss and affective values. These 
representations put SI coherence in the global and local discourse frame, observing 
coherence in SI, by combining all the illuminating elements in the theoretical 
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framework. Table 7 shows symbols and abbreviations used for transcription, 
annotation and analysis:  
 
           Table 7 Symbols and abbreviations for the interpreting discourse transcriptions 
1) Coherence THeme, RHeme. Cohesive devices: CT- temporal; CS- spatial; CP- process; ∵∴ -cause 
and effect; rep- repetition; >F- focusing device; ref: reference; elip: ellipsis; # condition; ÷ 
contrast; Situ: situation; cont: context; purp: purpose /skop: skopos; fr: frame & sc: script 
with S&C: situation & context; thematic role: goal; I: initial; MMT: mental model theory 
2)  ICM PM: propositional model; MM: metaphoric model; Mnm: metonymic model; IS: image 
schema; CDS: p-1/p0/p+; CRP: Cognitive Reference Point; tr: trajector, lm: landmark; D: 
dominion, T: target; ic: iconicity; ΩEmbodied section; Φsemi-embodied section;  *non-
embodied section;TP: Topical (most salient) propositions- Ptru: Shiatsu Massage Cushion; 
structure; use step 
3)  SI ø anticipation; ∞ compensation; ≒coordination; >>pragmatic inference;  
? unclear syntactic attachment, semantic scope or pragmatic domain; @, fp filled pause; 
+long pause;-pause; [], information loss; ☺ ☻affective values 
 
An assembly of these symbols is used to represent the formulation by combining all 
the elements described above. The transcripts were annotated with top-down and 
bottom-up marks on the basis of the theoretical framework. Literal back translation is 
supplied to allow readers to follow the course of assembly of semantic and cognitive 
representations from the morpho-syntax of the input. Analysis is provided to primarily 
observe how the subjects follow the coherence clues. The quantitative indicators were 
calculated in terms of coherence clues achieved by the interpreting subjects. The 
English source text appears in Times New Roman bold face and the Chinese 
interpretations are in SimSun. Coherence clues are marked with underlines both in 
source and target texts. These details are provided to enable readers to follow the 
coherent course of assembly of semantic and cognitive representations, facilitated by 
analysis. The back translation is not a central issue of this research, and only acts as a 
window on the assembly of meaning and coherence clues for expository purpose. In 
addition, an English gloss is used to accompany the interpreted text for readers to 
follow synchronization (Table 19). Table 8 below is used as a partial example to show 
how this corpus was annotated. The words underlined in the source text are examined 
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to see if they are matched in the target text:  
 
Table 8 a segmented example of transcription with assembly, back translation and analysis  
 p-1,p0,p+1prepositions(previous,current&subsequent); D domain; tr trajector; lm landmark; CRP cognitive 
reference point; Ref reference ;  F focus; T target ;  ☺ ☻affective values;  @, fp filled pause; +long pause;-pause;   
[], information loss; ∵∴ -cause and effect; >>pragmatic inference 
 
 
As the source text develops, any concept can be processed introspectively and 
retrospectively in terms of primary and secondary focuses. In other words, any 
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concept or element in the current discourse can be activated and turned into a 
prominent point, i.e. trajector. For instance, the two proper names, Craig and 
Hömedics, in Sentences 1 and 2, are underlined as coherence clues, and are analyzed 
in order to testify the notion that names, terms and numbers are ‘classic examples of 
items difficult to associate into the mental model, and are notoriously vulnerable to 
error or omission’ (Setton 1999: 253). The scores on the right side in Table 8 show 
how the statistical results are produced. In terms of calculation of the coherence clues, 
for each of the testing texts a database was constructed by means of Microsoft Excel, 
in which each record (row) corresponded to a text proposition, and each field 
(column), to information about the cognitive linguistic properties of the text. This 
made it simple to generate information about propositions with a given property (e.g. 
CRPs, trajector and landmarks). The numbers of coherence clues were calculated, and 
generated with the database calculation functions through Microsoft Excel. According 
to Dillinger (1994; Section 3.4), each slot-filler pair of each proposition in the ST 
received a score according to the degree of similarity between it and the segment of 
the subjects’ response being analyzed. Rather than use Dillinger’s ordinal scale of 
similarity, I basically use a nominal scale as follows due to the facts that are discussed 
in Section 3.4:    
 
0 if the slot-filler pair was not present in the segment (absent);  
0 If a sequence of the slot is mismatched with the SL. It is interesting to observe how 
any mismatch sequences affect the upcoming interpretation.      
1 if there was a change in surface form of the filler without a change in meaning 
(paraphrase). 
1 if the slot-filler par appeared in the segment verbatim.  
 
The design of the whole standard scale of the coherence clues is represented in Table 
9 below, in which the total numbers of coherence clues in each section are presented 
in the top row, and then subdivided into Subsection A and B respectively, according 
to the distance to the core of bodily experience:  
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Table 9 The total number of coherence clues for each section   
Section 1                                      Base number x 5                                                 Section 2 Base number x 5  
Activation & construal                 19 x5 = 95                                                            Embodied                                   34 x 5 = 170  
Segment A sequencing steps        13 x5 = 65                                                            Segment A sequencing steps      23 x 5= 115 
Segment A structure                     6 x 5 = 30                                                             Segment B: structure                   11 x 5 = 55 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 3                                        Base number x 5                                                Section Base number x 5  
Semi-embodied                              22 x 5 = 110                                                         Non-embodied                           26 x 5 = 130 
Segment A near embodied             9 x 5 = 45                                                             Segment A non hand-on            20 x 5 =100 
Segment B embodied extension     13 x 5 = 65                                                           Segment B subject matter          6 x 5 = 30  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
    Now it is time to step back and have an evaluative look at the deviations of the 
method from standard real-life interpreting practice. 
 
   5.7 Deviations from standard interpreting practice   
 
This experiment involves deviations from standard interpreting research practice. The 
subjects are not full-time professional interpreters, having neither an interpreter 
certificate granted by any Chinese national interpreting professional institutions, nor 
membership of the International Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC). 
However, according to the AIIC in 2008, there were only twenty-two members from 
the Chinese mainland registered with this association, out of whom seven are based in 
Shanghai, fifteen in Beijing. In addition,  according to Gile (1994), the difficult access 
to professional practitioners makes the research into real interpreting problematic due 
to such factors as geography, lack of physical availability, confidentiality of translated 
material, and even the personal reasons – many interpreters do not appreciate having 
their work scrutinized. On the other hand, both interpreting teachers and students are 
resourceful and available as subjects, even though they only work part-time for the 
local interpreting and translation organizations or agencies.  
   Next, the situation is simulation based. However, simulation is recognized as 
experimental research in the case of role-plays in a quasi-authentic environment 
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because simulation comes close to fieldwork. In the quasi-authentic environment, the 
interpreting trainees are not subjects, but protagonists who aim to enhance their 
interpreting performance, ‘in a given social setting – classroom settings’ (McDonough 
1997, Pöchhacker 2004: 63). 
This research also shares the deviations from practice of Dillinger’s work (1979) 
(Section 3.4) in that there were no audiences. According to Anderson (1979) and 
Dillinger (1994), the consequences for processing without an audience are unknown; 
no major qualitative difference might be expected in the interpreter’s overall 
performance. Subjects were not paid. According to Dillinger (1994) the consequences 
of this difference are unpredictable, and might entail a slight decrease in the 
interpreting performance; however, it is impossible that subjects can perform the 
complex interpreting task ‘in more than one way’ (Dillinger 1994: 162).  
    
      
  5.8 Concluding remarks  
 
    
This research adopts embodied experientialism as the base for the framework, and 
embodied cognitive linguistics for the method, combined with the traditional 
computational approach to coherence in simultaneous interpreting, to set up the 
experimental design. The experimental procedures are designed on the basis of the 
framework of Immersed Experiencer Frame (IEF). The Idealized Cognitive Model 
(ICM) is used to analyze the source text through cognitive processing, and Dillinger’s 
computational approach to coherence in simultaneous interpreting is used to access 
valid and reliable tools for data manipulation. The pilot test helped to uncover any 
serious flaws or problems that might have been overlooked at the design stage, and to 
generally fine tune the material and the procedure for the present experiment.  
On the basis of the research questions and hypothesis, a detailed account has been 
given of the design, in terms of the three items, namely subjects, materials, 
experimental conditions and procedures to ensure the replication, validity and 
reliability of this study. This experiment has described precisely what happened to the 
 137
subjects from the moment that they arrived to the moment they left. This subsection 
has provided a detailed account of what the experimenter said and did to the subjects 
in the order in which the experimenter did it, aiming to provide all the information 
necessary for any other researchers to be able to repeat precisely what this experiment 
did – to undertake what might be called an exact or direct replication of this study.               
However, upon reflection, it is apparent that there are some flaws in the design of 
the experiment. Firstly, in Section 5.3 I undertook the sample T test only for the 
undergraduates, in both control and experimental groups, to evaluate the effects of 
language proficiency, but not for the teachers group or the postgraduate group, on the 
grounds that the undergraduates in the control group interpreted for a second time; 
this was because information about the test achievements of the teachers group in 
language proficiency was not available and also because the small quantity of data 
(involving only five subjects) made a T text appear  insignificant or unnecessary for 
the two contrastive postgraduate groups. Next, in Section 5.4, I overlooked a fact that 
the procedures were orally given in Chinese to the experimental group, which might 
add an extra factor when comparing the results of the control and the experimental 
group. Thirdly, individual differences may exist within the control groups that would 
affect their performance. For example, some individuals, in this experiment, might 
have a better visual imagination, or some other individual trait, which would enhance 
their performance of the task even when they have had no previous embodied 
experience. These problems will have to be addressed in future work. However, the 
results do seem indicative of the influence of bodily experience and therefore support 
my recommendations to consider incorporating more opportunities for this in 
interpreter training and also more research into this aspect of the basis of coherence. 
This study will further proceed to the results in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 6 Results  
 
With the method described in Chapter 5, this chapter examines the results to explore 
the research questions in the light of the ICM: 1) Does the interpreter’s relevant 
bodily experience help her to achieve coherence in the source text (ST) and target text 
(TT)? 2) How does the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence 
reflect the textual structure of the source text (ST)? In order to explore the two 
questions, results are provided according to the procedures described in Section 5.4. 
With a view to the first question, we will examine the results of the activation and 
construal stage when the interpreting subjects in the experimental group went through 
their bodily experience of installing the shiatsu device, by filling in concepts/slots and 
relations/fillers in the propositions, prior to their interpreting performance (Section 
6.1). We will see the statistical difference between the two contrastive groups: the 
experimental group with exposure to bodily experience and the control group without 
any bodily experience (Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.3). With respect to the second question, a 
pattern of the interpreter’s mental effort emerges on the basis of the statistic indicators 
of the sections representing semi-embodied, embodied and non-embodied concepts 
(Section 6.3). In order to explore the role of full preparedness in achieving coherence, 
we will examine the results of the second interpretations made by the undergraduates 
in the control group (Section 6.4).  
    Section 6.1 starts with the results of the embodied activation and construal stage 
before interpreting; Section 6.2 provides a set of comparisons of the performance of 
the contrastive groups with and without embodied experience in the experiment, 
focusing on different factors involved in building coherence, in order to address 
Question 1. With respect to Question 2, on the basis of these total data and findings, 
Section 6.3 summarizes the role of the interpreter’s relevant bodily experience, in 
particular, observes how the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving 
coherence reflects the textual structure of the ST. Section 6.4 deals with the issues 
relating to the interpreter’s preparation in the context of no bodily experience.  
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Because of the small size of the corpus, only percentage results were used to indicate 
trends rather than show what results reached statistical significance.   
 
6.1 Activation and construal stage before interpreting: direct understanding   
 
At this point, the subjects in the experimental group had completed the stage of their 
bodily experience in installing the shiatsu massager, so how they activated and 
construed the mental structure to attain coherence, through filling in the slot-pair 
cognitive diagrams, was examined. Table 10 below shows the number and percentage 
of the total coherence clues (Table 9, Chapter 5), which each individual group in the 
experimental group achieved after their embodied activation and construal stage. The 
three individual groups in the experimental group are listed on the left column: 
teachers, postgraduates and undergraduates:     
  
Table 10 Number and percentage of coherence clues achieved for activation and construal by the 
experimental group 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Group          Number/% out of total                         Number/% in subsection A                                Number/ % in subsection B                                  
                                                                                                                                                    
Teachers                 49/51%                                         45/69 %                                                         4/13 % 
Postgraduates          55/58%                                         47/72 %                                                         8/27 % 
Undergraduates       50/53 %                                        40/62 %                                                         10/33 % 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number of clues    95                                                       65                                                                               30     
 
Table 10 indicates the outcomes of the interpreting subjects of the three individual 
groups in the experimental group after their bodily experience with the shiatsu device. 
Success rates for filling the spaces with the coherence clues were 51% for the teachers, 
58% for the postgraduates, and 53% for the undergraduates. The overall performance 
is not satisfactory, in that none of the three groups achieved the threshold of 60 points, 
according to the research and design (Harris 2008). This seemingly familiar device is 
not as easily conceptualized as it seems, as the Interpretive Theory of translation 
asserts (reviewed in Section 3.2). However, the bodily experience stage makes its 
significance felt in helping the interpreter to achieve coherence. In particular, a closer 
look shows that in terms of the information in subsection A, the installation 
 140
procedures of the shiatsu device, the three groups have achieved significantly more 
than the basic threshold: 69% of coherence clues for the teacher’s group, 72% for the 
postgraduate group, and 62% for the undergraduate group. The primary issue arises 
from the data: what is the link between the interpreting subjects’ bodily experience 
and coherence processing in their interpreting?  The basic issue will give rise to 
questions under an umbrella:  Will the interpreting subjects basically have the fixing 
procedures mapped into their minds via mental space blending? Will the activation 
and construal activity help them to form the basic mental links in the action sequence? 
Will the interpreting subjects have their working memory activated through their 
bodily experience, which would help them have access to coherence in their 
interpreting? I leave these questions to the following chapter for discussion, by means 
of examination of the detailed corpora. 
The findings relating to the six fixing steps show that the subjects in the 
experimental group can basically arrange the sequential order according to the natural 
sequence without mismatching the installation steps even though a few steps were 
missed somehow. Table 11 below shows this point by choosing the interpreting 
postgraduates in the experimental group to access a micro view as follows:   
 
Table 11 Six fixing steps sequential order arranged by the postgraduate group 
Group No.                  Six fixing steps sequential order 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  
PG+1 ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PG+2 missed ok ok ok ok missed 
PG+3 ok ok missed ok ok ok 
PG+4 ok ok ok ok ok missed 
PG+5  ok ok ok ok ok missed 
 
 
PG+1 matched the six steps order totally, PG+2 missed two steps order, the rest (PG+3, 
PG+4and PG+5) missed only one. This interesting result leads to questions: will the 
iconicity of the process basically be projected into the interpreters’ minds? Can the 
experimental interpreting subjects have the sequential actions entered into their 
mental spaces? Alternatively, will they have natural chains of action stored in their 
minds, avoiding obstacles in generating the sequential discourse? This will be further 
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explored in the forthcoming chapter for discussion in line with the conclusions on 
iconicity by cognitive linguists (Section 4.6.2). On the other hand, the data pertaining 
to the structure of the shiatsu massager in subsection B in Table 9 above demonstrates 
that the subjects only found the coherence clues at rates of 13% for the teachers, 27% 
for the postgraduates, and 33% for the undergraduates. Specifically, in terms of the 
shiatsu structure (Figure 21), the subjects could access the action of kneading heads, 
move up and down, but how (rotating) and where (on the guide), and what material 
(PVC) of the guide are less activated in memory. Therefore, the findings will give rise 
to questions on more specific and detailed cognitive processing properties involved in 
building up an ICM structure to make sense and establish coherence. Specifically, will 
the prominent concepts be activated more easily than the obscure ones as the 
theoretical framework postulates in Chapter 4? If it is true, how does it affect the 
interpreter‘s performance? In addition, the data interestingly indicate that in the 
experimental group, the undergraduates have achieved 2% more coherence clues 
rating than the teachers, and 5% less than postgraduates; and the postgraduates had a 
slight upper hand overall among the three (up to 7% more than the teachers, 5% than 
undergraduates). Issues keep arising from the data; considering that the young novices 
engaged in interpreting seem to have a more inquisitive mind and careful observation 
during their bodily experience activities – will this facilitate their interpreting? Does 
this phenomenon suggest that the interpreters should do their utmost to access any 
information available so as to have any nodes activated? According to the Interpreting 
Theory of translation (IT) (reviewed in Chapter 3), observing carefully and trying to 
absorb relevant knowledge and information in the current situation and context are 
important abilities for interpreters to build up the detailed coherence. This issue is still 
to be further discussed in the following Chapter 7 along with the detailed corpora.  
    In summary, these observations have led straight to the main research issues in 
question: Does the interpreter’s bodily experience help her to achieve coherence? This 
question will be initially explored by comparing the two contrastive groups in the 
following sections, on the basis of the coherence clues ratings which the subjects 
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achieved during their interpreting performance, in the sections representing embodied, 
semi-embodied, and non-embodied knowledge. This will lead to exploring the second 
question: how does the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence 
reflect the textual structure in the ST?   
 
6.2 Integration stage: coherence clues achieved in interpreting each section   
 
The findings in the following sections show how interpreters, both with (the 
experimental group) and without (the control group) bodily experience, achieved 
coherence in SI. In order to investigate both the role of the interpreter’s bodily 
experience and her mental effort reflecting the textual structure, analyzed from the 
ICM perspective, the following findings are presented according to the discourse 
sequence as described in Section 5.2: the sections representing the semi-embodied, 
embodied, and non-embodied concepts in the ST. From the perspective of the ICM, 
the propositional model is used to analyze the embodied concepts based section; 
image schema is used to examine the semi-embodied concepts based section; the 
metaphorical and metonymic model is used to evaluate the non-embodied and/or 
abstract concepts based section. 
 
6.2.1 The section representing semi-embodied concepts  
 
This section includes sentences 5 to 7, segments 4 to 14 in the corpora (Appendix 1). 
The concepts in this section basically involve some kind of reflection about the 
physical actions relating to the installation, and general ideas about the shiatsu device, 
therefore, it also includes the Speaker’s introduction to his speech.  
    Tables 12 and 13 below provide the number and percentage of coherence clues 
achieved by the two contrastive groups, for the section representing semi-embodied 
concepts. The findings in the contrastive tables show that the experimental group with 
their bodily experience followed more coherence clues than the control group without 
any bodily experience. Each individual experimental group achieved significantly 
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more coherence clues than their respective peer group: 85% vs. 75% for the teachers’ 
groups; 87% vs. 71% for the postgraduate groups, and 85% vs. 38% for the 
undergraduate groups. That represents 10% difference between the paired teachers 
groups, 16% between the paired postgraduates groups, and most strikingly, 47% 
between the paired undergraduates groups:  
 
Table 12 The experimental group: number and percentage of coherence clues attained in the section 
representing semi-embodied concepts  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Group               Number/% out of total clues             Number/ % in subsection A                            Number/% in subsection B   
Teachers                        93/85 %                                     42/93 %                                                                    51/78% 
Postgraduates                96/87 %                                     45/100 %                                                                  51/78% 
Undergraduates            93/85 %                                    44/98 %                                                                     49/75% 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number of clues     110                                            45                                                                                65 
 
Table 13 The control group: number and percentage of coherence clues attained in the section 
representing semi-embodied concepts 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Group              Number/% out of total clues            Number/% out in subsection A                    Number/% out of in subsection B     
Teachers                         83/75 %                                       40/89 %                                                                 43/66% 
Postgraduate                  78/71 %                                        43/96 %                                                                 35/54% 
Undergraduate             42/38 %                                        30/67 %                                                                 12/18% 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number of clues    110                                                 45                                                                           65 
 
These findings could imply that the  bodily experience of the subjects in the 
experimental group makes a difference in helping them to access the representations 
in the mental world, but more issues need explaining: primarily, what are the links 
between the contextual situation and integrative embodiment, and coherence? How 
does the image schema in the interpreter’s mind work to help make sense of semi-
embodied concepts?  In comparison with any other section, the subjects achieved 
more of these coherence clues for both groups with and without the embodied 
experience. The issues arise from this: why is it comparatively easier to make sense 
and establish coherence in the section of semi-embodied concepts? The answer to this 
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question seems to point to the fact that the semi-embodied information may be 
general and broad from image schema perspective, but this needs further discussion 
with reference to the detailed corpora in the following chapter. In addition, how is the 
inferential ability facilitated or constrained by the interactive embodiment? In other 
words, does the interpreting subjects’ interactive embodiment help them to activate 
their working memory?  
The comparison of the results between the undergraduate interpreters and other 
groups in the experimental group is significant, in that the undergraduates in the 
experimental group not only did much better in following coherence clues than their 
peer group (47%, as mentioned above) but also nearly caught up with the 
experimental postgraduates (2% less), and attained the same coherence clues rating as 
the teachers (up to 85%). Can this point to the hypothesis (Section 5.1) that, the 
embodied experience can compensate for the deficiency in language competence? All 
the issues mentioned above are left to further explanations behind the data in the 
following chapter.  
 
6.2.2 The section representing embodied concepts 
 
This section includes coherence clues in matching steps in relation to the structure (S8) 
and fixing steps of the shiatsu equipment (S10-S15). This section overlaps with the 
interpreter trainees’ previous bodily experienced stage of the activation and construal, 
by their experience of setting up and trying out the device (Section 5.1), analyzed 
from the propositional model. Tables 14 and 15 below show the number and 
percentage of coherence clues which the two contrastive groups attained for the 
embodied section, suggesting that the exposure to bodily experience process makes its 
significance felt in interpreting performance through the embodied activation and 
construal procedure, especially when the two contrastive groups were compared with 
each other. The outcomes show that the experimental group succeeded in tracking 
more coherence clues than the control group, on the grounds that the experimental 
group matched the coherence clues more than the control group in terms of the paired 
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teachers’ group (14% difference), and the paired postgraduate group (34%), and 
especially the paired undergraduate group, for which the difference was 43%:  
 
Table 14 The experimental group: number and percentage of coherence clues attained in the section 
representing embodied concepts 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Group                  Number/% out of total                       Number/% in subsection A                             Number/% in subsection B  
Teachers                         89/52 %                                                    77/67 %                                                           12/22% 
Postgraduates                 119/70 %                                                  96/83 %                                                           23/42 % 
Undergraduates             116/68 %                                                 98/85 %                                                           18/12% 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number of clues      170                                                            115                                                                     55 
 
Table 15 The control group: number and percentage of coherence clues attained in the section representing 
embodied concepts  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Group                Number /% out of total clues              Number/ % in subsection A                             Number/ % in subsection B    
Teachers                        64/38 %                                                 56/49 %                                                               8/15% 
Postgraduate                 61/36 %                                                  47/41 %                                                              14/25% 
Undergraduate             42/25 %                                                 28/24 %                                                               14/9 % 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number of clues     170                                                          115                                                                       55 
 
In addition, the postgraduate group still takes a slight lead in attainment (2%) over the 
undergraduate group and even over the teacher’s group (18%) in the experimental 
group. The outcomes of the experimental group basically coincide with those of the 
previous embodied activation and construal stage, in terms of coherence clues rating 
achieved by the different individual groups. Can it suggest: more embodiment, more 
understanding, and more coherence?  At this point, more issues arising from this data 
will need to be investigated by referring to the corpora in the forthcoming chapter. 
Primarily, can the interpreter’s embodied experience compensate for the deficiency in 
language competence? How can the interpreter rely on the embodied mental structure 
as the mappings to bridge reference and inference for coherence? In other words, do 
these findings suggest that the subjects with embodied experience have formed such 
embodied structures as frame and script, by having the action sequences projected and 
mapped in their minds due to the fact that this group had gone through the embodied 
activation and construal? In short, does the interpreting subjects’ interactive 
embodiment help them to achieve coherence in interpreting each section?   
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It is also interesting to observe the two contrastive groups separately. Table 14 
shows the coherence clues ratings achieved by the control group, who have not 
undertaken any bodily experience procedures. Under the non-embodied condition, the 
teachers’ group ranks in the top place overall in achieving coherence, that is, 3% 
above the postgraduates group and 22% above the undergraduate group. But when we 
have a close look at subsection B, the non-embodied level, the teacher’s group 
achieved 10% more coherence clues than the postgraduates and 1% more than the 
undergraduate group. In short, in the case of the non-embodiment level, regarding the 
overall interpreting performance, the experienced teachers could use their academic 
background to facilitate their interpreting, but when it comes to the less prominent or 
salient concepts, academic experience does not necessarily confer much advantage. 
This is further evidenced in the data in Table 13, which shows that, having undergone 
their bodily experience, the postgraduates and undergraduates improved their 
interpreting performance more than the teacher’s group; the postgraduates achieved 
70% of coherence clues, the undergraduates 68% while the teacher’s group only 52%. 
Therefore, it is worth discussing this phenomenon in the following chapter: in the 
condition of non-embodiment, experience and academic background knowledge may 
play a role in achieving coherence, while, in the embodiment context, bodily 
experience makes a fundamental difference. And also, with the same degree of 
difficulty in terms of the speech material, and on the basis of embodiment, novices 
might do as well as the experienced, even if not better. Could it be assumed that 
interpreting courses or programmes for Chinese undergraduates can be offered, 
provided that embodied cognition is taken into their teaching modules?  
In addition, further investigation of this phenomenon is required by combining the 
corpora with the theoretical framework of this study, which posits that the 
embodiment-based frames and scripts underlie the interpreter’s performance to help to 
achieve coherence, and that when interpreters have the propositional mental structure 
and image schema they could have easy access to the local coherence clues, and the 
interpreter is able to bridge reference and inference for local coherence, since a chain 
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of mental links are projected into their working memory, by metaphorical processing, 
in a form of the schema, such as the container, the part-whole, the link, the centre-
periphery and the source-path-goal (Lakoff 1987: 272-275), (reviewed in Section 4.2.2, 
and discussed in Section 7.2.2). The next issue to be discussed by combining the 
corpora is: how the interpreting subjects, on the basis of their existing bodily 
experience, processed the previous relevant construal elements into a part of working 
memory, and how they facilitate the current construal along with the functional web 
activated by the current words in integrating the embodied experience and interpreting 
through working memory (Section 3.5)? Following this line, it is necessary to note: 
how are verbs related with the whole situation, and could make some aspects more 
prominent and salient cognitively (Fillmore 1982, 1985), rather than logically or 
grammatically (Langacker 2000: 331, 359)? The issue arising from this finding will 
lead to a discussion: how will the interpreter’s bodily experience affect her skills, such 
as anticipation, compensation, coordination and judgment?          
 
6.2.3 The section representing non-embodied concepts 
 
This section includes sentences 16 to 19; segments 34 to 43 (see Section 5.1). It 
represents non-embodied concepts and includes the type of knowledge which is far 
from the core of the direct embodiment (for instance, warnings on application of the 
shiatsu massager), which is more or less abstract (Subsection A), including the subject 
matter-based knowledge such as technical terms and numbers (Subsection B), defined 
by Wang (2006, Section 4.5.4) as background knowledge, which is unconventional 
and unpredictable in communication.  
Tables 16 and 17 show the number and percentage of coherence clues attained by 
the two contrastive groups for this section based on non-embodied concepts. The 
experimental group again attained more coherence clues than the control group, with 
the teachers’ group attaining nearly twice as many coherence clues as their peers 
group (50 % vs. 28%), the postgraduate group attained 19% more than their peer 
group (56% vs. 37%), and most strikingly, the undergraduate group’s success in 
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following coherence clues was 52% times higher than that of its peer group (64% vs. 
12%):  
 
Table 16 The experimental group: number and percentage of coherence clues attained in the section 
representing non-embodied concepts    
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Group               Number/% out of total clues                Number/ % in subsection A                        Number/% in subsection B     
Teachers                     74/57 %                                                         61/53 %                                                13/43% 
Postgraduates             73/56 %                                                         62/54 %                                                11/37 % 
Undergraduates         83/64 %                                                        73/63 %                                                 10/33 % 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number of clues  130                                                                 100                                                         30                  
 
 
Table 17 The control group: number and percentage of coherence clues attained in the section representing 
non-embodied concepts 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Group               Number/% out of total clues                  Number/% in subsection A                          Number/% in subsection B    
Teachers                    37/28%                                                          30/26 %                                                  7/23% 
Postgraduate             48/37%                                                           41/36 %                                                  7/23% 
Undergraduate         16/12 %                                                          15/13 %                                                  1/3% 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number of clues   130                                                               100                                                           30                  
 
The issue which needs to be discussed in the forthcoming chapter is: has the 
embodied activation and construal helped the subjects with bodily experience to form 
a basic mental structure?  Further, does this basic mental structure facilitate inference 
to achieve coherence (even though the interpreting outcome is not satisfactory in 
terms of the matching rate of coherence clues overall)? However, in comparison with 
the two previous sections of the semi-embodied concepts and embodied concepts, the 
interpreting performance of this section is the weakest link with respect to both 
experimental and control groups, in terms of the actual numbers of clues tracked. It is 
clearly the biggest obstacle in interpreting. The question arising from this finding will 
be further addressed by combining this theoretical framework and the corpora. The 
lack of specialized knowledge of what is being interpreted is the impeding factor 
which prevents the speaker from inferencing or bridging the reference for coherence; 
and the inactive, changeable and unpredictable information in the discourse is 
problematic for the interpreting subjects. Tables 16 and 17 show, even though the 
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technical terms had been distributed to the subjects before interpreting task, the 
outcomes of the two contrastive groups do not appear satisfactory. The technical 
terms and numbers in subsection B are the weakest links in the weak chain of the non-
embodied section: the teachers in the experimental group only followed 27% of these 
and their peer group only 20%; the other two groups were worse.  
At this point, my curiosity leads to a closer look at how subjects interpreted the 
technical terms and numbers in subsection B, as Table 18 shows below. The technical 
terms include PVC guide, AC main outlet, short circuit, and the numbers include 230 
volts, 30 pounds, and 69 pounds. I focus on the teachers in the experimental group for 
examination. Table 18 below shows the accuracy in numerical and technical data 
rendered by the teachers’ group.  In terms of numbers, the findings show that the 
larger the number is, the more difficult it is for interpreting, and numbers are more 
difficult to render if more than two numbers are put together in a speech discourse:  
 
Table 18 Accuracy in numerical and technical terms achieved by the teachers in experimental group 
Serial No. Numerical  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
41 30 pounds ok missed ok ok ok 
42 69 pounds ok missed wrong (96) wrong (68) wrong (60) 
27 230 volt wrong (200) wrong(220) ok ok missed 
 Tech-terms       
27 AC main outlet missed (AC) missed (AC) missed (AC) missed (AC) missed (AC) 
38 Short circuit missed  missed ok missed missed 
19 PVC guide  ok missed ok missed missed 
 
 
With respect to technical terms, only the general concepts could be presented (e.g. 
main outlet), but the specific terms (e.g. AC) are usually missed. The issue, arising 
from this for further discussion in combination with the specific corpora, is: could the 
interpreter’s bodily experience help her to form frame knowledge and facilitate the 
inferencing process for the experimental group? In addition, regarding interpretation 
of numerical and technical terms, the issue arising from this finding for further 
discussion is: If ‘the technical words are closely connected with learning the subjects 
and may present conceptual difficulties’ (Jordan 1997: 152), should the interpreter be 
equipped with enough knowledge of the subject matter or popular science to be 
specialized in their interpreting career as Dillinger asserts (Section 3.4)? Further, are 
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numbers, names and terms, as Setton (1999: 253) claims, typical items which are 
difficult to associate into the mental model, and vulnerable to error or omission in 
interpreting? Following this question, more crucial issues to be discussed in the 
following chapter are: how can interpreter trainees be helped to build up the required 
knowledge or to comprehend the abstract concepts by metaphoric and metonymic 
processing? In other words, how can interpreters fulfill tasks involving more complex 
and specialized subject matters?   
In order to find out how metonymic processing is reflected in interpreting the 
abstract or non-embodied information, I purposely analyzed the synchronicity of two 
subjects, an undergraduate and teacher with bodily experience, as Table 19 shows 
below. The corpus for synchronization is based on an undergraduate and a teacher. 
The accuracy of audible synchronization is guaranteed on the grounds that both the 
source speech of the Speaker and the interpretations of the subjects were stored 
separately in the master memory of the control panel, and their recordings 
automatically proceed without any margin of error for timing. The audio data in Table 
19 is taken from the speech, starting from 3 minutes, 21 seconds to 4 minutes 12 
seconds. A word-for-word Chinese gloss accompanies the English input test, 
including a few Chinese particles (e.g. de/地 an adverbial particle), and other language 
specific features without transparent equivalents in English (e.g. yao/要an auxiliary 
conditional marker; yixia/一下 an adverbial auxiliary phrase; ba/把  a preposition 
particle).  
These results showed more detailed findings. The subjects start a bit slowly to 
follow up the thread of Speaker’s ideas, with the undergraduate’s EVS (ear voice span) 
from 7 to 8 seconds, and teacher’s EVS from five to six seconds. When moving into 
the right track of the ideas thread of the Speaker, they both can keep nearly in a 
synchronic step with the speaker, up to 1 to 4 seconds EVS.  In particular, the teacher 
appeared more professional than the undergraduate in anticipating and generalizing 
information: 
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Table 19 Synchronization: interpretations of the non- embodied section rendered by UG+1 and T+1 with gloss 
 
S T  S 1 6 :  A l w a y s  r e m e m b e r  0 3 . 2 1  t o  s t o r e  i t  p r o p e r l y @ 0 3 .  2 3  P l a c e  t h e  a p p l i a n c e  i n  i t s  b o x  o r  i n  a  s a f e ,  d r y ,  a n d  c o o l  
p l a c e  0 3 . 2 9  +  @         
U G + 1 接 下 来  我 给 大 家  说 一 下 注 意 事 项 0 3 . 2 9  把 它 放 到 一 个 适 当 的 位 置 0 3 . 3 1  让 它 干 燥  以 及 不 要 太 潮 湿 的 环 境 0 3 . 3 5  
    Following,      I   to everyone   say  (yixia)   warnings.                with it put to  a   proper place                                let it dry          and     not   too damp environment 
T+1   记住       一定   要    把它    放 在  安全，凉爽  的地方 03.25 
      Remember        must   (yao)    with it      put in (a)  safe,    cool         (de)  place 
S 1 7 :  W a t e r  o r  a n y  l i q u i d s  0 3 . 3 3  t h a t  c o m e  i n t o  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  a p p l i a n c e 0 3 . 3 5  a r e  d a n g e r o u s @ 0 3 . 3 6  
U G + 1 记 住   不 要 让 它 以 水 ，  以 及 液 体 接 触  0 3 . 3 9  因 为 这 是 很 危 险 的 0 3 . 4 0  
    Remember not (yao) let it  with water,   as well as liquid contact           because this is very dangerous  
T + 1  不 能 够 让 水 和 任 何 液 体 进 去 0 3 . 3 1  
     Not can let water and any liquid come in  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
S 1 8 :  A v o i d  c o n t a c t  w i t h  s h a r p  e d g e s  o r  p o i n t e d  o b j e c t s  0 3 . 4 1  w h i c h  m i g h t  c u t  o r  p u n c t u r e  t h e  f a b r i c  s u r f a c e .  @ 0 3 . 4 3  
U G + 1 在 此 大 家    注 意    不 要 让 他 接 触 锐 利 的 东 西 0 3 . 4 5  它 会 损 伤 座 椅 0 3 . 4 6  
    In here   everyone    pay attention   not (yao) let it contact sharp (de) things          it will damage (the) chair. 
T + 1   再 一 个   不 要 放 到 锐 利 东 西 的 旁 边  0 3 . 3 8  
          Another thing   not (yao) put to sharp things   (de) side  
S 1 9 :  T o  a v o i d  b r e a k a g e ,  0 3 . 4 6  +  D O  N O T  w r a p  t h e  p o w e r  c o r d  a r o u n d  t h e  a p p l i a n c e  +  0 3 . 5 0  S 2 0 :  D O  N O T  h a n g  t h e  u n i t  
b y  t h e  c o r d +  @  0 3 . 5 2  This will cause short circuit 03.55 
U G + 1 以 及 不 要 把 这 个 线  环 绕  在 椅 子 上  0 3 . 5 2    更     不 要 把  它 吊  起 来 0 3 . 5 3   这 样 都 会 减 少 它 的 寿 命 0 3 . 5 7  
    And    not (yao) with this wire  wrapped around this chair               what is more   not (yao) with it hang up                         this     all  will  reduces its life          
T + 1   不 要 拉 扯 电 线 ，       这 样 会 把 店 子 弄 坏  0 3 . 5 0  
Not (yao) pull or tear (the) wire   this   can (ba) (the) cushion damage   
 
S 2 1 :  @  L a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n 0 3 . 5 7 ,  y o u  c o u l d  h a v e  i t  n o w  a t -  3 0  p o u n d s  0 4 . 0 0 .  I n  J o h n  L e w i s ,  E d i n b u r g h  0 4 . 0 2 ,  i t  c o s t s -  
6 9  p o u n d s 0 4 . 0 4 @  I f  y o u  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d ,  f e e l  f r e e  t o  t r y  t h e  S h i a t s u  m a s s a g e r  a g a i n 0 4 . 1 0  b e f o r e  y o u  b u y  i t . 0 4 . 1 1  +   T h a n k s                              
U G + 1 生 们 女 士 们 0 3 . 5 8 你 现 在 就 可 以 得 到 它 @ 3 0 英 镑 的 价 格 就 可 以 把 它 带 回 家 了 0 4 . 0 1  或 者 你 花 6 0 英 镑 - 如 果 你 在 国 外  在  英 国 买 它 ， 大 家 可 以 试 坐   
            Gentlemen, ladies      You now  (jiu) can get it             30 pounds price  (jiu)  can with it take home,                             or   you spend 60 pounds  – if you (are ) abroad ,  in  UK buy it    everyone can try it  @             
一 下 在  买 它 之 前 0 4 . 1 1                
          yixia)         before buying it    
T + 1 先 生 们 女 士 们   你 们 现 在 就 可 以 购 买 ， 只 需 3 0 英 镑  0 4 . 0 0   而 在 英 国 哪     需 要 6 9 英 镑  如 果 你 想 的 话 ， 可 以 再 试 一 下 0 4 . 1 2  
Gentlemen, ladies           you    now    (jiu)  can purchase    only need 30 pounds               but in UK (na :auxiliary ) need  69 pounds   if you want ,              can again have a try   
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This could show how the experimental subjects used metonymic mental processing 
for non-embodied abstract information. This will be further discussed in Section 7.2.3. 
However, the size of the corpus is not large enough; the metaphorical processing of 
abstract concepts has not been tracked in the data. In other words, how the 
interpreting subjects use metaphorical processing as an extension to understand 
abstract concepts has not been dealt with in the present corpus. This problem will 
further be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 as a crucial part of future work.  
 
 
6.3 The overall results: the role of the interpreter’s bodily experience and the 
mental effort reflecting the textual structure   
 
 
On the basis of the existing outcomes, we will summarize the role of the interpreter’s 
bodily experience, in particular, to address the second research question: How does 
the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence reflect the textual 
structure of the source text (ST)? The answers to the two questions are found through 
the following results of the total outcomes of the two contrastive groups. Tables 20 
and 21 below show the total results of the two contrastive groups in terms of the 
number and percentage of coherence clues which each total group of teachers, 
postgraduates and undergraduates followed for each section. The findings in the two 
tables below show that, as in all the previous sections, the subjects in the experimental 
group succeeded in following more coherence clues than those than the control group. 
Both contrastive groups achieved the highest level of coherence in the semi-embodied 
section, 85% for the experimental group and 62% for the control group, and came 
down to a lower level in the embodied section, 64% for the experimental group, 33% 
for the control group; finally the lowest level was in the non-embodied section, 56% 
for the experimental group and 25% for the control group:  
 
Table 20 Number of total coherence clues and percentage attained by the overall experimental group 
Section                                     activation & construal           embodied           semi-embodied           non-embodied    
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Number&% of total clues          154 /54%                                324/64%            282/85%                    220/56%             
Number/% in Sub. A                 132/68%                                 271/79%             131/97%                    196/65%                               
Number /% in Sub. B                 22/24%                                  53/32%              151/77%                     34/37%             
____________________________________________________________________ 
Total number                             285                                           510                     330                              390 
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Table 21  Number of total coherence clues and percentage by the overall control group  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Section                                                       embodied                                     semi-embodied                non-embodied  
Number& % of total clues                        167/ 33 %                                     203/62%                          101/25%   
Number /% in Sub. A                                131/38%                                       113/84%                           86/28% 
Number/ % in Sub. B                                36/22%                                          90/46%                            15/16%                                                  
____________________________________________________________________________________________                                        
Total number    285                                      510                                                 330                              390 
 
 
In order to have a clearer picture of results relating to the role of the interpreter’s 
bodily experience, Tables 20 and 21 above are represented as the following bar chart 
below, Figure 21, where the first bar on the left represents the embodied activation 
and construal stage, only carried out by the experimental group; with respect to the 
other three pairs, the bar on the left indicates the percentage of coherence clues which 
the experimental group attained while the bar on the right represents those which the 
control group followed:  
 
Figure 21 The data showing the role of interpreter’s bodily experience 
 
The findings suggest that, first and foremost, the interpreting subjects’ exposure to 
bodily experience has driven them through their interpreting like a compulsive force 
vector, making the subjects in the experimental group achieve higher coherence rating 
than those in the control group. Thus, the hypothesis on the role of the interpreter’s 
exposure to bodily experience (Section 5.1) has been verified.  
Next, despite the different outcomes above, the two contrastive groups show a 
regular pattern of the interpreter’s mental effort in achieving coherence, in terms of 
the textual structure. The coherence ratings stand in an inverse ratio to the mental 
effort: more coherence rating, less mental effort, vice versa. The findings in Figure 22 
below show that, the two groups share the mental effort pattern, from the ICM 
perspective, indicating the relations of the coherence rating clues and the increasing 
mental effort spent by the experimental group (left) and the control group (right). The 
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best interpreted coherent section is the semi-embodied information, followed by the 
section representing embodied concepts, finally by the section representing non-
embodied concepts, in terms of the coherence rating scale. The findings suggest that, 
in terms of the mental effort, the interpreting subjects spent the least mental effort on 
the semi-embodied section, a slight increasing mental effort on the embodied section, 
most mental effort on the non-embodied section. This finding contradicts the 
hypothesis in the Section 5.1, which assumes that the most coherent interpreted 
section should be the embodied section which was supposed to be the first place in the 
scale, and require least mental effort: 
 
                                         The increasing mental effort  
       
         Figure 22a    ICM structure                                Figure 22b     Textual structure     
Figure 22 Data of the textual structure: an ICM perspective   
 
From the ICM perspective, the interpreting subjects’ mental effort reflects the texture 
structure of the source text (ST), which can be outlined in terms of the speech stages 
as follows: 
a) Introducing the objective of the speech event: the interpreter’s mental effort mental 
effort starts up its process at an easy and lower level. 
b) The stage of semi-embodied concepts, analyzed from image schema perspective, 
including explanation of the meaning and purpose of the product being promoted: the 
interpreter’s mental effort starts working at a stable and a low rate. 
c) The stage of embodied concepts, viewed from the propositional model perspective, 
including briefing on the appliance’s structure, explaining fixing procedures: the 
interpreter’s mental effort starts working at an increasing level    
d) The stage of non-embodied concepts, analyzed from the metaphorical and 
metonymic model perspective, including warnings about storage, favorable price 
/numerals, technical terms: the interpreter’s mental effort progresses into the most 
demanding level.    
e) Concluding remarks: the interpreter’s mental process starts decreasing its effort.   
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The data show a form of increasing mental effort invested in processing the semi-
embodied, embodied and non-embodied knowledge in attention energy, with the 
embodiment playing the central role in understanding. These findings contribute to 
the theories of contextual configuration (Tebble 1994) (reviewed in Section 3.1.1) and 
information structure (Seleskovitch and Ledere 1986) (reviewed in Section 3.2), and 
the effort models (Gile 2005) (reviewed in 3.3.2). The issues arising from this finding  
will be discussed in combination with the corpus in the following Chapters 7 and 8, 
from the ICM perspective.  
At this point, a question rises: how does the textual structure reflect cognitive 
properties in processing information from the ICM perspective, in terms of 
idealization, hierarchy, gradience, fuzziness and gestalt, reviewed in Sections 4.2.6 
and 5.2? In other words, what do the cognitive properties suggest to the interpreter in 
processing information? Further, what underlies the properties?  These questions will 
be discussed in Section 7.3. Now, this research will see how the undergraduates in the 
control group succeeded in their second attempt at interpreting the same text.  
 
 
6.4 The second interpreting outcome achieved by the undergraduates without 
embodied experience  
 
 
The five undergraduate subjects in the control group who were not subjected to bodily 
experience were asked to repeat the interpreting for a second time, but one subject (P-5 
Table 4b) did not present his outcome due to a recording failure. We will see how the 
other four performed in the relevant sections, and compare their results with their four 
peers in the experimental group in their original interpretations. It is necessary to 
repeat the objectives of this repetitive group which are set out in Section 5.4.4, as 
follows: do all interpreters need to have physical experience of everything that could 
be talked about in the conference? Which parts should be physically experienced? 
Does the interpreter draw on some sort of indirect experience?  In this section, we will 
be able to access only the initial outcomes of the issues, and undertake an in-depth 
discussion in the following chapter.  
Tables 22 to 27 show the number and percentage of coherence clues attained for 
each relevant section based on the embodied, semi-embodied and non-embodied 
knowledge, by the two contrastive groups: the undergraduates in the control group, in 
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their first and second interpretations, and their peers of the experimental group, in 
their original interpretations. In the following tables in this section, first interpretation 
means the original interpreting performance of the undergraduates in the control 
group in terms of coherence clues, and second interpretation means the repeated 
interpretation of the same text of the same control group; the experimental group 
means the undergraduates of the experimental group in terms of their original 
interpreting performance.   
 
6.4.1 The section representing embodied concepts  
 
As mentioned above, Tables 22and 23 show the results of the undergraduates in the 
control group for their first and second performance of the interpretation, compared 
with the performance of their peers in the experimental group with respect to the 
number and percentage of coherence clues achieved for the embodied-section: 
 
 
Table 22 Number and percentage of coherence clues attained by the four undergraduates of the control 
group in their first and second interpretations in the section representing embodied concepts  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Number & % of total clues           Number //% of clues in Sub. A                          Number/% of clues in Sub. B 
   1st                   2nd                     1st              2nd                                 1st             2nd  
  34/25%                  83/61%                      22/24%           62/67%                                      12/27%            21/47%         
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number 136                                                      92                                                                       44  
 
 
Table 23 Number and percentage of coherence clues originally attained by the four undergraduates of the 
experimental group in the section representing embodied concepts  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Number & % of total clues             Number /% of clues in Sub. A                              Number/% of clues in Sub. B 
                    92/68%                                         76/83%                                                                       16/36%  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number 136                                                92                                                                              44  
 
 
From Tables 22 and 23, it can be seen that the control group have improved their 
interpreting coherence performance by more than twice as much from the first attempt 
(from 25% up to 61%). This suggests that a better preparation could contribute to 
coherence in SI. However, compared with their peer experimental group, the control 
group remains 7% and 26% behind in following coherence clues overall in subsection 
A, which may be due to the lack of the interactive embodiment process. In short, full 
preparedness is critical for interpreting, and the exposure to bodily experience remains 
the control centre to help the interpreter to achieve coherence, therefore, direct 
 157
understanding is based on embodiment, and needs to be physically engaged for 
making sense, and embodiment helps to extend indirect understanding. An interpreter 
needs bodily experience for direct understanding to facilitate her sense making 
process, in that she uses her bodily experience as a foundation to access the indirect 
understanding (an initial answer to the questions raised at the introduction of this 
section: do all interpreters need to have physical experience of everything that could 
be talked about in the conference? Which parts should be physically experienced?). In 
addition, an interesting finding is that with respect to subsection B, the accurate 
coherence clues attained by the undergraduates in the control group the second time 
are 11% higher than those originally achieved by the experimental group. This shows 
that the obscure and minor aspects of cognition are easily ignored by the experimental 
group, and full preparation, or rather imagery capacity contributes to comprehension 
and coherence in the indirect understanding. These findings will be further discussed 
in Sections7.1 and 7.4.  
 
 
6.4.2 The section representing semi-embodied concepts 
 
Tables 24 and 25 below show the results achieved by the undergraduates in both 
control (in first and second interpretations) and experimental groups, indicating the 
number of coherence clues attained for the section representing semi-embodied 
concepts:  
 
 
Table 24 Number and percentage of coherence clues attained by the four undergraduates of the control 
group in their first and second interpretations in the section representing semi-embodied concepts  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Number & % of total clues                  Number /% of clues in Sub. A                  Number/% of clues in Sub. B 
   1st                   2nd                     1st              2nd                              1st               2nd  
    35/40%                 75/85%                    30/83%            36/100%                              5/10%                  39/75%         
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number 88                                                      36                                                                      52  
 
 
Table 25 Number and percentage of coherence clues originally attained by the four undergraduates of the 
experimental group in the section representing semi-embodied concepts  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Number &% of total clues                Number /% of clues in Sub. A                  Number/% of clues in Sub. B 
                   76/86%                                            35/97%                                                                41/79%  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number 88                                                     36                                                                       52 
 
Just as in the embodied section, the overall interpreting coherence performance of the 
 158
undergraduates in the control group has been enhanced to over twice their original 
level from 40% to 85%, but still 1% less than that of their peers in the experimental 
group; specifically, 83% to 100% (3% higher than their peer group) in terms of 
subsection A, and from 10% to 75% (4% less than their peer group) with respect to 
subsection B. This finding further shows that the information which is closer to bodily 
experience is easier to retrieve than that which is further and remote from bodily 
experience, thanks to the imagery capacity. As the theoretical framework postulates, 
the information at the interface between the propositional mental structure and 
metaphoric and metonymic processing is general and broad, therefore easier to follow 
especially when imagination and inference is fully applied, and there is bodily 
experience to draw on. In other words, an interpreter who is fully prepared can 
achieve more coherence than her peer who is not fully prepared, on the grounds that 
she can use her imagination and inference for some sort of indirect experience, in 
order to make sense and build coherence, and bodily experience still plays a role of 
control centre for the most sufficient coherence (an initial answer to the questions 
raised at the introduction of this section: Does the interpreter draw on some sort of 
indirect experience? ). This will be discussed in detail in Section 7.4. 
 
6.4.3 The section representing non-embodied concepts 
 
Tables 26 and 27 below show the results of both undergraduate interpreters in both 
control and experimental groups in the number and percentage of coherence clues 
achieved in the section representing non-embodied concepts. The undergraduates in 
the control group have also enhanced their overall performance from 15% to 48%, but 
this is still 16% less than their peers in the experimental group. Regarding subsection 
A the coherence clues attained by the control undergraduates are still 19% less than 
those tracked by the experimental undergraduates:  
 
Table 26 Number and percentage of coherence clues attained by the four undergraduates of the control 
group in their first and second interpretations in the section representing non-embodied concepts  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Number & % of total clues             Number /% of clues in Sub. A                         Number/% of clues in Sub. B 
   1st                   2nd                     1st              2nd                                 1st             2nd  
   16/15%                 50/48%                       15/19%          45/56%                                       1/4%              5/21%         
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number 104                                                    80                                                                      24  
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Table 27 Number and percentage of coherence clues originally attained by the four undergraduates of the 
experimental group in the section representing non-embodied concepts  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Number & % of total clues             Number /% of clues in Sub. A                         Number /% of clues in Sub. B 
                   67/64%                                          60/75%                                                                7/29%  
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Total number 104                                                   80                                                                     24 
 
In addition, this result further shows that the non-embodied section, or rather, the 
concepts and language which are remote from bodily experience or perception, 
including technical terms and numbers, are the most challenging parts for interpreting, 
from 4% the first time and 21% the second time. How to further address this issue and 
offer solutions is to be discussed in Section 7.4.  
    It is time to go back to the questions at the introduction to this section: do all 
interpreters need to have physical experience of everything that could be talked about 
in the conference? Which parts should be physically experienced? The findings 
initially show that not everything needs to be experienced, but the bodily experienced 
concepts which play the role of control centre in achieving coherence, such as related 
actual components and operational process, should be embodied or experienced 
physically, helping to activate and construe the propositional mental structure. And 
then: Does the interpreter draw on some sort of indirect experience?  Yes, her 
imagination might work to help her to make sense by using indirect experience; this 
really makes a difference regarding the semi-embodied discourse. However, the 
directly embodied experience will determine the effect of indirect experience. 
Ultimately, how are these issues handled in an interpreting training programme? 
These questions will be discussed further in the following Section 7.4 on the 
application of this study – an ICM-based interpreting training programme.    
 
 
6.5 Concluding remarks  
 
 
If this theoretical framework is correct, and the assumptions of the experimental 
conditions are justifiable as described above, then in the context of my experiment the 
following results would be expected. Firstly, from the results of the embodied 
activation and construal stage before interpreting, I have found that the subjects in the 
experimental group succeeded in achieving coherence clues more in the prominent 
and salient aspects of the shiatsu device than in the obscure and minor aspects, also 
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that the undergraduates did slightly better than the teachers, and the postgraduates 
ranked in the first place in tracking the coherence clues.  
Secondly, I have presented comparisons of the performance of the different groups 
in following coherence clues with and without embodied experience in their 
interpreting, by comparing performance in the specific text segments and providing 
quantitative indicators. First and foremost, on the basis of the findings in the sections 
representing embodied concepts, semi-embodied and non-embodied concepts, the 
interpreting subjects with exposure to their bodily experience achieved a higher 
coherence rating than those in the control group. The first hypothesis on the role of 
the interpreter’s bodily experience has been verified (Section 5.1). In addition, in 
terms of the experimental group, the postgraduates and undergraduates achieved 
higher coherence ratings than the teachers, but regarding the control group, the 
teachers achieved higher coherence clue ratings than the postgraduate and 
undergraduate subjects. One striking piece of data is that the non-embodied concepts 
are the weak links in interpreting, in particular, the numbers and technical terms.  
Thirdly, I found that, in terms of the coherence ratings scale, the best interpreted 
coherent section is the semi-embodied information, followed by the section 
representing embodied concepts, finally by the section representing non-embodied 
concepts; accordingly, in terms of the scale measuring the interpreting subjects’ 
mental effort, the interpreting subjects spent the least mental effort on the semi-
embodied section, a slightly increasing mental effort on the embodied section, and the 
most mental effort on the non-embodied section, suggesting the interpreting subjects’ 
mental effort expended in achieving coherence reflected the textual structure in terms 
of its content difficulty. The second hypothesis on the interpreter’s mental effort 
(Section 5.1) has been contradicted and re-modified, which will be discussed in the 
following chapter. Finally, in order to explore such relevant questions as how the 
preparation works without embodied experience, the undergraduates in the control 
group were asked to interpret the same material for a second time. The result shows 
that the full preparation works effectively by means of the interpreting subjects’ 
imaginative capacity, but not as well as bodily experience in helping to achieve 
coherence.  
This chapter has described the key characteristics of the body of data relating to the 
research questions. However, the initial findings seem to be far from adequate to 
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provide either interpretations or the solutions to all the issues arising from the results, 
as discussed above , due to the small size of the corpus, only percentage results were 
used to indicate trends rather than show what results reached statistical significance, 
this will be discussed in Chapter 8. Therefore, the results of this chapter have only 
built up a framework for further exploration, so let us move on to Chapter 7, 
Discussion, bearing in mind all the issues arising from the results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162
Chapter 7 Discussion 
 
The previous chapter has described the data and findings which have initially 
addressed the research questions: a) Does the interpreter’s relevant bodily experience 
help her to achieve coherence? b) How does the interpreter’s mental effort expended 
in achieving coherence reflect the textual structure of the source text (ST)? The 
preliminary findings show that the interpreting subjects who were immersed in 
interactive embodiment prior to interpreting have achieved more of the coherence 
clues than those who were not, in their simultaneous interpreting (SI). The 
interpreters’ exposure to interactive embodiment influences their performance in 
achieving coherence in the different sections representing semi-embodied, embodied 
and non-embodied concepts. The results in the previous chapter also suggest a more 
specific outcome with respect to the textual structure of the three sections of the 
source text (ST), from the ICM perspective, in terms of the coherence ratings scale: 
the best interpreted coherent section is the one which is based on semi-embodied 
concepts, followed by the section representing embodied concepts, finally by the 
section representing non-embodied concepts. In terms of mental effort, the findings 
indicate that the interpreting subjects spent least mental effort in processing the semi-
embodied knowledge; a slightly increasing mental effort in processing the embodied 
knowledge; most mental effort in processing the non-embodied knowledge. The 
discussion develops around the two research questions, on the basis of the results 
presented in the previous chapter. This chapter will make an attempt at offering 
interpretations, comments and solutions to the issues arising from the results, in 
combination with the corpora.  
This chapter develops with Sections 7.1 and 7.2 addressing Question (a), and 
Section 7.3 exploring Question (b). Section 7.1 will discuss the central role of the 
interpreters’ immersion in interactive embodiment in helping them to establish mental 
coherence before interpreting. Section 7.2 will discuss interpreters’ understanding of 
semi-embodied concepts (7.2.1), embodied concepts (7.2.2) and non-embodied and/or 
abstract concepts (7.2.3), in establishing coherence in SI, from the ICM perspective. 
Question (b) will be addressed in Section 7.3, which discusses the interpreter’s mental 
effort in processing the textual structure, also from the ICM perspective. On the basis 
of these discussions above, in combination with the findings on the second 
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interpretations rendered by the four undergraduate interpreters of the control group, 
Section 7.4 is designed to show the application of this research: an ICM-based 
interpreting training programme. Section 7.5 will establish the holistic model of 
coherence in SI, in terms of the origin of coherence, global and local coherence, 
contributing to an understanding of how coherence in SI is achieved. This discussion 
will be conducted on the basis of the discourse sequence, in which order of the source 
text (ST) develops, as described in Section 5.2 Materials, also in alignment with each 
section in Chapter 6.  
 
 
7.1 Interpreters’ immersion in interactive embodiment: a control centre for 
mental coherence before interpreting 
 
 
In Section 6.1 the interpreting subjects of the experimental group immersed 
themselves in installing the shiatsu device, this bodily experience in combination with 
activation and construal activities helped them to build coherence throughout their 
interpretations, and invest more appropriate mental effort in processing the textual 
structure. The essential issue arising from the previous corresponding Section 6.1 is: 
what is the link between the interactive embodiment and coherence in SI? Initially, 
according to the Interpretive Theory of translation (IT), as reviewed in Section 3.2, SI 
has three stages in achieving coherence: (1) perception and its mental complement, (2) 
conceptualization and categorization, (3) interpreting output. The postulations of these 
three stages was supported by Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 17-43) who point out that 
conceptualization and categorization are shaped by the peculiar nature of our bodies, 
and processed in the brain.  
The Embodied Cognition Paradigm in interpreting connects the interpreter with the 
language representations via her bodily experience, helping to broaden the view on 
interpreting. According to Setton (1999: xii), without links to some basic principles of 
cognition, interpreting studies will ‘ultimately leave us with another complex 
descriptive nomenclature’. In other words, cognitive science provides the theoretical 
framework for interpreting studies. The most basic principle of cognitive science is 
embodiment (Lakoff and Johnson 1999:  17): 
 
                   Our sense of what is real begins with and depends crucially upon our bodies, 
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especially our sensorimotor apparatus, which enables us to perceive, move and 
manipulate, and the detailed structures of our brains, which have been shaped by 
both evolution and experience. 
 
According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 77-82), this is because a bodily experience 
or set of bodily experiences helps to make our concepts coherent by virtue of having a 
mental structure. In other words, structuring the experience in terms of 
‘multidimensional gestalts’ (1980: 81) and the correlations between them is the key to 
understanding coherence in the experience and the discourse as well. Embodiment is 
the core of the ICM, and the origin of coherence in interpreting, on the grounds that 
the interpreter’s relevant bodily experience helps her to link the related concepts.  For 
this reason, the interpreter should be engaged not only in interpreting skills training 
but also in physical commitment to her interpreting task, especially in the case of such 
applied subjects as the technical and business interpretations, as the Embodied 
Cognition Paradigm requires. 
    At this point, let me refer back to the assumption of the Interpretive Theory of 
translation (IT) (Section 3.2) on the three stages of interpreting: conceptualization, 
categorization and expression. The three elements are inseparable. In completing their 
embodied experience of installing the shiatsu device, and the subsequent cognitive 
processing, the interpreting subjects formed categories and concepts through their 
bodily experience. What that means is that the categories and concepts which the 
interpreter forms are part of her experience, separating and structuring aspects of her 
experience into discernible kinds. Thus, interactive embodiment helps the interpreter 
to build up the basic coherence, or origin of coherence.   
    The subsequent issue raised by the results in Chapter 6 is: why are prominent 
concepts more easily activated than subordinate or obscure ones in the interactive 
embodiment in building coherence, in terms of the interpreting subjects of the 
experimental group? This phenomenon is shown in the observation that, after their 
bodily experience, the interpreting subjects recalled the main and significant 
categories of the shiatsu device, such as moving up and down, rotating (69 % of 
coherence clues for the teachers group, 72% for the postgraduates group, and 62 % for 
the undergraduates group), but ignoring the minor or specific aspects, such as on the 
PVC guide (13% of the coherence clues for the teachers, 27% for the postgraduates, 
and 33% for the undergraduates). This issue is specifically addressed by Lakoff and 
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Johnson, referring to the interactive embodiment process (1999: 17-43), on the 
grounds that in the case of visual images, each incoming image is limited by the 
brain’s processing capacity of what is being seen and visualized, only tending to focus 
on the highest or the most salient level of the perceived information. With 100 million 
light-sensing cells, the human eye has only about 1 million fibres accessible to the 
brain. Therefore, each incoming image must be reduced in complexity by a factor of 
100; that is to say, information in each fibre constitutes a neural categorization of the 
information from around 100 cells. This sort of neural categorization exists 
throughout the brain, up through the highest level of categories. Following this theory, 
it can be assumed that the interpreting subjects of the experimental group undertook a 
neural hierarchic categorization of what they were physically engaged in. They tended 
to focus on processing the prominent and salient perceptual information which they 
could be aware of, such as moving up and down, and rotating next, but the least 
attention was given to the murky aspects, such as PVC guides, which exists in the 
bottom level of categorization. The references to neural events taking place could be 
further backed up by the relevant neuro-linguistic based research in future work since 
it was not the focus of this study at this stage. 
Following the same line above, with respect to preparation for technical subject 
interpreting, the Interpretive Theory of translation (IT, 1986) (reviewed in Section 3.2) 
claims that, the interpreting trainees should acquire the technical knowledge, by virtue 
of comparison and observation of everyday seemingly familiar technology, from 
simple to complex knowledge, for instance, from the car driving to its driving system, 
from the television to its transmission. According to IT, exploring the depth of what is 
being observed is an interpreter’s second nature (IT 1986) (reviewed in Section 3.2). 
The findings of this experiment support IT in that the interpreter should develop an 
acquisitive mind, given that the overall outcomes of activation and construal stage are 
51% coherence clues attained by the teachers; 58% by the postgraduates and 53% by 
the undergraduates. The embodied cognition theory further gives an account of how 
this comparison and observation takes place. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 
17-43), the information is passed from one dense group of neurons to another through 
a sparse network of connections. When processing the information, the brain will start 
activating the pattern with a set of neurons, but cannot do this thoroughly, due to the 
sparse set of connections; in other words, the pattern of activation spread over the first 
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set of neurons is so great that it cannot be represented through a one to one mode in 
this sparse set of connections. Therefore, the connections automatically group certain 
input patterns, mapping them across to match the input and output ensembles. In this 
way, the brain will process the input information economically and naturally, by 
virtue of matching these input and output ensembles. Whenever a difference occurs 
between the outputs and inputs in terms of a neural ensemble, a further neural 
categorization will take place, resulting in more mental effort.  
    On this basis, the interpreter cannot mentally process the desired amount of 
information transferred from her perceptual system, due to the limitation of the sparse 
connections, but rather starts observing only the prominent aspects of what is being 
seen when she has the initial bodily experience, and has the input pattern projected 
into her mind as mappings. By means of her imaginative capacity, the interpreter will 
process the information smoothly when matching her mental mappings with the 
continuing input; otherwise she would have to spend more mental effort in processing 
the incoming information, due to the mismatch between her mental projections and 
the input ensembles in progress. Meanwhile, the interpreter needs to build up patterns 
of neural ensembles by constant categorization, in exploring the depth of an issue in 
question. Therefore, the interpreter should not only observe the physical context and 
object, exploring the highest level of categories, for the sake of her forthcoming 
interpreting task, but also consciously categorizes and conceptualizes the obscure and 
minor information in the bottom level of categorization by linking the relevant 
concepts.  
Let us go back to the notion that the interpreter’s interactive embodiment is the 
central control for her to achieve mental coherence before interpreting, on the grounds 
that through embodiment, the interpreter has the actual world projected into her 
mental world, which is the primary principle of the Embodied Cognition Paradigm in 
interpreting. This section is further discussed in combination with Langacker’s acts of 
engaged and disengaged cognition (2008: 535), represented by Figures 23(a) and (b) 
below. Figure 22(a) below shows an act of engaged cognition, where the interpreter 
interacts physically and directly with something in the world (W). The interpreter 
effects this interaction (double arrow) through her body, primarily via her sensory and 
motor organs. The box labeled A indicates the role of the brain in this engagement: A 
is the processing activity, including the interpreter’s sensory input and motor 
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commands, which constitutes her interactive experience. Figure 23(b) represents the 
interpreter’s analogous mental processing which takes place without engagement 
during interpreting. This is disengaged cognition. In interpreting, certain facets of A, 
labeled A´ come to occur automatically for the interpreter, in the absence of any 
current interaction with the world: 
 
 
Figure23 (a) Engaged/embodied cognition        Figure 23 (b) Disengaged/embodied cognition   
(Langacker 2008:535.Fig.14.15) 
 
 
A´ is seen as a simulation of A, on the grounds that simulation is accepted as having a 
deep-seated role in conceptualization and cognitive semantics (Johnson 1987; 
Barsalou 1999; Langacker 2008: 536). By virtual of sensory and motor imagery, the 
interpreter can activate appropriate images – simulating the experiences they represent, 
to build up coherence. In addition, the interpreter relies on simulation to invoke an 
‘imaginary vantage point’ (Langacker 2008: 536) or viewing circumstances by virtue 
of spoken expressions. In grasping ideas of the Speaker, or making sense, the 
interpreter simulates the experience and logic of the Speaker. In other words, 
‘Simulation is also essential for recognizing other conceptualizers and the nature of 
their mental experience’ (Langacker 2008: 536). In understanding a speech, the 
interpreter has to imagine being in the Speaker’s place in terms of the latter’s motives, 
following his thread of ideas so as to construe the mental world of the Speaker via the 
blending space to build coherence (Figure 9, Section 4.4). Figure 24 below indicates 
how the interpreter and the Speaker blend in the mental spaces. The Speaker 
represents the source space and the interpreter the target space:  
 
 
Figure 24 The interpreter and the Speaker in mental blending spaces (based on Fauconnier 
and Turner 2002: 7. Fig.3)   
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Both the Speaker and the interpreter have established a cognitive world via their 
interactive embodiment with the real world. They communicate for the exchange of 
information. The solid lines in the diagram represent counterpart connections, such as 
the conference purpose or theme, identities, roles, intentions and attitudes of 
participants. The generic space comprises the ICM and background knowledge, which 
is shared by the Speaker and the interpreter, and also determines the Speaker’s speech 
contents. For the purpose of a given conference, structure from the two input mental 
spaces is projected onto a third blending space to determine the domain and topics of 
the conference. The two input spaces could be completely separated and 
simultaneously developed since they represent the Speaker and the interpreter as 
different communicators but share the same pattern of mental spaces. Speakers and 
interpreters are connected via their shared purpose/skopos, context and situations on 
this occasion, and further they are constrained by an ICM. In addition, the interpreter, 
in advance, will pose such questions of the conference as: what is the purpose/skopos 
of the conference and its time and place? What are the conference types, e.g. 
technological or economic? Who are the participants and what are their roles? What 
results do they expect to achieve? What are the problems they need to overcome to 
achieve the purpose? What conflicts lie in the different groups of participants? The 
simultaneous interpreter can creatively predict what is potentially to be expressed, and 
associate all relevant immediate events with the current situation to facilitate her 
interpreting performance. The ICM suggests that the simultaneous interpreter should 
be fully engaged in preparing for the coming conference. Besides what is mentioned 
above, the interpreter will further digest all the information available for the 
forthcoming conference, facilitating her output in the blending process. In terms of 
this study, the interpreter accesses her best understanding of the embodied knowledge 
by being immersed in the experience of installation of the shiatsu. This specific bodily 
experience is turned into her Experience in general as she incorporates this specific 
context of embodied experience into a broad and integrated context, which consists of 
the purpose of the shiatsu device, the process of its manufacture, its marketing, and all 
other relevant elements(Section 1.4). 
This Embodied Cognition theory has developed and addressed the most critical 
weak point of all the theories reviewed in Chapter 2, represented by de Beaugrande 
and Dressler’s theory on coherence, and Johnson-Laird’s Mental Models Theory, on 
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the grounds that they have ignored the primary link between embodiment and the 
actual world. According to Lakoff (1999: 75-76) ‘Accordingly, it seemed natural to 
assume that the mind could be studied in terms of its cognitive functions, ignoring any 
ways in which those functions arise from the body and brain’. Lakoff (1999: 76) has 
called the assumption of no body in the conception of mind as philosophy without 
flesh vs. Philosophy in the flesh. This is also where the objectivism-based SI 
paradigms misfire as reviewed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.  
    According to Pöchhacker (1992; 2004) (reviewed in Chapter 3), Embodied 
Cognition is a ‘new and promising path’ for the direction of interpreting studies (2004: 
203), but needs further exploration theoretically and experimentally. Interpreting 
studies is a young discipline; it has yet to reach its maturity, and it is developing in 
closer contact with other subjects, such as cognitive linguistics. Therefore, this study 
has provided a case for application of the Embodied Cognition Paradigm in achieving 
coherence in SI.  
To sum up, interactive embodiment is the real origin of coherence. As Johnson 
(1987: xiii) asserts that ‘Any adequate account of meaning and rationality must give a 
central place to embodied and imaginative structures of understanding by which we 
grasp our world’. Interactive embodiment serves as a control centre to access mental 
coherence in interpreting, and the central thread of the present discussion.  
 
 
7.2 Integration: interpreting stage 
 
In terms of IEF (Immersed Experiencer Frame) (reviewed in Section 4.5), the subjects 
of the experimental group have now carried out the embodied activation and construal 
stage, and then moved into the integration stage – the interpreting stage. We further 
discuss how the interpreting subjects in both the experimental and control groups have 
built coherence, via the sections representing semi-embodied, embodied and non-
embodied concepts respectively in terms of the textual structure of the source text 
(ST).  
    In the following discussions, I basically adopt a simple random sampling method, 
which means that the probability or chance for each group or individual to be sampled 
is equal (Ma 2008: 33). I will select at random two contrastive groups at a time to 
compare in detail their performance over the selected section of the text.   
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7.2.1 Contextual situation dependency vs. semi-embodied concepts: an image 
schema perspective 
 
 
This section ranges from sentence 1 to 7, designed to study the semi-embodied 
concepts, analyzed from the image schema. Sentences 1 to 4 are classified into 
introduction to the contextual situation (Section 5.2.1). The results in this semi-
embodied section show that the experimental groups did better than the control group 
(85% vs. 75% for the teacher’s groups; 87 % vs. 71 % for the postgraduate groups and 85% 
vs. 38% for the undergraduate groups). The first issue arising in Section 6.2.1 is: what are 
the links between the contextual situation and interactive embodiment and coherence? 
Tables 28a and 28b below show the interpretations of Sentence 1, rendered by 
experimental group (Table 27a), and the control group (Table 27b):  
 
Table 28a Interpretations of sentence 1 to 2 by the undergraduates of the experimental group  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Coherence clues: bold typed; [] omitted information; @ pause; - filled pause  
 
S T  S 1 :  @  G o o d  m o r n i n g ,  l a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n  S 2 :  @ W e l c o m e  t o  o u r  
p r o d u c t  p r o m o t i o n  f a i r  o f  H ö m e d i c s .  -  I  a m  C r a i g ,  s a l e s  m a n a g e r  
UG+1 先 生 们 女 士 们 早 上 好 -  ( G o o d  m o r n i n g ,  g e n t l e m e n  a n d  l a d i e s )  欢 迎 大 家 来
到 我 们 的 产 品 展 销 会  ( W e l c o m e  t o  o u r  p r o d u c t  p r o m o t i o n  f a i r )  我 是 克 瑞
- 这 里 的 销 售 经 理  ( I  a m  K e r i ,  s a l e s  m a n a g e r )  
UG+2 女 士 们 先 生 们 早 上 好 - ( G o o d  m o r n i n g ,  l a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n )  欢 迎 来 到 这
次 广 交 会 - ( W e l c o m e  t o  t h i s  G u a n g z h o u  T r a d e  F a i r )  我 - 是 销 售 经 理 克 莱
斯  ( I  a m  s a l e s  m a n a g e r ,  K r i s )  
UG+3 女 士 们 先 生 们 早 晨 好 - ( G o o d  m o r n i n g ,  l a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n )  欢 迎 来 到 我 们
这 个 产 品 促 销 会 - ( W e l c o m e  t o  o u r  p r o d u c t  T r a d e  F a i r )  我 是 销 售 部 经 理
克 瑞  ( I  a m  s a l e s  m a n a g e r  K e r i )  
UG+4 女 士 们 先 生 们 早 上 好 - ( G o o d  m o r n i n g ,  l a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n )  欢 迎 来 到 我
们 产 品 的 推 销 会  ( W e l c o m e  t o  o u r  p r o d u c t  p r o m o t i o n  F a i r )  我 是 克 莱 恩
销 售 部 经 理 -  ( I  a m  K e r i -  m a n a g e r  o f  s a l e s  d e p a r t m e n t )        
UG+5 女 士 们 先 生 们 早 上 好 - ( G o o d  m o r n i n g ,  l a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n ) 欢 迎 来 到 产 品
促 销 会 - ( W e l c o m e  t o  o u r  p r o d u c t  T r a d e  F a i r )  我 是 销 售 经 理 ( I  a m  s a l e s  
m a n a g e r )   
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
A first close look at the superscripts shows that the interpreting subjects in both the 
experimental and control group seemed weak at proper names pertaining to the 
Speaker (Craig and Hömedics), presumably using more energy in processing, as 
pointed out by Gile in his Effort models (1995) (reviewed in Section 2.3), but the 
subjects of the experimental group rendered the two names more appropriately than 
the control subjects. Specifically, four out of the five interpreting subjects of the 
experimental group succeeded in rendering the Speaker’s name, Craig; all five 
omitted the proper name, Hömedics, but they managed to replace it with general 
pronoun “我们” (we). On the other hand, as Table 28b shows, the five subjects in the 
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control group initially seemed constrained in following up the Speaker; the simple 
greetings (UG-1) and self-introduction (UG-3) were missed out; and the proper names 
were mostly omitted. In particular, hesitant pauses emerge in each interpreting 
recording, suggesting the interpreters’ uncertainty and lack of confidence:   
 
 Table 28 b interpretations of sentence 1 to 2 by the undergraduates of the control groups  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
UG-1   [ ]  [ ]  @  我 是 科 瑞 销 售 经 理 -  ( I  a m  K e r i ,  s a l e s  m a n a g e r )                                               
UG-2  早 上 好 女 士 们 先 生 们 - ( G o o d  m o r n i n g ,  l a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n ) 欢 迎 来 到 这 个
销 售 中 心 - ( W e l c o m e  t o  t h i s  s a l e s  c e n t e r ) 我 是 科 瑞 德 销 售 经 理  ( I  a m  
K e r i d  s a l e s  m a n a g e r )  
UG-3    早 上 好 先 生 们 女 士 们 - ( G o o d  m o r n i n g ,  l a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n )  [ ]  [ ]  @  
UG-4  早 上 好 女 士 们 先 生 们 - ( G o o d  m o r n i n g ,  l a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n )  我 是 科 瑞 德 销
售 经 理  ( I  a m  C r a i g ,  s a l e s  m a n a g e r )  [ ]  @  
UG-5 早 上 好 先 生 们 女 士 们 -  ( G o o d  m o r n i n g ,  l a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n )  欢 迎 来 到 家
庭 用 品 市 贸 会  ( W e l c o m e  t o  h o m e  c o m m o d i t y  t r a d e  f a i r )  [ ]  @  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
As the data shows, names can be associated into the mental model, so it is true of 
numbers and technical terms, as opposed to the assumption of Setton (1999: 253), as 
mentioned in Section 6.2.3. The truth is that interpreting names, numbers and terms 
need mental effort as much as Gile’s mental models assume (1995) (Section 3.3.2). 
This will be further discussed in Section 7.2.3. Tables 29a and 29b below show 
interpretations of sentences 3 to 4 rendered by the undergraduates of the experimental 
and control group respectively. The undergraduates with bodily experience (Table 29a) 
have managed to make sense of the context and situation, tracking the links from the 
broad to specific information, following the coherence clues in the sequencing order: 
introducing a product→ look → shiatsu massager:  
 
Table 29a Interpretations of sentence 3 to 4 by the undergraduates in the experimental group  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
S T  S 3 : @ I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  r e c o m m e n d  a  @  g o o d  p r o d u c t  t o  y o u .  S 4 : +  N o w  
l o o k  a t  t h i s  ( p o i n t i n g  t o  t h e  g a d g e t )  T h i s  i s  a  S h i a t s u  M a s s a g e  
C u s h i o n  
UG+1    我 很 愿 意 给 大 家 介 绍 一 下 我 们 的 新 产 品  ( N o w  I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  i n t r o d u c e  o u r  
n e w  p r o d u c t )  现 在 大 家 请 看 这 里  ( N o w  p l e a s e  e v e r y o n e  l o o k  a t  h e r e )  这
是 一 个 减 压 按 摩 椅  ( T h i s  i s  a  S h i a t s u  M a s s a g e  C u s h i o n )  
   UG+2    现 在 哪 - 向 大 家 推 销 一 种 新 的 产 品 ( N o w  I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  m a r k e t  o u r  n e w  
p r o d u c t ) 现 在 哪 - 大 家 看 到 的 是 一 种 指 压 式 按 摩 椅  ( N o w  w h a t  y o u  s e e  i s  a  
S h i a t s u  M a s s a g e  C u s h i o n )  
            UG+3    今 天 - 我 想 给 大 家 推 荐 我 们 的 一 种 产 品 ( N o w  I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  r e c o m m e n d  o u r  
p r o d u c t  t o  y o u )  这 就 是 我 们 的 手 指 式 按 摩 器  ( T h i s  i s  a  S h i a t s u  M a s s a g e  
C u s h i o n )  
UG+4      我 想 向 大 家 推 荐 一 个 很 好 的 产 品  ( I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  r e c o m m e n d  o u r  p r o d u c t  t o  
y o u )  大 家 看 这 里  ( L o o k  a t  h e r e )  这 是 手 指 试 按 摩 垫  ( T h i s  i s  a  S h i a t s u  
M a s s a g e  C u s h i o n )  
UG+5   我 要 向 大 家 推 荐 一 款 好 产 品 ( I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  r e c o m m e n d  o u r  p r o d u c t  t o  y o u )  
大 家 来 看 看 这 个  ( e v e r y o n e  L o o k  a t  t h i s )  这 是 一 个 手 指 式 按 摩 垫  ( T h i s  i s  a  
S h i a t s u  M a s s a g e  C u s h i o n )  
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They appear assured and fluent in the interpreting processes without long and 
hesitating pauses, showing that their mental effort is used appropriately towards these 
semi-embodied concepts which are general and broad. On the other hand, the five 
undergraduates without bodily experience have tracked the basic coherence clues, but 
they appear unenergetic, hesitant and uncertain in interpreting, and use more effort 
than they should at this stage, in order to catch the coherence clues, even though the 
control group had been informed of the context of situation as had the experimental 
group:  
 
 
Table 29b Interpretations of sentence 3 to 4 by the undergraduates in the control group  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
UG-1   我 要 向 你 们 介 绍 一 档 产 品  ( I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  p r o m o t e  t h i s  p r o d u c t  t o  y o u )  请
观 看 一 下  ( p l e a s e  h a v e  a  l o o k )  这 是 一 款 手 指 式 按 摩 机  ( T h i s  i s  a  f i n g e r  
l i k e  M a s s a g e r )  
UG-2    [ ] 看 一 下 这 个  ( N o w  l o o k  a t  i t ) 这 是 一 个 手 指 式 按 摩 器 ( T h i s  i s  a  f i n g e r  
l i k e  M a s s a g e r )  
UG-3   我 给 你 们 介 绍 一 种 新 的 产 品  ( I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  i n t r o d u c e  a  n e w  p r o d u c t )  看 这
个 产 品  ( N o w  l o o k  a t  t h i s  p r o d u c t )  这 是 一 个 手 指 式 按 摩 器  ( T h i s  i s  a  
f i n g e r  l i k e  M a s s a g e r )  
UG-4   这 对 你 来 说 是 一 个 和 那 很 好 的 产 品  ( T h i s  i s  a  g o o d  p r o d u c t  t o  y o u )  看 看 这 个  
( l o o k  a t  t h i s )  这 是 一 个 按 摩 器  ( T h i s  i s  a  M a s s a g e r )  
UG-5   今 天 ， 我 给 你 们 介 绍 一 种 新 产 品  ( T o d a y  I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  i n t r o d u c e  a  n e w  
p r o d u c t  t o  y o u )  看  ( l o o k )  这 是 一 款 手 指 式 按 摩 式 的 垫 子  ( T h i s  i s  a  f i n g e r  
l i k e  m a s s a g e r )  
 
 
The significance of the contextual situation varies with or without any interactive 
embodiment for the interpreting subjects, thus providing a criterion for the 
differentiation of both groups with and without bodily experience. On the basis of the 
data above, I attempt to explain what is observed from the view of both Systemic 
Functional Linguistics (SFL) (Section 2.1) and embodied cognition on contextual 
situation based coherence. This section can be summed up as follows: the Speaker, 
Craig, the sales manager from Hömedics starts with the account of the social context 
or environment (Guangzhou Trade fair) where meanings are being generated: 
 
Field of discourse: the skopos/purpose – promoting the shiatsu massager, introducing 
how to use it and warnings against misuses.    
Tenor of discourse: the product promoter and the potential customers.  
Mode of discourse: speech delivered by mono-lingual: English; the process of 
creating the discourse is via spoken medium. Channel: - phonic; -
signed.    
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From the Embodied Cognition perspective, I again use Langacker’s reference point 
relationships (1991: 170; 2008: 504) (reviewed in Section 4.7.1; Figure 11), so as to 
show how the interpreter constructs her path of mental access. Figure 25 below 
illustrates the way the experimental interpreter as the conceptualizer (represented by C) 
establishes the path of mental access to make sense and build coherence. Having been 
engaged in the embodied activation and construal stage, the interpreting subject will 
start up her mental progression by following the domain (D) – promotion of product, 
further narrowing down on shiatsu massager – the reference point (R), and tracking 
the chain of relations of target (T):   
 
  
   
 
Figure 25 Path of mental access of the interpreter (Langacker 2008: 504. Fig.14.1)  
 
 
 
Mental Models theory (MMT) (reviewed in Section 2.3) emphasizes two non-verbal 
aspects of discourse coherence; one is the contextual situation, the other inference. 
The interpreting subjects in the experimental group have formed the image schema of 
the shiatsu massage promotion in the Guangzhou Trade Fair. This image schema 
consists of simple and basic cognitive structures, derived from their embodied 
interaction with the physical context. On the other hand, the control group, without 
this embodied activation and construal stage, seemed constrained and less motivated 
in building coherence links. In short, interpreting is heavily situation-dependent, and 
the exposure to bodily experience helps the interpreter to facilitate inferential ability 
in achieving coherence, on the grounds that embodiment supplies the additional 
signaling required for the interpreter to build coherence. The idea is that, by 
experiencing installation of the parts and shiatsu device, the interpreting subjects in 
the experimental group had acquired some embodied structure and image schema of 
the context, in other words, they had established relationships which they could apply 
to other instances of this locative relation. This supports the assumption of the 
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Interpretive Theory of translation (Section 3.2), in attaching importance to the context 
and situation. The situation falls into both visible and invisible categories, including 
what we see, i.e. gestures and facial expressions, and all the factors relevant to the 
speech and all elements perceived and imagined in the conference.  
The embodied context and situation might help to infer the elements and signs, 
which are indicated by the Speaker, for instance, the purpose or motive of the meeting: 
promotion of the shiatsu massager. The interpreting subjects of the experimental 
group could use their creative potential to anticipate possible ideas, direction and 
terms of the speech. This anticipation will help the interpreter to build up her 
cognitive context and coherent links. On the other hand, without bodily experience, 
the subjects in the control group appeared to have been less motivated or uncertain in 
the on-going interpreting task because they had not been singled out to have the 
interesting experience of the experimental group. According to the Mental Space 
Blending theory (Section 4.4) it can be assumed that the interpreting subjects with 
bodily experience had blended what they experienced in the contextual situation, 
including the purpose/skopos, domain, reference and targets. Experience has a very 
rich and broad sense, on the grounds that it includes not only basic perceptual, motor-
program aspects but also emotional, social and linguistic dimensions (Johnson 1987: 
xvi). It is this interactive aspect of embodiment that helps the interpreter to make an 
effective sense of the contextual situations, thus building up coherence for what is to 
be interpreted.  
Let us further discuss the corresponding questions arising from Section 6.2.1: What 
are the relations between semi-embodied concepts and image schemas? Why does it 
seem comparatively easy to make sense and establish coherence in the section 
representing semi-embodied concepts, compared with any other sections representing 
embodied and non-embodied concepts?  
Tables 30a and 30b below show the interpretations from sentences 5 to 7, rendered 
by the five postgraduates in the experimental group (30a) and the five teachers in the 
control group (30b). Sentences 5 and 6 are included in Subsection B, explaining the 
Japanese word, shiatsu and its purpose; while Sentence 7 is categorized into 
Subsection A, including the testing of the listeners’ feelings about the bodily massage. 
This classification is based on the assumption that Subsection A is closer to 
embodiment than Subsection B (Section 5.2):  
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Table 30a  Interpretations from sentence 5 to 7 by the postgraduates in the experimental group  
 
P o s t g r a d u a t e s  i n  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a l  g r o u p  
 
S T  S 5 :  @ A s  y o u  k n o w ,  s h i  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r  -  a n d  a t s u  m e a n s  p r e s s u r e ,  p u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r  a n d  y o u ’ v e  g o t  S h i a t s u ;  -  
m e a n i n g  ‘ f i n g e r  p r e s s u r e ’  
 
P G + 1 正 如 你 知 道 ， 这 个 - 这 个 在 日 语 名 字 是 手 指 的 意 思 。 S h i a t s u 是 压 力  ( A s  y o u  k n o w ,  t h i s - i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r ,  s h i a t s u  p r e s s u r e )    
把 它 们 放 在 一 起 ， 就 是 手 指 的 压 力 和 按 摩  ( P u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r ,  ( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r l i k e  m a s s a g e )    
 
P G + 2 众 所 周 知 呢 ， s h i 在 日 语 里 意 为 手 指 ；  i a t s u 意 为 按 摩  ( A s  y o u  k n o w ,  s h i  -  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r ,  i a t s u  m e a n s  p r e s s u r e )  
 
把 它 们 和 在 一 起 ， 就 是 手 指 式 按 摩 意 思  ( P u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r ,  ( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r l i k e  m a s s a g e )    
 
P G + 3 大 家 都 知 道 ， s h i 用 日 语 来 解 释 是 手 指 ， i a t s u 在 日 语 里 是 按 摩  ( A s  y o u  k n o w ,  s h i ,  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r ,  i a t s u  m e a n s  p r e s s u r e )  
把 它 们 放 在 一 起 ， 就 是 S h i a t s u ， 意 思 哪 就 是 手 指 式 按 摩  ( P u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r ,  ( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r  m a s s a g e )  
 
P G + 4 正 如 你 知 道 的 ， s h i 在 指 手 指 ;  a t s u 是 指 手 指 的 压 力  ( A s  y o u  k n o w  - s h i  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r ,  a t s u  m e a n s  p r e s s u r e )  把 它 们 放  
在 一 起 ， 就 是 指 手 指 的 压 力  ( P u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r ,  ( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r  m a s s a g e )   
 
P G + 5 大 家 知 道 ， s h i 在 日 语 里 意 为 手 的 意 思 -  i a t s u 是 ‘ 按 摩  ( A s  y o u  k n o w ,  s h i ,  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r ,  a t s u  m e a n s  p r e s s u r e )  
那 么 ， s h i + a t s u 组 合 在 一 起 ， 就 是 说 用 手 指 式 按 摩  ( P u t  s h i  a n d  a t s u  t o g e t h e r ,  ( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r  m a s s a g e )  
 
        
S 6 :  +  I n  t h i s  d a y  a n d  a g e  o f  b a d  b a c k s -  d u e  t o  m u c h  o f f i c e  w o r k ,  l a b o r  a n d  s i t t i n g  t o o  l o n g  f o r  y o u r  s t u d i e s ,  S h i a t s u  
M a s s a g e r  i s  t h e  p e r f e c t  r e l a x a t i o n  g a d g e t  f o r  e v e r y  o c c a s i o n  
 
P G + 1 当 今 社 会 ， 大 家+ 工 作 压 力 非 常 繁 重 ， - +  ( c o u g h )  繁 重 的 工 作 和 学 习  ( N o w  i n  t o d a y ’ s  s o c i e t y  e v e r y o n e  i s  u n d e r  w o r k  p r e s s u r e ,  t o o  
m u c h  w o r k  a n d  s t u d y )  常 常 需 要 大 家 身 心 放 松  ( O f t e n  o n e  n e e d s  r e l a x a t i o n  a n d  m a s s a g e )  
 
P G + 2 在 这 个 时 代 中 间 呢 ， 大 家 都 在 办 公 室 坐 着 ， 工 作 的 太 久 ， 有 时 候 会 觉 得 腰 酸 背 痛  ( N o w  i n  t o d a y ’ s  t i m e  e v e r y o n e  i s  w o r k i n g  i n  o f f i c e ,  
w o r k i n g  t o o  l o n g ,  f e e l i n g  b a c k a c h e )  那 么 ,  可 以 用 这 个 按 摩 垫 可 以 帮 助 你 舒 展 一 下 筋 骨  ( S o  y o u  c o u l d  u s e  t h i s  m a s s a g e  c u s h i o n  
t o  s t r e t c h  y o u r  b a c k )  
 
P G + 3 现 在 哪 ， 由 于 过 多 的 办 公 室 工 作 都 会 造 成 大 家 背 疼  ( N o w  m u c h  o f f i c e  w o r k  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  b a c k a c h e )  所 以 我 们 这 个 手 指 式 按 摩 垫 就 是 专 门
针 对 这 种 办 公 室 背 疼 ， 或 者 对 这 个 有 所 帮 助  ( S o  o u r  s h i a t s u  m a s s a g e r  i s  d e s i g n e d  f o r  b a c k a c h e ,  h o p e d  t o  b e  o f  s o m e  h e l p  f o r  
t h i s )  
 
P G + 4 现 如 今 ， 由 于 在 办 公 室 呆 的 时 间 太 长 ， 背 部 压 力 很 大 ， 所 以 造 成 很 多 背 部 问 题  ( N o w a d a y s  m u c h  o f f i c e  w o r k  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  b a c k a c h e )  
而 这 款 产 品 能 够 很 好 地 缓 解 这 种 背 部 压 力  ( S o  o u r  s h i a t s u  m a s s a g e r  i s  d e s i g n e d  t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h i s  b a c k  p r e s s u r e )  
 
P G + 5 在 如 今 过 多 的 案 牍 工 作 当 中 ， +  -  ( N o w ,  d u e  t o  m u c h  o f f i c e  w o r k )  手 指 式 按 摩 椅 是 你 解 除 工 作 劳 累 的 一 个 很 好 的 器 械  ( T h i s  s h i a t s u   
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      M a s s a g e r  i s  a  g o o d  d e v i c e  t o  a l l e v i a t e  y o u r  f a t i g u e  f r o m  w o r k )  
 
 
S T  S 7 : +  J u s t  n o w  a l l  o f  y o u  h a v e  s a t  o n  i t  a n d  h a v e  h a d  a  p o s i t i v e  p e r s o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e .  H o w  d o  y o u  f e e l  a b o u t  i t ?  @  
 
C o m f o r t a b l e ?  + @  Y e s ,  -  I  t h i n k  y o u  w i l l  a g r e e .  +  
 
 
P G + 1 刚 才 ， 你 们 都 已 经 坐 在 我 们 垫 子 上 进 行 了 体 验 ， -  ( J u s t  n o w ,  y o u  w e r e  s e a t e d  o n  o u r  c u s h i o n  a n d  h a v e  h a d  e x p e r i e n c e )  H o w -  
你 们 感 觉 如 何 哪 ？  ( H o w  d o  y o u  f e e l ? )  我 想 大 家 感 到 非 常 的 舒 适 吧 ？  ( I  t h i n k  y o u  w i l l  f e e l  c o m f o r t a b l e )  
 
P G + 2 刚 刚 哪 - 大 家 - 已 经 尝 试 过 了 这 个 按 摩 垫 ， 已 经 享 受 它 了  ( J u s t  n o w ,  y o u  w e r e  s e a t e d  o n  o u r  c u s h i o n  a n d  h a v e  h a d  e n j o y e d  i t )  
感 觉 怎 么 样 ？  ( H o w  d o  y o u  f e e l ? )  舒 服 吧 ？  ( C o m f o r t a b l e ? )  我 想 大 家 会 觉 得 非 常 舒 服 的  ( I  t h i n k  y o u  w i l l  f e e l  c o m f o r t a b l e )  
 
P G + 3 你 们 大 家 都 已 经 坐 在 这 个 按 摩 垫 上 了 ， 你 们 可 以 亲 身 经 历 这 个 垫 子  ( J u s t  n o w ,  y o u  w e r e  s e a t e d  o n  o u r  c u s h i o n ,  a n d  h a v e  h a d  
p e r s o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  i t )  有 什 么 感 觉 哪 ？  ( H o w  d o  y o u  f e e l ? )  舒 服 吗 ？  ( C o m f o r t a b l e ? )  是 的 ， 我 觉 得 你 们 应 该 会 有 这 样 的 感 觉  ( I  
t h i n k  y o u  w i l l  h a v e  s u c h  k i n d  f e e l i n g )  
 
P G + 4 就 像 你 们 现 在 坐 在 上 面 ， 感 受 过 了 一 样 ， 你 们 都 有 自 己 的 个 人 感 受  ( J u s t  l i k e  y o u r  b e i n g  s e a t e d  o n  i t  y o u  h a v e  h a d  y o u r  o w n  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  i t )  感 觉 怎 么 样 哪 ？  ( H o w  d o  y o u  f e e l ? )  感 觉 到 很 舒 服 吧 ？ ( C o m f o r t a b l e ?   )  我 想 的 话 觉 一 定 会 感 觉 很 舒 服 的  ( I  t h i n k  
y o u  w i l l  f e e l  c o m f o r t a b l e )  
 
P G + 5 我 想 ， 刚 才 您 已 经 体 验 过 它 了  ( I  t h i n k ,  j u s t  n o w  y o u  h a v e  h a d  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  i t )  你 是 不 是 有 这 样 的 体 验 ？  ( D i d  y o u  h a v e  h a d  s u c h  
f e e l i n g ? )  非 常 舒 适 ， 是 吗 ？  ( C o m f o r t a b l e ,  i s n ’ t  i t ? )  我 想 肯 定 是 的  ( I  t h i n k  i t  i s  c e r t a i n )  
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The data in Table 30a show that the postgraduates in the experimental group appear 
more motivated in following the Speaker’s ideas while the teachers in the control 
group seem less motivated in generating messages, and lost more coherence clues, 
although they have tried to manage their interpretations in an economical way. In 
order to have a clear picture of this finding, I take the super-segments of the 
postgraduate (PG+2) in the experimental group, and the teacher (T-1) in the control 
group as follows:     
  
P G + 2 众 所 周 知 呢 ， s h i 在 日 语 里 意 为 手 指 ； i a t s u 意 为 按 摩  ( A s  y o u  k n o w ,  s h i  -  i n  
J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r ,  i a t s u  m e a n s  p r e s s u r e )  把 它 们 和 在 一 起 ， 就 是 手 指
式 按 摩 意 思  ( P u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r ,  ( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r l i k e  m a s s a g e )   
 P G + 2 在 这 个 时 代 中 间 呢 ， 大 家 都 在 办 公 室 坐 着 ， 工 作 的 太 久 ， 有 时 候 会 觉 得 腰 酸 背 痛  
( N o w  i n  t o d a y ’ s  t i m e  e v e r y o n e  i s  w o r k i n g  i n  o f f i c e ,  w o r k i n g  t o o  
l o n g ,  f e e l i n g  b a c k a c h e )  那 么 ,  可 以 用 这 个 按 摩 垫 可 以 帮 助 你 舒 展 一 下 筋 骨  ( S o  
y o u  c o u l d  u s e  t h i s  m a s s a g e  c u s h i o n  t o  s t r e t c h  y o u r  b a c k )  
P G + 2 刚 刚 哪 - 大 家 - 已 经 尝 试 过 了 这 个 按 摩 垫 ， 已 经 享 受 它 了  ( J u s t  n o w ,  y o u  w e r e  
s e a t e d  o n  o u r  c u s h i o n  a n d  h a v e  h a d  e n j o y e d  i t )  感 觉 怎 么 样 ？  ( H o w  d o  
y o u  f e e l ? )  舒 服 吧 ？  ( C o m f o r t a b l e ? )  我 想 大 家 会 觉 得 非 常 舒 服 的  ( I  t h i n k  
y o u  w i l l  f e e l  c o m f o r t a b l e )  
 
The postgraduate in the experimental group vigorously followed the coherence clues 
(bold typed in the corpus) as follows:  
 
s h i → 手 指 ;  i a t s u → 按 摩 → 把 它 们 和 在 一 起 → 手 指 式 按 摩 ;  
在 办 公 室 坐 着 → 工 作 的 太 久 → 腰 酸 背 痛  
尝 试 → 感 觉 怎 么 样 → 舒 服 吧 ？ → 非 常 舒 服 的  
 
However, the teacher in the control group (please refer to Table 30b below) has lost 
the coherent links in sentence 7, omitting the information, and also appears unsure and 
hesitant in interpreting as follows:            
 
 
T - 2 在 日 语 中 s h i 是 手 指 -  a t s u 指 的 是 压 力 的 意 思  ( s h i  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r ;  
i a t s u  m e a n s  m a s s a g e )  两 者 放 在 一 起 ,  意 思 是 手 指 按 摩 . 可 以 有 效 的 减 轻 你 的 压 力  
( P u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r ,  ( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r  p r e s s u r e  c u s h i o n )  
 
T - 2 [ ]  [ ]  
T - 2 刚 才 ， 你 们 都 感 受 了  ( J u s t  n o w ,  y o u  h a v e  h a d  e x p e r i e n c e )  [ ]  舒 服 吗  
( C o m f o r t a b l e ? )  我 觉 得 应 该 是  ( I  t h i n k  ( y o u )  s h o u l d  h a v e )  
 
The corpus in Table 30a and Table 30b represent the interpreting performance of the 
two contrastive groups, in terms of the section representing semi-embodied concepts. 
The difference between the experimental and control group lies in the compulsive 
force schema (Johnson 1987: 2) (reviewed in Section 4.2; Figure 8), in that the 
interpreters’ relevant bodily experience helps them to drive through their interpreting 
track as the compulsive force vector to make them process information efficiently.    
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Table 30b Interpretations from sentence 5 to 7 by teachers in the control group 
 
T e a c h e r s  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  g r o u p  
 
S T  S 5 :  @ A s  y o u  k n o w ,  s h i  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r  -  a n d  a t s u  m e a n s  p r e s s u r e ,  p u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r  a n d  y o u ’ v e  g o t  S h i a t s u ;  -  
m e a n i n g  ‘ f i n g e r  p r e s s u r e ’  
 
T - 1 大 家 都 知 道 ， s h i 在 日 语 中 意 思 值 得 是 手 指  -  a t s u 指 的 是 按 压  ( A s  y o u  k n o w ,  s h i  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r ;  i a t s u  m e a n s  m a s s a g e ) 所    
以 ， 把 他 们 合 在 一 起 ， 就 是 手 指 式 按 摩 椅  ( P u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r ,  ( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r  p r e s s u r e  c u s h i o n )  
 
T - 2 在 日 语 中 s h i 是 手 指 -  a t s u 指 的 是 压 力 的 意 思  ( s h i  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r ;  i a t s u  m e a n s  m a s s a g e )  两 者 放 在 一 起 ,  
意 思 是 手 指 按 摩 . 可 以 有 效 的 减 轻 你 的 压 力  ( P u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r ,  ( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r  p r e s s u r e  c u s h i o n )  
 
T - 3 大 家 知 道 ， s h i  在 日 语 中 指 的 是 手 指  ( A s  y o u  k n o w ,  s h i  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r )  两 者 结 合 在 一 起 就 是 手 指 按 摩 椅  ( P u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r ,  
( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r  p r e s s u r e  c u s h i o n )       
 
T - 4 你 知 道 ， s h i 在 日 语 中 指 的 是 指 头 ； -  a t s u 指 的 是 压 力  ( s h i  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r ;  i a t s u  m e a n s  m a s s a g e )  放 在 一 起 ， 就 是 手 指 按 摩 椅  
( P u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r ,  ( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r  p r e s s u r e  c u s h i o n )  
 
T - 5 你 们 应 该 知 道 ， s h i 在 日 语 里 面 是 手 指 ； -  a t s u 指 的 是 安 压  ( A s  y o u  k n o w  s h i  i n  J a p a n e s e  m e a n s  f i n g e r ;  i a t s u  m e a n s  m a s s a g e )  
两 者 放 在 一 起 ， 意 思 是 手 指 式 按 摩 。 ( P u t  t h e m  t o g e t h e r ,  ( i t )  m e a n s  f i n g e r  p r e s s u r e  c u s h i o n )  
 
 
S 6 :  +  I n  t h i s  d a y  a n d  a g e  o f  b a d  b a c k s -  d u e  t o  m u c h  o f f i c e  w o r k ,  l a b o r  a n d  s i t t i n g  t o o  l o n g  f o r  y o u r  s t u d i e s ,  S h i a t s u  
M a s s a g e r  i s  t h e  p e r f e c t  r e l a x a t i o n  g a d g e t  f o r  e v e r y  o c c a s i o n  
 
T - 1 现 在 呢 ， 很 多 的 人 很 长 时 间 坐 在 办 公 室 里  ( N o w ,  m a n y  p e o p l e  w o r k  i n  t h e  o f f i c e  f o r  l o n g  t i m e )  
所 以 这 样 一 个 手 指 试 按 摩 椅 对 坐 办 公 室 的 人 来 说 是 一 个 很 好 的 -  ( s o  t h i s  s h i a t s u  m a s s a g e r  i s  a  g o o d  ( d e v i c e )  f o r  a  p e r s o n  s i t t i n g  i n  
o f f i c e )   
 
T - 2 [ ]  [ ]  
 
      T - 3 今 天 由 于 太 多 的 工 作 ， 压 力 太 大  ( N o w  d u e  t o  m u c h  w o r k ,  ( p e o p l e )  h a v e  t o o  m u c h  p r e s s u r e )  因 此 ， 按 摩 是 一 种 很 好 的 放 松 方 式  ( s o  t h i s  
s h i a t s u  m a s s a g e r  i s  a  g o o d  ( d e v i c e )  f o r  r e l a x a t i o n )   
 
T - 4  在 现 在 时 代 呢 ， 我 们 的 脊 背 呢 由 于 办 公 室 的 压 力 很 多 -  很 受 压 力  ( I n  t o d a y ’ s  a g e ,  d u e  t o  o f f i c e  p r e s s u r e  w e  h a v e  b a c k a c h e )  
现 在 我 们 有 这 样 一 个 好 东 西  ( N o w  w e  h a v e  s u c h  a  g o o d  t h i n g )  
 
T - 5 现 在 我 们 都 有 许 多 办 公 室 的 任 务  ( N o w ,  w e  h a v e  m u c h  o f f i c e  w o r k )  [ ]  
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S T  S 7 : +  J u s t  n o w  a l l  o f  y o u  h a v e  s a t  o n  i t  a n d  h a v e  h a d  a  p o s i t i v e  p e r s o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e .  H o w  d o  y o u  f e e l  a b o u t  i t ?  @  
 
C o m f o r t a b l e ?  + @  Y e s ,  -  I  t h i n k  y o u  w i l l  a g r e e .  +  
 
T - 1 你 坐 上 去  ( J u s t  n o w ,  y o u  s a t  o n  i t )  有 什 么 感 觉 ？  ( H o w  d o  y o u  f e e l ? )  很 舒 服 吧 ？  ( C o m f o r t a b l e ? )  呃 ， 我 相 信 是 的  ( I  t h i n k  y o u  
w i l l  a g r e e )  
 
T - 2 刚 才 ， 你 们 都 感 受 了  ( J u s t  n o w ,  y o u  h a v e  h a d  e x p e r i e n c e )  [ ]  舒 服 吗  ( C o m f o r t a b l e ? )  我 觉 得 应 该 是  ( I  t h i n k  ( y o u )  s h o u l d  h a v e )  
 
T - 3  [ ]  舒 服 吗 ？  ( C o m f o r t a b l e ? )  ，Y e a 我 想 你 们 都 感 到 很 舒 适  ( I  t h i n k  y o u  w i l l  f e e l  c o m f o r t a b l e )  
 
T - 4 你 现 在 坐 上 来  ( J u s t  n o w ,  y o u  a r e  s i t t i n g  o n  i t )  感 觉 如 何 呢 ？  ( H o w  d o  y o u  f e e l ? )  感 觉 是 不 是 非 常 棒 。 ( ( A r e  y o u )  f e e l i n g  g r e a t ? )  
是 的  ( Y e s )  
 
T - 5 刚 才 ， 你 们 都 可 以 坐 在 上 头  ( J u s t  n o w ,  y o u  m a y  s i t  o n  i t )  你 们 感 觉 如 何 ？  ( H o w  d o  y o u  f e e l ? )  舒 服 吗 ？  ( C o m f o r t a b l e ? ) 是 的  ( Y e s )  
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    In terms of the textual structure, the Speaker, at the beginning of speech, will talk 
about general things, providing outlines and topics. At this ice-breaking stage, the 
information is neither specific, nor profound, and the ideas are predictable; likewise, 
the interpreter can work her way in sparing mental effort. The finding accounts for the 
results in Section 6.2.1: it seems easier to make sense and to establish coherence in 
this section representing semi-embodied knowledge; however the experimental 
groups did better than the control group. This section reflects the relation between 
interactive embodiment, and the textual structure or the information pattern, from the 
image schema perspective. After experiencing the installation of the shiatsu device, 
the interpreting subjects formed the basic, pre-conceptual structures, or schematized 
patterns of this activity, especially pertaining to vision, space, motion, and force; 
meanwhile they formed the image schema, which fundamentally provide a skeletal 
organization relevant to the conceptions and information, as Langacker (2008: 32) 
claims as follows:   
   
      Cognitive linguists incline more to imagistic accounts. The best-known proposal 
posits a set of image schemas, described as schematized patterns of activity 
abstracted from everyday bodily experience, especially pertaining to vision, space, 
motion, and force. Image schemas are seen as basic, pre-conceptual structures that 
give rise to more elaborate and more abstract conceptions (or at least provide their 
skeletal organization) through combination and metaphorical projections.  
 
The interpreting subjects of the experimental group underwent the embodied 
activation and construal stage, and formed the initial image schema, on the basis of 
which they projected this image schema into their working memory to facilitate their 
interpreting. According to Lakoff (1987: 454) it is possible for an image schema to fit 
into a perception or an image, in that our perceptions and our mental images are 
structured by image schemas, and the schemas associated with lexical items are 
capable of fitting the schemas that structure our perceptions and images. As explained 
in Figure 14, Section 5. 1, the image schema, which lies at the interface between the 
propositional structure and metaphorical/metonymic processing, provides the skeletal 
organization of the cognition process, giving rise to the general and broad framework 
of information. According to Ungerer and Schmid (2001), even though developed, the 
schema is apparently less concrete than the rich prototype categories of objects and 
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organisms; ‘as the term suggests, an image schema, as a basic and abstract semantic 
principle, should be understood as a mental picture which is more elementary than 
both concrete categories and abstract principles’ (Ungerer and Schmid 2001: 160). 
This is the answer to the question: what are the relations between semi-embodied 
concepts and image schema? Further, why does it seem easy to make sense and 
establish coherence in the semi-embodied section?  
    Finally, how is the inferential ability facilitated and constrained by the existing 
interactive embodiment? Tables 30a and 30b above also show that both experimental 
and control groups rendered the basic information, but the former provided a more 
coherent and continuous pattern of propositions, in other words, the subjects of the 
experimental group showed a better inferential capacity than the control group. The 
assumption for this is that their bodily experience gave rise to direct understanding, 
which is reflected in the set of propositions. According to Johnson, ‘A proposition 
exists as a continuous, analog pattern of experience or understanding, with sufficient 
internal structure to permit inference’ (1987: 4); and image schemata and their 
metaphorical extensions are embodied in this special sense; they constitute much of 
meaning structure and inferential patterns. Johnson asserts (1987: 4):  
 
        This structure constrains the way the schema organizes meaning and influences the 
drawing of inferences in domains of understanding concerned with forces of a certain 
kind. The main point is that the internal structure of the image schema exists in a 
continuous, analog fashion within our understanding, which permits it to enter into 
transformations and other cognitive operations. 
 
This implies, as reviewed in Section 4.2.5 that the cognition process is like a 
compulsive force driven by a power (Johnson 1987), and the source of the power is 
generated through immersion in interactive embodiment, which in turn determines the 
image schema, and both the embodied concepts and image schemata further enable 
inferencing in interpreting. This finding will fill in the gap in the Mental Model theory 
(MMT) on inferencing (Section 2.3), which ignores the origin of coherence. This 
finding gives the answer to the question: How is the inferential ability facilitated and 
constrained by the existing interactive embodiment?  
    At this point, we cannot help wondering if the causes for the omissions might be 
various, and if embodiment may be only one part of the solutions, could a full 
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preparedness reduce the loss of information, helping the interpreter without bodily 
experience to follow the Speaker’s flow of ideas? In other words, what needs to be 
experienced directly? And what can be extended from the embodiment? This will be 
discussed in Section 7.4.  
 
 
7.2.2 Direct embodied understanding and coherence building: a propositional 
model perspective  
 
 
This section is based on direct bodily experience, as defined in Section 5.2.3, ranging 
from sentence 8 to 15, segments 15 to 33. The section representing embodied 
concepts is further divided into two subsections: Subsection A and Subsection B. 
Subsection A includes the fixing steps (S9-15) serving as the control centre for 
understanding this discourse; Subsection B (S8) includes information about the 
structure of the shiatsu device, as one part of the subjects’ bodily experience but not 
so prominent in terms of cognition. This section is used to study how the interpreter’s 
bodily experience leads to direct understanding and coherence, analyzed from the 
propositional model perspective (Chapter 5, Figure 15). At this embodied stage, the 
experimental group matched the coherence clues more successful than the control 
group: the paired teacher’s group showed 25% difference, and the paired postgraduate 
group, 34%, and most strikingly for the paired undergraduate group, the difference 
was 43%. The first issue arising from the corresponding section in the previous 
section 6.2.2 is: can the bodily experience compensate for the deficiency in language 
competence as this theoretical framework assumes? To further answer this question 
we can look at groups representing different levels of language competence. We 
notice that the postgraduates of the experimental group took a slight lead in attainment 
over the undergraduates of the experimental group (2%) and even over the teachers in 
the experimental group (18%).These outcomes of the experimental group coincide 
with those of the embodied activation and construal stage, in terms of coherence clues 
ratings which the postgraduates (58%), undergraduates (53%) and teachers (51%) had 
achieved. Can it suggest: more fully engaged embodiment means more understanding, 
and more coherence? From the corpora below, we can see interpretations from 
sentence 8 on the structure of shiatsu rendered by the undergraduates in the 
experimental group and the teachers of the control group as Table 31 shows:   
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Table 31 interpretations of sentence 8 on the structure of shiatsu device by the undergraduates in experimental group and the teachers in the control groups 
 
ST  S 8 :  @ T h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  S h i a t s u  M a s s a g e r  i s  s i m p l e .  @  T w o  k n e a d i n g  h e a d s ,  -  r o t a t i n g ,  +  t r a v e l  u p  a n d  d o w n -  a l o n g  t h e  
P V C  g u i d e s ,   @  r e l i e v i n g  p a i n  a n d  f a t i g u e  o n  y o u r  b a c k .  + @  
 
Experimental undergraduate group  
 
U G + 1 这 个 使 用 方 法 很 简 单  ( T h i s  a p p l i c a t i o n  m e t h o d  i s  s i m p l e )  两 个 按 摩 球  ( T w o  k n e a d i n g  h e a d s )  [ ]  以 及 这 样 的 一 个 导 轨  ( a n d  a l o n g  
w i t h  t h i s  g u i d e )  从 上 倒 下 ， 从 颈 部 到 腰 部  ( f r o m  u p  a n d  d o w n ,  f r o m  n e c k  t o  w a i s t )  [ ]   
 
U G + 2 这 个 手 压 式 的 按 摩 椅 ， 它 的 结 构 其 实 非 常 简 单  ( T h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h i s  s h i a t s u  i s  s i m p l e )  有 两 个 按 摩 头  ( T h e r e  a r e  t w o  k n e a d i n g  
h e a d s 然)  后 ， - + 在 椅 子 的 背 部 移 动 来 按 摩  ( t h e n  m o v e  a t  t h e  b a c k  o f  t h e  c h a r  t o  m a s s a g e  [ ]  [ ]  
 
U G + 3 手 指 式 按 摩 垫 的 结 构 非 常 简 单  ( T h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h i s  s h i a t s u  i s  s i m p l e )  有 两 个 按 摩 头  ( T h e r e  a r e  t w o  k n e a d i n g  h e a d s )  [ ]  
它 们 上 下 移 动  ( T h e y  m o v e  u p  a n d  d o w n )  [ ]  [ ]  
 
U G + 4 那 么 ,  它 的 结 构 非 常 简 单  ( i t s  s t r u c t u r e  i s  s i m p l e )  两 个 按 摩  ( T h e r e  a r e  t w o  k n e a d i n g  h e a d s )  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  
 
U G + 5 手 指 式 的 按 摩 垫 结 构 是 非 常 简 单 的  ( T h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  s h i a t s u  m a s s a g e r  i s  s i m p l e )  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  
 
 
Control Teacher’s group  
 
T - 1 它 的 结 构 非 常 简 单  ( I t s  s t r u c t u r e  i s  s i m p l e )  有 两 个 按 摩 点  ( T h e r e  a r e  t w o  m a s s a g e  d e v i c e s )     [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  
 
T - 2  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]   
 
T - 3 这 款 手 指 按 摩 椅 的 结 构 非 常 的 简 单  ( I t s  s t r u c t u r e  i s  s i m p l e )  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]   
 
T - 4 这 个 按 摩 器 的 结 构 非 常 简 单  ( T h i s  s t r u c t u r e  o f  m a s s a g e r  i s  v e r y  s i m p l e )  有 两 个 尼 龙 的 - 电 子  ( T h e r e  a r e  t w o  n y l o n  e l e c t r o s )  [ ]  [ ] 放  
 
在 P V C 的 靠 背 上  ( P u t  o n  P V C  b a c k )  [ ]  
 
T - 5 [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]   
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The five undergraduates in the experimental group seem more confident in following 
the coherence clues than the five teachers in the control group, providing a more 
coherent chain of ideas, while the latter appear to lose the coherent links in various 
degrees. We will use the superscripts of Subsection B (S8), the structure of the shiatsu 
device, to have  a close look at the data of two experimental undergraduates (UG-1 and 
UG+2) vs. two control teachers (T-1and T-2) below, as represented in Table 30, so as to 
discuss these points:   
 
U G + 1 这 个 使 用 方 法 很 简 单  ( T h i s  a p p l i c a t i o n  m e t h o d  i s  s i m p l e )  两 个 按 摩 球  
( T w o  k n e a d i n g  h e a d s )  [ ]  以 及 这 样 的 一 个 导 轨  ( a n d  a l o n g  w i t h  t h i s  g u i d e )  
从 上 倒 下 ， 从 颈 部 到 腰 部  ( f r o m  u p  a n d  d o w n ,  f r o m  n e c k  t o  w a i s t )  [ ]   
U G + 2 这 个 手 压 式 的 按 摩 椅 ， 它 的 结 构 其 实 非 常 简 单  ( T h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h i s  s h i a t s u  
i s  s i m p l e )  有 两 个 按 摩 头  ( T h e r e  a r e  t w o  k n e a d i n g  h e a d s 然)  后 ， -
+ 在 椅 子 的 背 部 移 动 来 按 摩  ( t h e n  m o v e  a t  t h e  b a c k  o f  t h e  c h a r  t o  m a s s a g e  [ ]  [ ]  
 
 
These two undergraduates in the experimental group (UG+1 and UG+2) appeared to be 
driven by a compulsive force, following the basic coherence clues, starting from 
simple structure →two kneading heads → move up and down (bold in the examples). They 
can basically follow the Speaker synchronically, and coordinate the information, able 
to go beyond the constraint of language input, while the first teacher in the control 
group only renders the general information: its structure is simple, but cannot go on 
with how the two kneading heads work. In particular, the second teacher in the control 
group got stuck, seeming to blank out as following data shows:       
 
 
T - 1 它 的 结 构 非 常 简 单  ( I t s  s t r u c t u r e  i s  s i m p l e 有 两 个 按 摩)  点  ( T h e r e  a r e  t w o  
m a s s a g e  s p o t s )  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  
 
T - 2  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]   
 
The whole data in Table 31 above, sampled from the five undergraduates of the 
experimental group and the five teachers of the control group, share similar findings 
to those above. With respect to the interpretations, the coherence clues achieved in 
this Subsection B are basically proportionate to the degree to which the subjects 
followed the coherence clues in the corresponding embodied and construal stage. As 
the finding concludes, if they can draw on embodied cognition, the interpreting 
undergraduates/novices can interpret as well as the interpreting teachers/ professionals. 
This finding on the role of interactive embodiment in coherence building has 
significance for SI training. The experimental group and control group process the 
output in the same way, as Dillinger (1989, 1994) (Section 3.4) found out: the 
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professional interpreters have the same process as the novice ones in comprehension. 
However, this finding also complements Dillinger’s conclusion from the ICM 
perspective: the difference lies in the interactive embodiment-based cognitive process; 
and also challenges Dillinger’s conclusion on the interpreter’s qualifications: the 
interpreter is made, rather than born. This finding implies that it is far from enough 
only to make SI trainees undergo highly intensive training of SI strategies; instead, 
they should be provided with interactive embodied processes, which would lead them 
into a fulfilling cognitive context, in this case, interpreting undergraduates can have a 
simultaneous training course and/or programme. However, how could a course predict 
all the different possible types of embodied experiences they need for all the possible 
interpreting contexts? In other words, how could a course prepare them for all the 
types of embodied experience? This will be discussed in Section 7.4.      
In addition, the coherence clues rating of this Subsection B in Tables 16 and 17 
points to the assumption of the Interpretive Theory of translation (Section 3.2) that the 
interpreter’s immersion in interactive embodiment compensates for the deficiency of 
language; more embodiment, more understanding, and more coherence, even 
considering that this Subsection B is not prominently or saliently experienced. This 
echoes the spreading activation of de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981), (reviewed in 
Section 2.2.1), in that when an item of knowledge is activated, other items closely 
relevant to it in mental storage become active to a different degree in terms of 
prominence. According to Wang (2006) (Section 4.4.4), the memory in the remote 
area is least likely to be activated in cognition. The answer to the issue (why did the 
interpreting subjects activate the prominent concepts more easily than the subordinate 
or obscure ones in the interactive embedment?) has also been discussed in Section 7.1.  
The issues above can be further discussed by means of the theories of 
multidimensional and experiential gestalts (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) (Chapter 4). 
The coherent structure of experience gives rise to experiential gestalts with the 
dimensions of experience. An experience or set of experiences are construed coherent 
by virtue of having a structure. This structure characterizes multidimensional and 
experiential gestalts, which are ways of organizing experiences into structured wholes. 
According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 81) experiential gestalts take the form of 
multidimensional structured wholes. Accordingly, their dimensions are defined with 
respect to directly emergent concepts. That is, the various dimensions, such as 
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participants, parts, stages, are categories that emerge naturally from our experience. 
The experiential gestalts with the dimensions of experience gives rise to causation, a 
directly emergent concept, and the other dimensions in terms of which we further 
categorize our experience. This concept of causation will be used in the following 
discussion from a more micro perspective. 
According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 81) ‘understanding such multidimensional 
gestalts and the correlations between them is the key to understanding coherence in 
our experience’. From the discussion above we can postulate that the experimental 
interpreting subjects, especially, the undergraduates of the experimental group, had 
formed the multidimensional gestalts, correlating the dimensions between the 
elements. They have used these basic dimensions of their experience to achieve 
coherence, categorizing the elements in terms of gestalts with at least these 
dimensions in terms of participants, parts, stages, linear sequence, and purpose. ‘The 
various dimensions are categories that emerge naturally from our experience. This 
contributes to global coherence’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 77). In this study’s case, 
participants are the sales promoter, and the potential customers; parts are those of 
shiatsu device, which the experimental interpreting subjects have experienced 
physically by virtue of their perceptions, and their interaction with them. Stages mean 
the fixing steps from the beginning to the end. Linear sequence means that the 
interpreting subjects were engaged physically in installing the shiatsu in the right 
order. Purpose means the sales promoter’s desire to sell out the product, so as to meet 
the needs of the users. In short, the bodily experience helped the interpreting subjects 
to access the coherent structure of experience, that is, experiential gestalts with the 
dimensions of experience, which has facilitated their capacity to achieve original and 
global coherence. The next issue arises: how can interpreters rely on the propositional 
structure and image schema as the mappings to bridge reference and inference for 
coherence? Could this mean that the interactive embodiment helps the interpreting 
subjects to activate their working memory by the link schema? These questions go 
down from the origin of coherence and global coherence to local coherence. I will use 
the superscripts of sentence 9 to 15, the fixing step of the shiatsu device, for micro 
analysis as shown in the postgraduate group with their bodily experience (Table 32a) 
vs. the postgraduate group without their bodily experience (Table 32b): 
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Table 32a The embodied section rendered by the postgraduates in the experimental group  
N  E n g l i s h  i n p u t  P G + 1   P G + 2  P G + 3  P G + 4   P G + 5  
2
1  
S 9 : I  w o u l d  l i k e  
t o  t a l k  a b o u t  
h o w  t o  u s e  t h i s  
S h i a t s u  
M a s s a g e r  
下 面 ， 我 很 高 兴 给 大 家
介 绍 一 下 如 何 使 用 这 个
产 品  N e x t ,  I  a m  
p l e a s e d  t o  t a l k  
b o u t  h o w  t o  u s e  
t h i s  p r o d u c t  
我 向 大 家 介 绍 一 下 怎 样
使 用 它 N e x t ,  I  w i l l  
t a l k  a b o u t  h o w  t o  
u s e  t h i s  p r o d u c t    
现 在 哪 ， 我 来 告 诉 大 家
， -
介 绍 一 下 如 何 使 用 这 个
按 摩 垫 N o w  I  w i l l  
t a l k  a b o u t  h o w  t o  
u s e  t h i s  m a s s a g e r    
我 现 在 想 向 你 们 展 示 一
下 如 何 使 用 这 一 款 按 摩
椅 N o w  I  w i l l  t a l k  
a b o u t  h o w  t o  u s e  
t h i s  m a s s a g e r     
我 想 说 一 下 怎 么 样 使 用 这
个 手 指 式 按 摩 垫  
I  w i l l  t a l k  a b o u t  
h o w  t o  u s e  t h i s  
m a s s a g e r     
2
2  
B r i e f l y  t h e r e  
a r e  s i x  s t e p s  
y o u  s h o u l d  
r e m e m b e r : +  @  
简 单 的 说 有 六 步  
B r i e f l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
t h e r e  a r e  s i x  s t e p s  
非 常 简 单 ， 有 六 个 步 骤
B r i e f l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
t h e r e  a r e  s i x  s t e p s  
简 单 的 来 说 ， 有 六 个 步
骤 B r i e f l y  
s p e a k i n g ,  t h e r e  a r e  
s i x  s t e p s   
简 单 的 来 说 有 六 个 步 骤
B r i e f l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
t h e r e  a r e  s i x  s t e p s  
总 共 有 六 步
B r i e f l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
t h e r e  a r e  s i x  s t e p s    
2
3  
S 1 0 :  O n e .  
A t t a c h  t h e  
m a s s a g e  s e a t  -  
t o  a l m o s t  a n y  
c h a i r  @  
第 一 步 ， - + ( c o u g h )  
把 这 个 按 摩 垫 放 倒 椅 子
的 椅 背 上 F i r s t  s t e p ,  
p u t  i t  u p o n  a n y  
c h a i r  
第 一 ， 把 按 摩 垫 放 在 随
意 的 一 个 椅 子 上 面  
F i r s t ,  p u t  i t  u p o n  
a n y  c h a i r  
第 一 步 -
把 这 个 按 摩 垫 固 定 在 任
何 椅 子 上 都 可 以 F i r s t  
s t e p ,  f a s t e n  i t  
u p o n  a n y  c h a i r
第 一 步 ， 把 这 一 款 手 指
式 按 摩 垫 可 以 放 到 任 何
一 个 椅 子 上 F i r s t  
s t e p ,  p u t  i t  u p o n  
a n y  c h a i r
第 一 ， 把 这 个 按 摩 垫 放 在
任 何 靠 背 椅 上  
F i r s t ,  p u t  i t  u p o n  
a n y  c h a i r  
2
4  
u s i n g  t h e  
i n t e g r a t e d  
s t r a p  a t  t h e  
b a c k  o f  t h e  s e a t  
然 后 确 保 用+ 松 紧 带 把
它 固 定 好  
A n d  t h e n  m a k e  
s u r e  t o  h o l d  i t  
w e l l  w i t h  
i n t e g r a t e d  s t r a p  
用 后 面 的 松 紧 带 绑 上 ，
A n d  h o l d  i t  w e l l  
w i t h  i n t e g r a t e d  
s t r a p  
+  
为 了 确 保 有 没 有 安 好 ，
就 看 一 下 这 个 松 紧 带  
T o  m a k e  s u r e  o f  
i t s  i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  
h a v e  a  l o o k  a t  t h i s  
i n t e g r a t e d  s t r a p
然 后 那 用 松 紧 带 系 紧  
A n d  t h e n  t i g h t e n  
i t  w i t h  t h i s  
i n t e g r a t e d  s t r a p  
然 后 ， 扣 紧 松 带  
A n d  t h e n  t i g h t e n  
t h e   i n t e g r a t e d  
s t r a p s  
2
5  
+  E n s u r e  i t  i s  
h e l d  f i r m l y  i n  
p l a c e  b y  
a d j u s t i n g  t h e  
s t r a p  a s  
n e c e s s a r y @ +  
@ [ ]  
 
 
 
 
 
@ [ ]  
 
@ [ ]  
 
@ [ ]  
 
@ [ ]  
 
2
6  
S 1 1 T w o , C o n n e c t  
t h e  p o w e r  
s u p p l y  l e a d  
f r o m  t h e  a d a p t e r  
w i t h  t h e  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
l e a d - i n  t h e  s i d e  
o f  t h e  s e a t +  @  
第 二 步 ， 进 行 电 源 连 接
， - 把 导 线 连 接 起 来  
S e c o n d  s t e p ,  
c o n n e c t  p o w e r  
s u p p l y ,  l e a d      
第 二 步 ， 接 上 电 源 ， 将
导 线 接 上 。  
S e c o n d  s t e p ,  
c o n n e c t  p o w e r  
s u p p l y ,  l e a d      
第 二 步 ， 就 是 通 电  
 
S e c o n d  s t e p ,  
c o n n e c t  p o w e r  
第 二 步 ， 把 电 源 线 接 到
电 源 上 面  
S e c o n d  s t e p ,  
c o n n e c t  c o r d  t o  
p o w e r  s u p p l y  
第 二 ， 在 您 将 线 路 连 接 好
之 后 ，  
S e c o n d ,  c o n n e c t  
c o r d s  
2
7  
S 1 2 T h r e e .  P l u g  
t h e  a d a p t o r  i n t o  
a  2 3 0 V  A C  
m a i n s  o u t l e t  
a n d  s w i t c h  o n +   
第 三 步 ， 把+ 适 配 器 放
到 2 4 0 伏 的 电 压 情 况 下
T h i r d ,  p u t  t h e   
a d a p t o r  i n t o  a  2 4 0  
m a i n  o u t l e t
第 三 步 ， 然 后 哪 ， 把 适
配 器 结 上 ， 2 3 4  A C  
电 源  T h i r d ,  
c o n n e c t  t h e   
a d a p t o r  i n t o  a  
第 三 步 ， 把 这 个+ 适 配
器 插 到 2 3 0 伏 的 电 源 上
， 并 通 上 电 T h i r d ,  
p l u g  t h e   a d a p t o r  
i n t o  a  2 3 0 v  m a i n  
第 三 步 ， 把 这 个 适 配 器
接 到 2 4 0 伏 的 电 源 上 面
， 然 后 打 开 T h i r d ,  
p l u g  t h e   a d a p t o r  
i n t o  a  2 3 0 v  m a i n  
然 后 哪 ， 把 适 配 器 联 到 2
伏 的 插 座4 0  上  T h i r d ,  
p l u g  t h e   a d a p t o r  
i n t o  a  2 4 0 v  m a i n  
o u t l e t  a n d  s w i t c h  o n   
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 2 3 4 v  m a i n  o u t l e t    o u t l e t  a n d  c o n n e c t  
p o w e r   
o u t l e t  a n d  s w i t c h  
o n  
2
8  
B y  t h e  w a y , -  
r e m e m b e r  t o  
f i n i s h  s t e p s  1  
t o  3  - b e f o r e  
s w i t c h i n g  t h e  
a p p l i a n c e  o n  a t  
t h e  m a i n s +  @  
+  在 坐 上 之 前 ， 确 保 前 三
步 已 经 做 好 了  
B e f o r e  b e i n g  
s e a t e d  m a k e  s u r e  
o f  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  
s t e p s  
 
顺 便 哪 ， 我 提 醒 一 下+
大 家 前 三 步 都 要 适 当 的
做 好  
B y  t h e  w a y  I  
r e m i n d  e v e r y o n e  t o  
d o  f i r s t  t h r e e  
s t e p s  p r o p e r l y
[ ]  顺 便 说 一 下 ， 在 连 接 电 源
之 前 ， 把 上 述 三 步 完 成  
B y  t h e  w a y ,  f i n i s h  
t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  
s t e p s  m e n t i o n e d  
a b o v e  b e f o r e  
c o n n e c t i n g  p o w e r   
2
9  
S 1 3  F o u r .  O n c e  
s e a t e d ,  -  u s e  
t h e  r e m o t e  
c o n t r o l -  t o  
o p e r a t e  t h e  
a p p l i a n c e . +  
第 四 步 ， 使 用 ， 按 摩 器
， -  
使 用 遥 控 器 ， 来 遥 控 手
指 按 摩 垫 来 进 行 按 摩 F
o u r t h  s t e p ,  u s e  t h e  
r e m o t e  c o n t r o l  ,  
a n d  t h e n  p r e s s  
‘ p o w e r ’  
 
 
 
 
第 四 步 ， 使 用 遥 控 器 选
择 上 面 的 按 钮 ， 根 据 自
己 的 需 要 选 择 按 钮  
F o u r t h ,  u s e  t h e  
r e m o t e  c o n t r o l ’ s  
b u t t o n  a n d  s e l e c t  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  y o u r  
n e e d  
下 面 ， 我 们 进 行 第 四 步
， 使 用 你 手 中 的 遥 控 器
选 择 你 不 同 的 需 要 ， 然
后 根 据 你 的 需 要 选 择 按
摩 垫 活 动 的 范 围  
N e x t ,  w e  w i l l  
c a r r y  o n  t h e  f o u r t h  
s t e p ,  u s e  t h e  
r e m o t e  c o n t r o l  i n  
h a n d   a n d  s e l e c t   
a c c o r d i n g  t o  y o u r  
n e e d  
第 四 步 ， 用 这 个 遥 控 面
板 ， 把 电 源 健 打 开 ， 然
后 可 以 上 下 调 控  
F o u r t h   u s e  t h i s  
r e m o t e  c o n t r o l  
p a n e l  a n d  p u t  t h e  
p o w e r  o n  a n d  
o p e r a t e  t h e  u p  a n d  
d o w n s     
第 四 步 ， 你 可 以 用 遥 控 器
来 控 制 它 通 过 开 关 键 来.
控 制 手 指 式 按 摩 垫 的 开 关  
F o u r t h  u s e  t h i s  
r e m o t e  c o n t r o l  f o r  
o p e r a t i o n  
3
1  
S 1 4 :  f i v e .  F o r  
a n  i n t e n s e  
m a s s a g e , -  
r e m o v e  t h e  f l a p  
f r o m  t h e  b a c k  o f  
t h e  c u s h i o n  
第 五 步 ， + -  
如 果 想 要 等 到( c o u g h )
较 轻 柔 的 按 摩 ， 可 以 把
减 压 垫 放 到 后 面 去  
F i f t h ,  i f  ( y o u ) w a n t  
g e n t l e  m a s s a g e ,  
p u t  t h e  f l a p  o v e r  
t o  b a c k  
第 五 步 ， 如 果 想 要 力 度
大 一 点 的 话 ， 就 把 这 个
减 压 垫 放 到 椅 子 的 背 面
F i f t h ,  i f  ( y o u ) w a n t  
s t r o n g e r  m a s s a g e ,  
p u t  t h e  f l a p  o v e r  
t o  b a c k   
第 五 步 ， 我 们 可 以 把 减
压 帘 从 按 摩 垫 上 移 走 ，
或 者 是 移 上  
F i f t h ,  w e  c o u l d  
r e m o v e  t h e  f l a p  o r  
k e e p  i t  ( o n  t h e  
b a c k )  
第 五 步 ， 如 果 觉 得 背 部
压 力 太 大 ， 可 以 把 这 个
帘 子 放 到 椅 子 背 后 来 减
轻 这 个 压 力 F i f t h ,  i f  
( y o u ) f e e l  p r e s s u r e  
t o o  i n t e n s e  w e  
c o u l d  p u t  t h e  f l a p  
t o  t h e  b a c k  t o  
r e d u c e t h e p r e s s u r e
第 五 ， 如 果 你 要 增 加 按 摩
强 度 的 话 ， 可 以 去 掉 减 压
帘  
F i f t h ,  i f  y o u  w a n t  t o  
i n c r e a s e  m a s s a g e  
i n t e n s e  d e g r e e ,  
( y o u )  c o u l d  r e m o v e  
t h e  f l a p  
3
2  
-  F o r  a  g e n t l e r  
m a s s a g e ,  k e e p  
t h e  f l a p  o n  a n d  
y o u  c a n  s o f t e n  
t h e  m a s s a g e  
f u r t h e r -  b y  
p l a c i n g  a  t o w e l  
b e t w e e n  y o u r  
b a c k  a n d  s e a t .  +   
如 果 想 要 较 强 的 按 摩 要
把 减 压 垫 放 到 上 面  
I f  ( y o u ) w a n t  a  
t e n s e  f l a p  ,  p u t  i t  
o n  [ ]     
如 果 想 要 压 力 小 一 些 ，
就 把 这 个 减 压 垫 放 上  
I f  ( y o u ) w a n t  a  
g e n t l e  f l a p  ,  p u t  i t  
o n   [ ]    
这 是 根 据 个 人 的 需 要 ，
这 是 减 压 帘 的 作 用  
T h i s  i s  b a s e d  o n  
y o u r  o w n  n e e d .  
t h i s  i s  t h e  
f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
f l a p [ ]  
[ ]   
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The five postgraduates in the experimental group followed the coherence clues from 
the beginning to end; they started up with 如何使用 (how to use), and 六个步骤 (six 
steps), further entered into more specific information, but closely followed the tiny 
links. For instance, from segments 26 to 27, sentences 11 to 12, they have used the 
coherence clues 连接电源 (connect power supply) as triggers to access the sub-links: 
适配器 (adaptor), 插入插座 (plug it into socket), even though the word ‘socket’ (插座) did not 
appear in the source text. In addition, they properly processed the semantic meaning 
by using cohesion shifts. For instance, in segment 24, sentence 10, three out of the 
five (PG+1. +4, +5) have added the cohesive device, conjunction ‘然后’ (and then), to 
make the sequential action clearer. Another example is that none of the five have used 
the switch code method to interpret, one to six steps, but rather, they have interpreted 
them into, 第一步(first step)， 第二步 (second step)，or 下一步 (next step)，or 然后 (and 
then).   
The five postgraduates in the experimental group can track the coherence clues 
synchronically, abreast with the speed of the speaker (normally 1 to 2 seconds 
minimum, in following the thematic elements). What is more, when the Speaker steps 
up his speed, the interpreters in the experimental group can go beyond the constrain 
of language form, and coordinate the information output, for instance, in sentence 14, 
segments 31 and 32, the five postgraduates in the experimental group can recognize 
the information by judgement (see Chapter 1). By comparing the source text (ST) and 
the target text  (TT), we can see that the five subjects are not confined to the 
information density (Dillinger 1994) (Section 3.4), instead, have used syntactic 
structures and their bodily experience based mental structure to judge the inputs while 
producing speech, for instance, when hearing F o r  a n  i n t e n s e  m a s s a g e ,  they have 
instantly anticipated r e m o v e  t h e  f l a p , and accordingly, at F o r  a  g e n t l e r  m a s s a g e ,  
they have immediately supplemented and completed the referents of  k e e p  t h e  f l a p  
o n . This data shows that the subjects, who undertook this embodied activation and 
construal stage, can automatically project their actions and events into their minds 
through the mental space blending process, on the grounds that the mental spaces are 
linked to each other through a series of mappings and projections, and constitute a 
conceptual integration network (CIN), and language is regarded as a series of 
complicated cognitive processing triggers. The interpreting subjects followed their 
mental mappings to form a CIN by virtue of the temporal iconicity mappings (Section 
 190
4.6.2 Mapping iconicity) in the form of a frame and script. Langacker (2008: 79) 
gives an account of temporal iconicity as follows:  
 
         There is a natural tendency for conceived time and processing time to be co-
aligned, such that the order in which events are conceived as occurring dovetails 
with the order in which they are conceptualized and described 
 
This observation suggests that the iconicity of the embodied process is projected into 
the experimental interpreters’ mind through their immersion in embodiment, in that 
the subjects have natural chains of actions and events stored in their minds, accessing 
the sequential discourse, which agrees with the theory of iconicity. Information 
organized according to natural language sequence is easier to remember (Clark and 
Clark 1977, Wang 2006: 555-556), as reviewed in Section 4.6.2; and the subjects tend 
to store events according to the natural sequence to establish coherence (Smith and 
Mclin 1970; Engelkamp 1974; Wang 2006: 555-556). In the meantime, the subjects 
with bodily experience can mostly anticipate, coordinate, compensate and judge the 
Speaker’s flow of ideas (see Chapter 1).  
This finding also compensates for the deficiencies in the theories of frame and 
script and iconicity, in how the interpreter builds coherence in cognition, shown in 
Figures 16 and 17, through the subjects’ bodily experience of installing the parts of 
the shiatsu device: a chain of mental links are projected into their working memory, 
by metaphorical processing, in the form of a schema, such as the container, the part-
whole, the link, the centre-periphery and the source-path-goal (Lakoff 1987: 272-275; 
reviewed in Section 4.2.3), which shows how the embodiment-based frame, script and 
iconicity work in helping the interpreters to achieve coherence.  
  On the other hand, as Table 32b below shows, the subjects without bodily experience 
appear vulnerable to losing the thread of ideas, losing the coherence links, with pauses 
and hesitations. A close look at the data in Table 32b shows that three postgraduates 
in the control group (PG-3,-4,-5) cannot respond to the input of the information on the 
first step of installation (segment 23); more coherence clues are omitted in segments 
23, 24 and 28. Particularly regarding segments 31 and 32, the five postgraduates in the 
control group cannot access interpreting strategies, such as anticipation and judgement, 
as their peers do. They have omitted the information (PG-1, PG-2 and PG-5) or paused 
and hesitated, unable to render the complete information (PG-3 and PG-4).
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32 b: The embodied section rendered by the postgraduates in the control group  
N
o  
E n g l i s h  i n p u t  P G - 1   P G - 2   P G - 3   P G - 4  P G - 5   
2
1  
S 9 :  I  w o u l d  l i k e  
t o  t a l k  a b o u t  
h o w  t o  u s e  t h i s  
S h i a t s u  
M a s s a g e r   
我 现 在 想 说 说 如 何 使 用
这 个 手 指 式 按 摩  
I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  
t a l k  a b o u t  h o w  t o  
u s e  t h i s  s h i a t s u  
m a s s a g e r  
我 要 告 诉 你 如 何 使 用 这
个 按 摩 器  
I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  
t a l k  a b o u t  h o w  t o  
u s e  ( i t )  
[ ]  我 想 谈 如 何 使 用 这 个 手 指
式 按 摩 垫  
I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  t a l k  
a b o u t  h o w  t o  u s e  
t h i s  f i n g e r  p a s s a g e  
c u s h i o n  
我 想 给 你 们 介 绍 一 下 如
何 使 用 这 个 手 指 式 按 摩
垫  
I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  t a l k  
a b o u t  h o w  t o  u s e  
t h i s  s h i a t s u  
m a s s a g e r  
2
2  
B r i e f l y  t h e r e  
a r e  s i x  s t e p s  
y o u  s h o u l d  
r e m e m b e r : +  @  
这 里 你 需 要 记 住 六 个 要
点  
H e r e  y o u  n e e d  t o  
r e m e m b e r  s i x  
p o i n t s  
简 单 的 来 说 ， 有 六 步 应
该 记 清 楚  
B r i e f l y  s p e a k i n g   
t h e r e  a r e  s i x  s t e p s
有 六 个 步 骤 使 用 这 个
按 摩 椅  
B r i e f l y  s p e a k i n g   
t h e r e  a r e  s i x  
s t e p s  
大 概 来 说 有 六 个 步 骤 ， 我
们 应 该 记 住  
B r i e f l y  s p e a k i n g   
t h e r e  a r e  s i x  s t e p s   
( w h i c h )  w e  s h o u l d  
r e m e m b e r  
有 三 项 你 们 应 该 知 道  
H e r e  y o u  n e e d  t o  
r e m e m b e r  t h r e e  
p o i n t s  
2
3  
S 1 0 :  O n e .  
A t t a c h  t h e  
m a s s a g e  s e a t  -  
t o  a l m o s t  a n y  
c h a i r  @  
第 一 步 ， 把 它 放 到 每 一
个 凳 子 上  
F i r s t  s t e p ,  p u t  
t h i s  m a s s a g e r  o n  
t o  a  c h a i r    
第 一 步 ， -
用 松 紧 带 把 它 放 到 任 何
一 个 椅 子 的 后 背  
F i r s t ,  p u t  t h i s  o n  
t o  a n y  c h a i r  w i t h  
i n t e g r a t e d  s t r a p s  
第 一 [ ]  
F i r s t  
[ ]  [ ]  
2
4  
u s i n g  t h e  
i n t e g r a t e d  
s t r a p  a t  t h e  
b a c k  o f  t h e  s e a t
用 松 紧 带 把 它 绑 在 背 后
F a s t e n  i t  w i t h  
i n t e g r a t e d  s t r a p s  
 用松紧带调节好 
u s e  i n t e g r a t e d  
s t r a p s   f o r  
a d j u s t m e n t      
 
[ ]  [ ]  
2
5  
+  E n s u r e  i t  i s  
h e l d  f i r m l y  i n  
p l a c e  b y  
a d j u s t i n g  t h e  
s t r a p  a s  
n e c e s s a r y @ +  
[ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  
2
6  
S 1 1 :  T w o .  
C o n n e c t  t h e  
p o w e r  s u p p l y  
l e a d  - f r o m  t h e  
a d a p t e r  -  w i t h  
t h e  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
l e a d -  i n  t h e  s i d e  
o f  t h e  s e a t . +  @  
第 二 步 ， 连 接 电 源
S e c o n d  s t e p  
c o n n e c t  t h e  p o w e r  
s u p p l y     
第 二 步 ， 将 导 线 接 好 ，
与 椅 子 左 边 的 导 线 连 接
在 一 起  
S e c o n d ,  c o n n e c t  
t h e  l e a d  t o  t h e  
c o r d  o f  c h a i r  o n  
t h e  l e f t  s i d e    
第 二 步 ， 连 按 电 源 ，
导 线  
S e c o n d ,  c o n n e c t  
t h e  p o w e r  a n d  
l e a d    
第 二 ， -  连 接 适 配 器  
S e c o n d ,  c o n n e c t  t h e  
a d a p t o r      
第 二 步 ， 插 上 适 配 器 ，
插 上 导 线 。  
c o n n e c t  t h e  
a d a p t o r  a n d  l e a d      
2 S 1 2 :  T h r e e .  [ ]  第 三 步 ， - 第 三 步 呢 ， 是 把 这 个 第 三 ， 把 适 配 器 插 到 2 3 0 [] 
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7  P l u g  t h e  
a d a p t o r  i n t o  a  
2 3 0 V  A C  m a i n s  
o u t l e t  - a n d  
s w i t c h  o n +  @  
打 开 开 关 。 +  
T h i r d ,  s w i t c h  o n    
 
 
适 配 器 调 到 2 0 0 - ．  
T h i r d ,  a d j u s t  t h e  
a d a p t o r  t o  2 0 0  
伏 的 电 流 上  
T h i r d ,  p l u g   t h e  
a d a p t o r  t o  2 3 0 v  
e l e c t r i c  c u r r e n t  
2
8  
B y  t h e  w a y ,  -  
r e m e m b e r  t o  
f i n i s h  s t e p s  1  
t o  3  - b e f o r e  
s w i t c h i n g  t h e  
a p p l i a n c e  o n  a t  
t h e  m a i n s .  +  @  
[ ]  顺 便 说 ， 在 打 开 开 关 前
， 完 成 一 ， 二 ， 三 步  
B y  t h e  w a y  f i n i s h  
1 - 3  s t e p s  b e f o r e  
s w i t c h i n g  o n    
[ ]  [ ]  [ ]  
2
9  
S 1 3 :  F o u r .  O n c e  
s e a t e d ,  -  u s e  
t h e  r e m o t e  
c o n t r o l -  t o  
o p e r a t e  t h e  
a p p l i a n c e . +  
一 旦 坐 在 上 面 ， 按 一 下
功 能 健  
O n c e  s e a t e d  p r e s s  
t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  
b u t t o n  
第 四 步 ， 使 用 遥 控 器  
F o u r t h  s t e p ,  u s e  
r e m o t e  c o n t r o l       
第 四 步 ， 是 坐 下 来 把
按 钮 按 下 去 ， 按 下 按
钮 开 关 ， 按 摩 器 开 始
按 摩  
F o u r t h  s t e p ,  o n c e  
s e a t e d   p r e s s  t h e  
b u t t o n  t o  s t a r t  
u p  t h e  m a s s a g e r  
第 四 ， 坐 下 ， 按 动 一 下 电
源 健 ， 然 后 选 择 按 摩 的 形
式  
F o r t h ,  t a k e  a  s e a t   
p r e s s  t h e  p o w e r  
b u t t o n  a n d  t h e n  
s e l e c t  t h e  m a s s a g e  
m o d e    
第 四 ， +  
使 用 遥 控 器 打 开 电 源 开,
关 F o u r t h  u s e  
r e m o t e  c o n t r o l  a n d  
p u t  t h e  s w i t c h  o n    
3
1  
S 1 4 :  f i v e .  F o r  
a n  i n t e n s e  
m a s s a g e , -  
r e m o v e  t h e  f l a p  
f r o m  t h e  b a c k  o f  
t h e  c u s h i o n  
[ ]  [ ]  第 五 步 呢 ， [ ]  
F i f t h  [ ]  
第 五 ， +  
如 果 轻 柔 的 按 摩  
F i f t h ,  i f  ( y o u )  n e e d  
s o f t  m a s s a g e  
[ ]  
3
2  
-  F o r  a  g e n t l e r  
m a s s a g e ,  k e e p  
t h e  f l a p  o n  a n d  
y o u  c a n  s o f t e n  
t h e  m a s s a g e  
f u r t h e r -  b y  
p l a c i n g  a  t o w e l  
b e t w e e n  y o u r  
b a c k  a n d  s e a t @    
[ ]  [ ]  要 轻 轻 的 按 摩 ， 在 你
的 后 部  放 一 个 毛 巾   
S i x t h ,  f o r  a  
g e n t l e  m a s s a g e  
p u t  a  t o w e l  
b e h i n d  y o u r  
b a c k    
把 毛 巾 放 到 你 的 后 背  
P u t  a  t o w e l  b e h i n d  
y o u r  b a c k  
[ ]  
3
3  
S 1 5 :  S i x .  P r e s s  
t h e  “ P o w e r  
“ b u t t o n  - ( f o r  a  
s e c o n d  t i m e ) -  t o  
s t o p  t h e  
m a s s a g e .  + +  @  
功 能 健 再 按 一 下 使 它 关
闭  
P r e s s  t h e  
f u n c t i o n a l  b u t t o n  
o n c e  m o r e  t o  s t o p  
i t  
第 六 步 ， 第 二 次 按 下 电
源 开 关 ， 停 止 使 用 按 摩
器  
S i x t h ,  p r e s s  t h e  
p o w e r  s w i t c h  f o r  a  
s e c o n d  t i m e  
第 六 步 呢 ， 把 这 个 按
钮 再 按 一 次 -  
S i x t h ,  p r e s s  t h e  
p o w e r  s w i t c h  f o r  
a  s e c o n d  t i m e  
 
[ ]  
第 六 步 ， 再 按 一 下 这 个
健 就 会 停 止 按 摩 s i x  
s t e p  P r e s s  t h e  
b u t t o n  o n c e  m o r e  
t o  s t o p  
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In addition, the five postgraduates in the control group cannot synchronize the output 
speed with the input, and they cannot conceptualize what is being interpreting so as to 
make direct sense or build coherence.  
    These phenomena can be further discussed in terms of frame and script. The 
subjects in the experimental group activated the link of sense among the shiatsu 
installation steps, and put the components together according to their relations by 
closeness of linkage, and formed the mental structure representing the shiatsu 
installation process. In short, they have made sense and achieved coherence in 
interpreting due to the existing stereotypic frame and script in their minds. As 
mentioned above, in addition to the interactive embodiment, image schema, iconicity, 
and a stereotypic approach to coherence, causation relations can also account for the 
phenomena of building coherence in SI. During interpreting, they were able to follow 
the thread of the Speaker’s ideas, making sense and building coherence, rather than 
engaging in code-switch transmission, as the Interpretive Theory of translation 
postulates (Section 3.2).  
           With respect to local coherence, the relationship between concepts can be 
expressed in linking causal phrases such as gives rise to, results in, is required by, or 
contributes to. This is called causation, which appears to account best for the relation 
between language and conceptual structure, as well as for the relationships among the 
varieties of causation (Lakoff 1977). The experimental postgraduates can track the 
causation relations among fixing steps by virtue of a series of actions: attach the seat 
→ connect the power supply→ plug the adapter → use the remote control → remove or 
retain the flap → press power button. According to Lakoff (1987: 54) causation is direct 
manipulation, characterized broadly and typically by the following cluster of 
interactional properties, this is called prototypical causation. I combine this 
assumption with the corpus as follows: 
 
(1) There is an agent that does something. (In this experimental case, the agent, the 
experimental subject installs the shiatsu massager.)    
   (2) There is a patient that undergoes a change to a new state. (The shiatsu’s parts are 
put together into a massager.) 
(3) Properties 1 and 2 constitute a single event; they overlap in time and space; the 
agent comes in contact with the patient. (The experimental subject is engaged    
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physically in contact with the shiatsu equipment.)  
   (4) Part of what the agent does (either the motion or the exercise of will) precedes the 
change in the patient. (The subjects intend to put the parts of the shiatsu device 
together for massage.)  
   (5) The agent is the energy source; the patient is the energy goal; there is a transfer of 
energy from agent to patient. (The experimental subject feeds energy into the shiatsu.) 
   (6) A single definite agent and a single definite patient. (The experimental subject and 
the shiatsu massager.)  
   (7) The agent is human. (The experimental subjects.) 
(8) The agent a) wills, b) is in control of, and c) bears primary responsibility for both 
his action and the change. (The experimental subject manipulates his or her action.) 
   (9) The agent uses his hands, body, or some instrument. (The subject uses his or her 
perceptual organs.) 
  (10) The agent is looking at the patient, the change in the patient is perceptible, and 
the agent perceives the change. (The subject has fixed it and enjoyed the massage.)  
 
According to Lakoff (1977, 1987: 54) the category of types of causation shows 
prototypical effects in the ways that they are represented in natural languages. These 
effects are relatively uniform across languages, also evident in this corpus, as revealed 
above.           
    In addition, the data in Tables 31a and 31b above show that the findings support 
Fillmore’s observations of verbs (1982, 1985) (Section 2.2.2.1), i.e. verbs are related 
with the whole situation, and can make some aspects more prominent and salient. In 
other words, it is the actions of fixing procedures that turn out to be the trajectors, the 
prominence and salience in the whole installation process to establish coherence. This 
finding challenges Wang’s claim (2006) that trajectors are mostly animated living 
things or people as subject(s) in sentences; but here in this experiment context, it is a 
series of actions, or verbs rather than nouns or animated living things or people that 
act as the attentional focus (trajector) in this technical context for the sake of 
coherence. Therefore it further supports Langacker’s theory of current discourse space 
(CDS) (2000: 331, 359) (Section 4.6.3), in that the choice of subject and object is 
neither a logic nor a grammatical issue but rather it involves cognition construal, 
mental focus or prominent concept. This develops the theory of thematic progression 
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(Section 2.1 and Section 3.1.1), in that the ICM-based approach to discourse analysis 
is to follow the semantic focus from the cognitive perspective, thus revealing the 
mental central attention of the Speaker, rather than being only limited to the text 
context.  
    The interpretations rendered in the section representing embodied concepts also 
suggest that the subjects used an increasing attentional effort to follow the coherence 
clues as the information is becoming more specific. In particular, when the 
information gets dense, as observed in Dillinger’s research into coherence in clauses 
(reviewed in Section 3.4), the subjects in the experimental group appeared to be 
struggling in following the coherence clues, the subjects of the control group seemed 
desperate as the corpora show above. This issue needs to be further studied, and will 
be addressed in Section 8.4, Future work.            
    In summary, as reviewed in Section 4.5, the ICM-based approach helps the 
interpreter to fill in missing links and to access the cognitive world, in achieving 
global and local coherence. In addition, the presence of the ICM was felt in the 
subjects’ distribution of their mental effort in their interpreting process in retrieving 
the relevant information from their memory storage. These findings support the 
hypothesis posited in Section 5.1.  
So far, we have discussed the semi-embodied discourse, from the image schema 
perspective, the embodied discourse from the propositional model perspective. 
According to the literature reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4, the propositional model and 
image schema together are the fundamental cognitive process to achieve the basic 
coherence in SI. We will move on to the non-embodied/abstract discourse, analyzed 
from the viewpoint of metonymic and metaphoric models in the following section. 
  
7.2.3 Non-embodied concepts and indirect understanding: a metonymic and 
metaphoric perspective  
 
As Section 5.2.4 explained, this section representing non-embodied concepts is based 
on sentences 16 to 19, segments 34 to 43. Knowledge in this section is not directly 
embodied, or remote from the core of bodily experience, unconventional and 
unpredictable in communication (Wang 2006, Section 4.4.4). The concepts in this 
section are defined to be inactive according to Chafe (1994) (reviewed in Section 4.7). 
The non-embodied section is also separated into two subsections: Subsection A (S16-
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19) (warnings) and Subsection B (technical terms listed below). This section is used 
to study how abstract concepts/non-embodied concepts are analyzed from the 
perspective of metaphorical and metonymic models in the construction of coherence 
in SI (Figures 14a and 14b; Section 5.1).  
Strictly speaking, the corpora in Table 33 below should reveal the role of 
metonymic processing, and the online background knowledge, and unconventional 
and unpredictable communication claimed by Wang (2006) (Section 4.4.4). However, 
in this research, metaphorical processing was not displayed as expected. This needs 
further exploration. The results in Chapter 6 show that the experimental group 
attained more coherence clues than the control group (with the teachers’ groups 50 % 
vs. 28%; the postgraduate groups 56% vs. 37%; the undergraduates group 64 % vs. 
12 %). However, even for the subjects in the experimental group, this section 
representing non-embodied knowledge is the weakest link in the three sections (85% 
of accurate coherence clues for the semi-embodied section, 64% for embodied, but 
only 56% for the non-embodied), especially in terms of the subject matter, technical 
terms and numbers (37%).  
In addition, as reviewed in Section 5.3, the subjects in the experimental group were 
active in asking questions when hearing the experimenter’s instructions of warnings 
against damage to the shiatsu device; it is assumed that asking questions can help the 
interpreter to activate mental links and build coherence.  
The corpora in Table 33 below represent the interpretations of teachers in both the 
experimental and control group. As reviewed in Section 4.7 on the ICM-based 
methodology, the subjects in the experimental group built mental coherence by 
activating the functional and meshing net of concepts, on the grounds that they had 
undertaken the embodied activation and construal stage, and filled the slot (trajector) 
and pair (landmark) cognitive concept map as Figures 19 and 20 indicate. The 
embodied activation and construal has also helped to activate the conceptual 
knowledge system, enabling them to track the coherence clues in terms of the trajector 
and landmark in the current discourse space (CDS). The corpora show that the 
teachers in the experimental group can process the information in an economic way as 
de Beaugrande and Dressler have claimed (1981) (reviewed in Section2.2.1):
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Table 33 Interpretations of the non- embodied section rendered by the teachers of both the experimental and control groups     
S T  S 1 6 :  A l w a y s  r e m e m b e r  t o  s t o r e  i t  p r o p e r l y @  P l a c e  t h e  a p p l i a n c e  i n  i t s  b o x  o r  i n  a  s a f e ,  d r y ,  a n d  c o o l  p l a c e .  +  @   
Teachers in the experimental group 
T + 1  记 住 一 定 要 把 它 放 在 安 全 ， 凉 爽 的 地 方  ( P l e a s e  r e m e m b e r  t o  p u t  i t  i n  a  s a f e  a n d  c o o l  p l a c e )  
T + 2  把 它 放 到 干 燥 ， 防 水 的 地 方  ( P u t  i t  i n  a  s a f e  a n d  c o o l  p l a c e )  
T + 3  一 定 要 适 当 的 放 置 放 到 干 燥 ， 凉 爽 的 地 方  ( P l e a s e  r e m e m b e r  t o  p l a c e  i t  p r o p e r l y ,  P u t  ( i t )  i n  a  d r y  a n d  c o o l  p l a c e )  
T + 4 请 记 住 把 它 放 在 安 全 ， 干 燥 的 盒 子 中  ( P l e a s e  r e m e m b e r  t o  p u t  ( i t )  i n  a  s a f e  a n d  d r y  b o x   
T + 5 把 它 放 到 干 燥 ， 不 要 太 潮 湿 的 地 方  ( P u t  i t  i n  a  d r y  a n d  n o t  h u m i d  p l a c e )  
T e a c h e r s  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  g r o u p  
T - 1  [ ]   
T - 2  [ ]    
T - 3  [ ]    
T - 4 放 到 干 燥 ， 阴 冷 的 地 方  ( P u t  ( i t )  i n  a  d r y  a n d  c o o l  p l a c e )  
T - 我 们 必 须 把 它 放 到 合 适 的 地 方  ( W e  s h a l l  p u t  i t  i n  a  p r o p e r  p l a c e )  
S 1 7 :  W a t e r  o r  a n y  l i q u i d s  t h a t  c o m e  i n t o  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  a p p l i a n c e  a r e  d a n g e r o u s @  
Teachers in the experimental group 
T + 1  不 能 够 让 水 和 任 何 液 体 进 去  ( D o n ’ t  l e t  w a t e r  o r  a n y  l i q u i d  i n t o  i t )  
T + 2  不 要 见 水  ( N o  w a t e r )  
T + 3  不 要 接 触 任 何 的 液 体 ， 否 则 是 很 危 险 的  ( D o n ’ t  l e t  a n y  l i q u i d  i n t o  i t ,  i t  i s  d a n g e r o u s  o t h e r w i s e )     
T + 4  有 一 些 注 意 事 项 - 要 防 水  ( T h e r e  a r e  s o m e  w a r n i n g s ,  f r e e  f r o m  w a t e r )  
T + 5  不 要 见 水  ( F r e e  f r o m  w a t e r )  
 
T e a c h e r s  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  g r o u p  
T - 1 [ ]  
T - 2 [ ]  
T - 3 [ ]  
T - 4 千 万 不 要 让 水 流 进 去  ( N e v e r  l e t  w a t e r  i n )  
T - 5 水 根 任 何 液 体 都 是 不 可 接 触 的  ( W a t e r  a n d  a n y  l i q u i d s  c o u l d  n o t  c o m e  i n t o  t h i s )  
S 1 8 :  A v o i d  c o n t a c t  w i t h  s h a r p  e d g e s  o r  p o i n t e d  o b j e c t s  w h i c h  m i g h t  c u t  o r  p u n c t u r e  t h e  f a b r i c  s u r f a c e .  @  
Teachers in the experimental group 
T + 1 再 一 个 ， 不 要 放 到 锐 利 东 西 的 旁 边  ( I n  a d d i t i o n ,  d o n ’ t  p u t  ( i t )  t o  a  s h a r p  o b j e c t )    
T + 2 远 离 尖 锐 的 东 西 以 免 把 它 的 表 面 损 伤  ( k e e p  i t  f a r  a w a y  f r o m  s h a r p  o b j e c t s  t o  d a m a g e  i t s  s u r f a c e )     
T + 3 也 不 要 用 锋 利 的 东 西 接 触 它  ( n o r  p u t  ( i t )  t o  a  s h a r p  o b j e c t )     
T + 4 要 和 一 些 锋 利 东 西 隔 离 开 来  ( s e p a r a t e  i t  f r o m  s h a r p  o b j e c t s )   
T + 5 不 要 让 尖 锐 的 东 西 接 触  ( D o  n o t  l e t  s h a r p  o b j e c t s  t o u c h  i t )  
T e a c h e r s  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  g r o u p  
T - 1  [ ]  
T - 2  [ ]  
T - 3  [ ]  
T - 4 也 不 要 任 何 锐 物 划 伤 这 个 表 面  ( d o n ’ t  h a v e  i t  s c r a p e d  w i t h  a  s h a r p  o b j e c t )   
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T - 5 我 们 要 尽 量 避 免 与 锋 利 的 东 西 来 接 触  ( w e  s h o u l d  t r y  t o  a v o i d  l e t t i n g  i t  i n  t o u c h  w i t h  a n y  s h a r p  o b j e c t s  s c r a t c h  t h i s  s u r f a c e  
 
S 1 9 :  T o  a v o i d  b r e a k a g e ,  +  D O  N O T  w r a p  t h e  p o w e r  c o r d  a r o u n d  t h e  a p p l i a n c e  +  S 2 0 :  D O  N O T  h a n g  t h e  u n i t  b y  t h e  c o r d +  
@      
         This will cause short circuit  
Teachers in the experimental group 
T + 1 不 要 拉 扯 电 线 ， 这 样 会 把 店 子 弄 坏  ( D o n ’ t  s t r e t c h  t h e  w i r e  l i n e s ,  ( t h i s )  w i l l  d a m a g e  t h e  c u s h i o n )   
T + 2 不 要 卷 起 来  ( D o n ’ t  w r a p  i t  u p )     
T + 3 更 不 能 用 导 线 捆 绑 坐 垫 。 否 则 呢 会 引 起 短 路  ( D o n ’ t  w r a p  t h e  m a s s a g e r  w i t h  w i r e  l i n e s ,  t h i s  w i l l  l e a d  t o  s h o r t  c i r c u i t )     
T + 4 不 能 用 绳 索 捆 绑 ,  也 不 能 将 其 打 卷  ( D o n ’ t  w r a p  t h e  m a s s a g e r  w i t h  w i r e  l i n e s .  d o n ’ t  b u n d l e  i t )   
T + 5 不 要 卷 折  ( D o n ’ t  b u n d l e  i t )  
T e a c h e r s  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  g r o u p  
T - 1 [ ]  
T - 2 [ ]  
T - 3 [ ]  
T - 4 不 要 用 导 线 把 这 个 东 西 倒 挂 起 来 ( D o n ’ t  h a n g  t h i s  w i t h  c o r d )  
T - 5 为 了 避 免 损 伤 - 我 们 不 能 有 线 悬 挂 它  ( i n  o r d e r  n o t  t o  d a m a g e  i t ,  w e  s h o u l d  n o t  h a n g  i t )    
 
S 2 1 :  @  L a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n ,  y o u  c o u l d  h a v e  i t  n o w  a t -  3 0  p o u n d s .  I n  J o h n  L e w i s ,  E d i n b u r g h ,  i t  c o s t s -  6 9  p o u n d s  
@  I f  y o u  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d ,  f e e l  f r e e  t o  t r y  t h e  S h i a t s u  m a s s a g e r  a g a i n  b e f o r e  y o u  b u y  i t .   +   T h a n k s                                 
Teachers in the experimental group 
T + 1 先 生 们 ， 女 士 们 你 们 现 在 就 可 以 购 买 ， 只 需 3 0 英 镑 而 在 英 国 哪 需 要 6 9 英 镑 - 如 果 你 想 的 话 可 以 再 试 一 下  ( L a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n  Y o u  c o u l d  g e t  
( i t )  n o w  o n l y  a t  3 0  p o u n d s ,  B u t  i n  U K  a t  6 9  p o u n d s ,  Y o u  c o u l d  t r y  a g a i n  i f  y o u  l i k e )  
T + 2 先 生 们 ， 女 士 们 ,  你 们 现 在 用 优 惠 价 格 可 以 购 买  ( L a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n  Y o u  c o u l d  b u t  i t  a t  a  f a v o r a b l e  p r i c e )  
T + 3 在 英 国 它 的 价 值 是 9 6 英 镑  而 在 广 交 会 上 ， 我 们 只 卖 3 0 英 镑 , 现 在 大 家 可 以 体 验 一 下 ( I n  U K  i t  c o s t s  9 6  p o u n d s ;  b u t  i n   G u a n g z h o u  t r a d e  
f a i r  w e  o n l y  s e l l  a t  3 0  p o u n d s  Y o u  c o u l d  t r y  a g a i n  i f  y o u  l i k e )  
T + 4 先 生 们 女 士 们 你 们 现 在 花 3 0 英 镑 就 可 以 买 到 我 们 的 产 品 - 那 么 这 个 产 品 在 伦 敦 售 到 了 6 8 英 镑 . 谢 谢 大 家 的 光 临  ( L a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n   
N o w  y o u  s p e n d  3 0  p o u n d s  f o r  i t ;  B u t  i n  L o n d o n  i t  c o s t s  6 8  p o u n d s )  
T + 5 你 们 现 在 花 3 0 英 镑 就 可 以 买 到 它 ,  而 在 国 外 需 要 6 0 磅 ;  对 此 感 兴 趣 的 话 ， 现 在 就 可 以 买 它  ( N o w  y o u  s p e n d  3 0  p o u n d s  f o r  i t ;  B u t  i n      
o v e r s e a s   c o u n t r i e s  i t  c o s t s  6 0  p o u n d s  
T e a c h e r s  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  g r o u p  
T - 1 女 士 们 ， 先 生 们 你 现 在 只 用 3 0 英 镑 就 可 以 享 受 这 个 价 值 为 6 0 英 镑 的 手 指 式 按 摩 椅  ( L a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n  Y o u  c o u l d  g e t  ( i t )  n o w  o n l y  a t  
3 0  p o u n d s ,  w h i c h  s h o u l d  h a v e  c o s t  6 0  p o u n d s )   
T - 2  [ ]    
T - 3 女 士 们 ， 先 生 们 你 们 现 在 花 3 0 英 镑 就 可 以 买 到 这 个 按 摩 椅 ,  如 果 对 此 感 兴 趣 的 话 现 在 就 可 以 体 验  ( Y o u  c o u l d  g e t  ( i t )  n o w  o n l y  a t  3 0  p o u n d s .  
Y o u  c a n  e n j o y  i t  i f  y o u  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d )  
T - 4 女 士 们 ， 先 生 们 你 现 在 只 用 3 0 英 镑 就 可 以 卖 到 这 个 东 西 在 你 买 之 前 可 以 大 大 方 方 的 感 受 一 下 这 个 按 摩 垫  ( Y o u  o n l y  s p e n d  3 0  p o u n d s  o n  t h i s  
y o u  c o u l d  f e e l  f r e e  t o  t r y  i t  b e f o r e  y o u  b u y  i t )    
  T - 5 女 士 们 ， 先 生 们 你 可 以 用 3 0  -  +  6 0 英 镑 买 它 ,  如 果 你 觉 得 适 合 的 话 ， 大 家 就 可 以 买 它   
      ( L a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n  y o u  s p e n d  o n l y  3 0 p o u n d s ,  6 0  p o u n d s  o n  t h i s  I f  y o u  f e e l  i t  p r o p e r  y o u  c o u l d  b u y  i t )   
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For instance, in terms of interpreting Sentences 16 to 19, while the five teachers in the 
experimental group can generate the information accurately in the target language of 
Chinese, the three of their peers (T-1, T-2 and T-3) have omitted the information. This is 
a typical example of the metonymic processing in meting out information, on the 
basis of the interpreter’s bodily experience and conceptual knowledge (Section 4.2.4). 
This also supports Dillinger’s conclusions (1989, 1994) (Section 3.4) – 
comprehension and coherence in interpreting is not a specialized ability, but the 
application of an existing skill under more unusual circumstances. Also making sense 
in interpreting is characterized by all of the same components being processed as 
listening. Interpreting experience has a weak quantitative effect on interpreting overall 
in terms of difference between the interpreting professional and the novice; the 
difference, if there is one, may be that the experienced interpreter may have learned to 
be more selective in the surface information which they process semantically. 
Furthermore, in order to see the role of the interpreter’s immersion in embodiment 
and the conceptual knowledge system, by virtue of metonymic processing, I purposely 
analyzed the synchronicity of two subjects’ output (Section 6.2.3, Table19), rendered 
by an undergraduate (UG+1) and a teacher (T+1) in the experimental group. Generally 
the results repeated those discovered by Paneth (1957) and Oleron and Nanpon 1965) 
(reviewed in Chapter 1), who found that the ear-voice-span (EVS) or lag ranges from 
two to four seconds minimum, and two to ten seconds maximum. However, my 
results have shown more detailed findings; that is, the subject started a bit slowly, 
following up the thread of ideas, with the undergraduate’s EVS from seven to eight 
seconds, and teacher’s from five to six seconds. When following the right track of the 
thread of ideas, they could keep nearly in a synchronic step with the Speaker, up to 
one to four seconds EVS. In particular, the teacher appeared more professional than 
the undergraduate in anticipating and generalizing the information. It can be assumed 
that equipping the interpreter with interactive embodiment and the relevant conceptual 
knowledge can help them in retrieving information due to metonymic processing: one 
word can activate the whole functional net stored in memory. However, due to the 
small size of this corpus, this aspect of synchronization needs to be studied further. 
This will be addressed in Chapter 8 in terms of limitations and future work.                             
On this basis, let us return to the issues arising from the corresponding Section 
6.2.3. Primarily, how is metonymic and metaphorical processing reflected in 
achieving coherence in the non-embodied knowledge? As reviewed in Sections 4.2.3 
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and 4.2.4, according to Ungerer and Schmid (2001: 147), metaphor and metonymy are 
different kinds of cognitive processes. Metaphor is primarily a process of mentally 
comparing one thing to another, and its principal function is to understand or make 
sense. Metonymy, on the other hand, basically has a referential function, allowing us 
to use one entity to stand for another. Therefore, metonymy not only serves as a 
referential device but also as a function of making sense or providing understanding.  
First, I discuss the links between the metonymic model and the non-embodied 
discourse. One entity is being used to refer to another; this function of metonymy is 
one of the basic elements of interpreting as the Interpretive Theory of translation  
claimed (1986): ‘when an expression that ordinarily profiles one entity is used instead 
to profile another entity associated with it in some domain’ (Langacker 2008: 69). 
Likewise, when the interpreter processes the coherence clues in terms of the trajector 
and landmark in the source text by virtue of the current discourse space (CDS), she 
will cognitively turn to the experiential connections and conceptual knowledge system 
relations for inference, which will also contribute to the economy of her mental effort 
as reviewed in Section 2.2.1. The metonymic processing is reflected in the 
interpreting process, and its importance is more felt in interpreting abstract and less or 
non-embodied concepts. The corpus in this section further supports and complements 
the Interpretive Theory of translation (Section 3.2), in that making sense and attaining 
coherence must be built upon perfect understanding of the source text, and interactive 
embodiment can facilitate the interpreter’s understanding of the background 
knowledge in question.           
 According to the corpus in Tables 33 above, the interpreting subjects are not 
good at interpreting technical terms and numbers, when rendering the segment 27: 
Plug the adaptor into a 230V AC mains outlet, the subject (UG+1) interpreted 230V into 两
千八百四十  (two thousand eight hundred forty). As a matter of fact, the conceptual 
knowledge on the household power is 230 volt for Chinese domestic utility. This 
echoes the definition of knowledge for the interpreter by Pöchhacker (1992) (Section 
3.5) – ‘specialized knowledge and competence of a given professional’, on the 
grounds that interpreting involves not only interactive embodiment but also 
conceptual knowledge system. This also supports the theory of continuity of de 
Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 84), reviewed in Section 1.2.1, in that ‘cognitive 
processes contribute a certain amount of COMMONSENSE knowledge derived from 
the participants’ expectations and experience regarding the organization of events and 
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situations’. From this corpus in terms of technical terms and numbers, it appears that 
the interpreting subjects might lack in such common sense knowledge. This is another 
instance of metonymic processing (see Section 4.2.4).  
According to IT, a technical term does not stand alone; it becomes meaningful in 
a conceptual knowledge system (Section 3.2). This can be explained by the theory of 
economy and inheritance of de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 92) (Section 2.2), on 
the grounds that as each item of knowledge may be stored in a cognitive system a 
mental effort is needed for searching this item, this is economy; and due to the fact 
that the item of knowledge is stored in a neat hierarchy, in form of classes vs. 
instances, subclasses vs. super classes, or analogies, prediction is possible about the 
time needed to access a certain fact, this is inheritance. These assumptions can 
provide an account of the weak points in the corpus where the interpreters performed 
poorly. In short, whether a word will activate a functional and meshing network will 
depend on her integration of the conceptual knowledge system. This finding 
challenges the assumption of Setton (1999: 253): ‘Numbers, names and dates are 
classic examples of items difficult to associate into the mental model and notoriously 
vulnerable to error or omission’. It is true that names and numbers are difficult and 
susceptible to error or omission, but they can fit into the Effort Model (Gile 1995) 
(Section 3.3.2), on the grounds that the background or specialized knowledge will 
balance the degree of error. For instance, in terms of multiple choices of measurement 
units, a. ton, b. gram, c. kilogram, it was possible for a three or five year old child to 
choose the item: Jack weighs 25 tons, but an adult would not, because background 
knowledge or common sense makes a difference. In addition, in Section 7.2.1, the 
corpus shows that the experimental group normally used a general pronoun, we, 
instead of the proper name, Hömedics, but the control group mostly omitted this 
message. Therefore, numbers and names are also associated into the Effort Model 
(Gile 1995). This finding also challenges Pöchhacker’s claim (1992) (Section 3.5) that 
the interpreter as a low-knowledge individual in technical conferences can still 
manage to establish a sufficient degree of coherence as a basis for target text 
production, suggesting that Pöchhacker’s observation is incomplete in this regard. 
Rather, without a comprehensive model of the text contents, or holistic structure of 
the conceptual knowledge system, the interpreter cannot rely on the non-embodied  
literal propositions to build up coherence as ‘models are assumed to be easier to 
remember than propositions because they are more elaborated and structured’(Setton 
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1999: 17). In other words, the function of economy and metonymy determines 
coherence in interpreting to a substantial extent. Therefore, this finding supports 
Dillinger’s assumptions (1989; 1994) (reviewed in Section 3.4): the interpreter must 
have the same knowledge as presupposed by the Speaker, and greater specialization of 
interpreters and the inclusion of specific domain knowledge are necessary for their 
training. Furthermore, the Speaker/writer has to design the text so that the interpreter, 
rather than the Speaker’s equally knowledgeable counterparts, can understand it.  
As a matter of fact, this finding further complements Pöchhacker’s framework of 
knowledge system (1992), (Section 3.5), from a micro perspective, by virtue of 
analysis of concept and inference. Firstly, the cognitive conceptual knowledge system 
has concepts built upon embodiment, as Lakoff (1987: 154) points out as follows:  
 
Cognitive models are embodied, either directly or indirectly by way of systematic 
links to embodied concepts. A concept is embodied when its content or other 
proprieties are motivated by bodily or social experience. This does not necessarily 
mean that the concept is predictable from the experience, but rather that it makes 
sense that it has content (or other properties) that it has, given the nature of the 
corresponding experience. Embodiment thus provides a non-arbitrary link between 
cognition and experience. 
 
A concept determines the inferential capacity, and inference, as the locus of 
perception and motor control, is the key element in interpreting. Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999: 20) define the concept as follows: ‘An embodied concept is a neural structure 
that is an actually part of, or makes use of, the sensorimotor system of our brains. 
Much of conceptual inferences, therefore, sensorimotor inference’. According to 
Johnson (1987: xi-xii) ‘What makes concepts concepts is their inferential capacity, 
their ability to be bound together in ways that yield inferences’.  
    Next, the cognitive conceptual knowledge system, as a type of mental processing, 
constitutes a series of psychological transformations, by which information about the 
relative locations and attributes of phenomena, either propositional or non-
propositional can be acquired, coded, stored, recalled, and decoded on the basis of 
everyday experience or metaphorical spatial environment. Therefore the 
representations are reflected in cognitive processing, like a script, schema or frame of 
references. On the other hand, the linguistic formalism has defined a concept as a 
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perceived regularity in events or objects, or records of events or objects, normally 
designated by a label, ignoring the part of the human perceptual functions which also 
have impulsive force in exciting the working memory and facilitating coherence.     
    Thirdly, propositions contain two or more concepts connected by linking words or 
phrases to form a meaningful statement. A proposition is a ‘continuous, analog pattern 
of experience or understanding, with sufficient internal structure to permit inferences’ 
(Johnson 1987: 4) (Section 7.2.1).This structure influences the inferential capacity in 
making sense. The cognitive conceptual system is represented in a hierarchical 
manner with the most broad, most general concepts at the top of the map and the more 
specific and detailed concepts arranged hierarchically below. The hierarchical 
structure for a particular domain of knowledge also depends on the context in which 
that knowledge is being applied or considered. This agrees with the categorization of 
embodied cognition. In addition, the conceptual knowledge system involves the 
inclusion of cross-links. These are relationships or links between concepts in different 
segments or domains of the conceptual system. Cross-links help to see how a concept 
in one domain of knowledge is related to a concept in another domain. 
The discussions above provide supplementary support for the conceptual structure, 
reviewed in the theoretical framework (Chapters 2 and 3), including conceptual 
network (Figure 1); knowledge space with an integrated unit (Figure 2); schematic 
illustration of the cognitive model (Figure 6 on the beach); exemplary network of the 
cognitive model (Figure 7), shiatsu structure and fixing steps of shiatsu, based on 
CRP, trajector and landmark (Figures 19 and 20). Before the interpreting task, the 
interpreter can construct a conceptual system with reference to some particular focus 
question which the Speaker seeks to answer. In this way, the interpreter can 
understand through the organization of knowledge pertaining to some situation or 
event, thus accessing the context for the task which she will interpret, by activating 
and construing the links in the knowledge network.   
Now, I will discuss metaphor vs. the non-embodied or non-propositional abstract 
discourse. According to Johnson (1987: 104), metaphor is understood in a 
metaphorically extended sense, not only as ‘propositional connection of two highly 
delineated, already determinate domains of experience, but also as a projective 
structure by means of which many experiential connections and relations are 
established in the first place’. As reviewed in Chapter 4, the fundamental 
propositional structure and image schema are extended into metaphorical and 
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metonymic processing for the abstract concept and language; the interpreter will also 
follow this cognitive process in making sense and building discourse in interpreting. 
However, this aspect of metaphoric processing was not significantly noted in the 
corpus due to the limited corpus size; this will be further discussed in Section 8.3 
Limitations.  
    In summary, it is on the basis of embodied experience and conceptual knowledge 
system that the interpreter makes sense and builds coherence, through metonymic and 
metaphorical processing.  
 
7.3 The interpreter’s mental effort and the textual structure: an ICM perspective 
 
 
There is one issue, which has been implicit in previous discussions, and now I 
explicitly discuss it in this section: how does the interpreter’s mental effort expended 
in achieving coherence reflect the textual structure in the source text (ST)? The results 
show the process of the interpreter’s mental effort in processing information structure, 
seemingly mismatching the ICM structure with this information distribution pattern as 
assumed in Section 5.1’s hypothesis, in that comprehension of the semi-embodied 
section, rather than of the embodied section ranked highest in terms of coherence 
clues achieved (85% vs. 62% for the semi-embodied section; 64% vs. 33% for the 
embodied section; and 56% vs. 25% for the non-embodied section). However, the 
findings agree with the ICM assumptions in processing information, rather than 
contradict them, in that the ICM is idealized: the information structure or the textual 
structure does not fit in with the ICM, perfectly or all the time. As a matter of fact, 
this seeming mismatch agrees with the textual structure for technical discourse 
proposed by Trimble (1985) (reviewed in Section 5.2), but analyzed from a mental 
effort perspective, on the basis of the ICM. The introduction is the beginning of a 
speech, and belongs to a warm-up stage; the information is usually general and broad, 
indicating that the interpreter can save her energy. When the speech enters into the 
section representing embodied knowledge, the interpreter will spend more effort in 
following up the thread of the Speaker’s ideas to achieve coherence, due to the fact 
that the information is getting dense and specific. The corpora in Tables 34a and 34b 
below are interpretations rendered by PG+1 of the experimental group and PG-1 of the 
control group: 
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Table 34a Representations of causation rendered by PG+1  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
下 面 - 我 很 高 兴 给 大 家 介 绍 一 下 如 何 使 用 这 个 产 品 ( N e x t ,  I  a m  p l e a s e d  t o   t a l k  a b o u t  
h o w  t o  u s e  t h i s  p r o d u c t )  简 单 的 说 有 六 步  ( B r i e f l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t h e r e  a r e  s i x  
s t e p s ) 第 一 步 ， - + ( c o u g h )  把 这 个 按 摩 垫 放 倒 椅 子 的 椅 背 上  ( F i r s t  s t e p ,  p u t  i t  u p o n  
a n y  c h a i r )  然 后 + 确 保 用 松 紧 带 把 它 固 定 好 ( A n d  t h e n  m a k e  s u r e  t o  h o l d  i t  w e l l  
w i t h  i n t e g r a t e d  s t r a p )  @ [ ] 第 二 步 进 行 电 源 连 接 ， - 把 导 线 连 接 起 来 ( S e c o n d  s t e p ,  
c o n n e c t  p o w e r  s u p p l y ,  l e a d )  第 三 步 ， + 把 适 配 器 放 到 2 4 0 伏 的 电 压 情 况 下  ( T h i r d ,  
p u t  t h e   a d a p t o r  i n t o  a  2 4 0  m a i n  o u t l e t )  第 四 步 - 使 用 - 按 摩 器 -  使 用 遥 控 器 ， 来
遥 控 手 指 按 摩 垫 来 进 行 按 摩  ( F o u r t h  s t e p ,  u s e  t h e  r e m o t e  c o n t r o l  ,  a n d  t h e n  
p r e s s  ‘ p o w e r ’ )  第 五 步 ， + -  ( c o u g h ) 如 果 想 要 等 到 较 轻 柔 的 按 摩 - 可 以 把 减 压 垫 放 到 后
面 去 (  F i f t h ,  i f  ( y o u ) w a n t  g e n t l e  m a s s a g e ,  p u t  t h e  f l a p  o v e r  t o  b a c k )  如 果
想 要 较 强 的 按 摩 要 把 减 压 垫 放 到 上 面 ( I f  ( y o u ) w a n t  a  t e n s e  f l a p  ,  p u t  i t  o n )  [ ] 第 六
步 ， + - （ c o u g h ） 按 下 电 钮 - 把 电 源 切 断 ( S i x ,  p r e s s  t h e  p o w e r  b u t t o n  t o  c u t  
p o w e r  o f f )  
 
    
 
 
Table 34a shows that PG+1 in the experimental group has formed a causal, sequential 
and specific links, and followed coherence clues (bold typed) just like the compulsive 
force driven pattern as Johnson (1987) claims.  On the other hand, PG-1 in the control 
group in Table 33b appears uncertain, omitting the primary information, or losing the 
crucial coherence clues, as the compulsive force has seemed to lose its vector. More 
mental coherence, less mental effort:  
 
      
Table 34b Representations of causation rendered by PG-1  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
我 现 在 想 说 说 如 何 使 用 这 个 手 指 式 按 摩 ( I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  t a l k  a b o u t  h o w  t o  u s e  
t h i s  s h i a t s u  m a s s a g e r )  这 里 你 需 要 记 住 六 个 要 点 (  H e r e  y o u  n e e d  t o  r e m e m b e r  
s i x  p o i n t s )  第 一 步 ， 把 它 放 到 每 一 个 凳 子 上 ( F i r s t  s t e p ,  p u t  t h i s  m a s s a g e r  o n  t o  
a  c h a i r ) 用 松 紧 带 把 它 绑 在 背 后 ( F a s t e n  i t  w i t h  i n t e g r a t e d  s t r a p s )  [ ] 第 二 步 连 接
电 源 ( S e c o n d  s t e p  c o n n e c t  t h e  p o w e r  s u p p l y ) [ ]  [ ] 一 旦 坐 在 上 面 ， 按 一 下 功 能 健
( O n c e  s e a t e d  p r e s s  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  b u t t o n ) [ ]  [ ] 功 能 健 再 按 一 下 使 它 关 闭 ( P r e s s  
t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  b u t t o n  o n c e  m o r e  t o  s t o p  i t )  
 
 
Following this line, with the speech moving to the non-embodied, and/or abstract 
concepts, the interpreter will apply her utmost attention for processing, activating 
proper expectations about the function of each new element to make sense. The 
abstract concepts are most effort consuming, and most vulnerable in making sense, 
especially without the context of embodiment. In order to have a further micro 
analysis, interpretations rendered by Teacher+1 in the experimental group and Teacher-1 
in control group are provided in Table 35 below. Teacher+1 in the experimental group 
has basically followed the coherence clues, presented the information economically; 
in other words, she has not been stuck in the code-switching or word for word 
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translation, but rather, focused on the ideas or the sense, going beyond the 
confinement of language surface, while Teacher-1 in the control group has failed to 
track the coherence clues until the last sentence, when she seemed to start up her 
response, but it was too late:  
 
Table 35 Micro analyses: interpretations rendered by Teacher +1 in the experimental group and Teacher -1 
in the control group: 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
S T  S 1 6 :  A l w a y s  r e m e m b e r  t o  s t o r e  i t  p r o p e r l y @  P l a c e  t h e  a p p l i a n c e  i n  i t s  
b o x  o r  i n  a  s a f e ,  d r y ,  a n d  c o o l  p l a c e + @   
 
T + 1  记 住 一 定 要 把 它 放 在 安 全 凉 爽 的 地 方  ( P l e a s e  r e m e m b e r  t o  p u t  i t  i n  a  s a f e  
a n d  c o o l  p l a c e )  
T - 1 [ ]  
S 1 7 :  W a t e r  o r  a n y  l i q u i d s  t h a t  c o m e  i n t o  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  a p p l i a n c e  a r e  
d a n g e r o u s @  
T + 1  不 能 够 让 水 和 任 何 液 体 进 去  ( D o n ’ t  l e t  w a t e r  o r  a n y  l i q u i d  i n t o  i t )  
T - 1 [ ]  
 
S 1 8 :  A v o i d  c o n t a c t  w i t h  s h a r p  e d g e s  o r  p o i n t e d  o b j e c t s  w h i c h  m i g h t  c u t     
o r  p u n c t u r e  t h e  f a b r i c  s u r f a c e .  @  
 
T + 1 再 一 个 不 要 放 到 锐 利 东 西 的 旁 边 ( I n  a d d i t i o n - d o n ’ t  p u t  ( i t )  t o  a  s h a r p     
o b j e c t )    
T - 1  [ ]  
S 1 9 :  T o  a v o i d  b r e a k a g e ,  +  D O  N O T  w r a p  t h e  p o w e r  c o r d  a r o u n d  t h e  
a p p l i a n c e  +  S 2 0 :  D O  N O T  h a n g  t h e  u n i t  b y  t h e  c o r d + @  This will cause short circuit  
 
T + 1 不 要 拉 扯 电 线 ， 这 样 会 把 店 子 弄 坏  ( D o n ’ t  s t r e t c h  t h e  w i r e  l i n e s ,  ( t h i s )  w i l l  
d a m a g e  t h e  c u s h i o n )   
T - 1 [ ]  
 
S 2 1 : @  L a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n ,  y o u  c o u l d  h a v e  i t  n o w  a t -  3 0  p o u n d s .  I n  
J o h n  L e w i s ,  E d i n b u r g h ,  i t  c o s t s -  6 9  p o u n d s @  I f  y o u  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d ,  f e e l  
f r e e  t o  t r y  t h e  S h i a t s u  m a s s a g e r  a g a i n  b e f o r e  y o u  b u y  i t .   +   T h a n k s                                 
 
T + 1 先 生 们 ， 女 士 们 你 们 现 在 就 可 以 购 买 ， 只 需 3 0 英 镑 而 在 英 国 哪 需 要 6 9 英 镑 - 如 果 你 想 的
话 可 以 再 试 一 下  ( L a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n  y o u  c o u l d  g e t  ( i t )  n o w  o n l y  a t  3 0  
p o u n d s ,  B u t  i n  U K  a t  6 9  p o u n d s ,  y o u  c o u l d  t r y  a g a i n  i f  y o u  l i k e )  
T - 1 女 士 们 先 生 们 你 现 在 只 用 3 0 英 镑 就 可 以 享 受 这 个 价 值 为 6 0 英 镑 的 手 指 式 按 摩 椅    
( L a d i e s  a n d  g e n t l e m e n  y o u  c o u l d  g e t  ( i t )  n o w  o n l y  a t  3 0  p o u n d s ,  w h i c h  
s h o u l d  h a v e  c o s t  6 0  p o u n d s )  
 
 
The descriptions above aim to show how the interpreting subjects’ mental effort 
expended in achieving coherence was reflected in processing the textual structure, and 
how they worked their way through the different sections in interpreting the overall 
structure. From the perspective of the textual structure, the interpreter’s interactive 
embodiment is the control centre of coherence building in this SI context, either 
facilitating or constraining the interpreter’s capacity to build coherence throughout 
interpreting to more or less degree. In addition, the more prominent and salient 
cognitive aspects give rise to direct understanding and coherence. With respect to the 
obscure and minor cognitive aspects, if the interpreter was not inquisitive, or not 
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careful enough to observe what is going on, say, from whole to part, outside to inside, 
she would lose out in information distribution links. The section representing 
embodied concepts in this research comes in the second rank in terms of coherence 
clues, and is analyzed from the propositional model perspective. According to the 
results, the best interpreted coherent section is semi-embodied information which 
corresponds to the image-schema. The section representing semi-embodied 
knowledge is more easily processed than the other two sections due to the fact that 
information in the image schema is general and broad, or in a skeleton form. 
When moving further away from the embodied knowledge to the non-embodied 
knowledge, the subjects started to confront difficulties, indicated by long pauses and 
omissions of information. This shows that background knowledge, represented by the 
conceptual knowledge system, is crucial in SI. Basically the interpreter should have 
acquired enough conceptual knowledge of the subject matter to process the 
information in question. The abstract concepts are the weakest link, particularly in 
terms of interpreting technical terms and numbers as the results in Chapter 6 show.  
    On the basis of this ICM-based discourse structure prototype, the interpreter can 
classify a variety of information in terms of the textual structure, and determine her 
mental effort or attentional energy; in other words, the interpreter will use this ICM 
based discourse structure prototype to complement the formula by Gile (1995) in his 
Effort Models: SI = L (listening and analysis) + P (production) + M (memory) + C 
(coordination) (reviewed in Section 3.3.2).   
    The SI information structure has semi-embodied information in the top rank, 
embodied in the middle and non-embodied information in the bottom. It implies that 
the interpreter would know semi-embodied information is general and broad, where 
the interpreter must meet (1) LA ≥ LR: listening and analysis adequacy can cope with 
this section. When the interpreting moves to embodied information, the interpreter 
must meet (1) LA ≥ LR, and (2) MA ≥ MR: not only listening but also more memory 
effort is involved. When the interpreting comes to the non-embodied section, the 
interpreter must meet the four: (1) LA ≥ LR, (2) MA ≥ MR, (3) PA ≥ PR and (4) CA 
≥ CR: the capacities available for each effort, including listening and analysis, 
memory, production and coordination, must be equal to or larger than its requirement 
for the task at hand (Gile 1997/2002: 165), suggesting that the non-embodied 
information, with abstract and specialized terminology, might be the greatest potential 
enemies, which the interpreter should spare no effort to overcome by virtue of 
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activating and construing the cognitive functional and meshing network.  
    The ICM improves on the rationalism-based theories on simultaneous interpreting, 
as reviewed in Section 3.3. On the basis of early cognitive science, both Cognitive 
Processing paradigm (CP) and the Effort Model assumed a strict dualism in which the 
mind was characterized in terms of its formal functions, independent of the body. This 
is the problem of ‘Cartesian discipline’ with interpreting studies, advocated by Gile 
(1994: 53), (Section 3.3).  Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 75-76) went to the core of the 
issue of the early cognitive linguistics as follows:  
        
         Mind, on both conceptions, happened to be embodied in the brain in the trivial 
sense in which software needs hardware to run on: the brain was the hardware on 
which the mind’s software happened to running, but the brain - hardware was seen 
as being capable of running any appropriate software, and so was assumed to play 
no essential or even important role in characterizing the mind-software. 
Functionally, mind was disembodied. Moreover, thought was seen as literal; 
imaginative capacities did not enter the picture all. This was modern version of the 
Cartesian view that reason is transcendental, universal, disembodied, and literal.  
 
The Embodied Cognition theory gives an account of the reason why the working 
memory assumption (Section 3.3), in ignoring the role of bodily experience, has lost 
its explanatory power. While pointing out the weak points in traditional cognitive 
linguistics, the ICM also inherits its reasonable elements, such as computing methods, 
which have been reflected in this study.  In summary, with respect to the interpreter’s 
mental effort, this study has provided a framework for Tebble’s contextual 
configuration (1994; reviewed in 2.1) and IT’s information structure (1996; reviewed 
in 3.2), and also a flow chart for Giles’s effort models (1995; reviewed in 3.3.2 ).  
Now let us discuss this question: what do the cognitive properties suggest to the 
interpreter in processing information, from the ICM perspective, reviewed in Section 
4.3? Further, what underlies the properties? Idealization suggests that the interpreter 
can use a prototypical model – that is, the best, representative example - to categorize 
the textual structure of the source text, dividing concepts relating to the topic into 
embodied, semi-embodied and non-embodied knowledge, and distributing her mental 
effort. Fuzziness suggests that the interpreter needs to know that, within the idealized 
textual structure, the embodied concepts, and semi-embodied and non-embodied 
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concepts merge into each other; however, the textual structure develops from the 
whole to the partial, which suggest to the interpreter that, the information will be 
transmitted from general to the specific, in a hierarchal and graded structure, so the 
interpreter expends an increasing mental effort.    
I start to explore this question above through Lakoff’s assumption on categories 
(1987: 6): ‘any adequate account of human thought must provide an accurate theory 
for all our categories, both concrete and abstract’. This ICM-based textual structure 
and the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence can be explained 
and classified by means of the functioning of categories, on the grounds that ‘A 
central goal of cognitive science is to discover what reason is like and, 
correspondingly, what categories are like’. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 
19), categorization is defined as not a simply intellectual matter, occurring after the 
fact of experience; rather ‘the formation and use of categories is the stuff of 
experience. It is part of what our bodies and brains are constantly engaged in’. 
Categories must have best examples, referred to as prototypes.  
This ICM-based prototype of the discourse structure, comprising the embodied, 
semi-embodied and non-embodied knowledge, is determined by cognitive 
categorization, on the grounds that ‘how we categorize is central to any understanding 
of how we think and how we function’ (Lakoff 1987: 6), and that ‘Linguistic 
categories are among the kinds of abstract categories that any adequate theory of the 
human conceptual system must be able to account for’ (Lakoff 1987: 180). I apply the 
cognitive conceptual system to account for the abstract categories of the discourse 
structure in coherence in SI.  
This ICM-based prototype of discourse structure is based on basic level 
categorization: generalization proceeds upward from the basic level and specialization 
proceeds downward (Lakoff 1987: 13). With respect to the discourse structure 
prototype, it starts upward from image schema based general information to embodied 
information in the middle, to the top of abstract/non-embodied concepts, and 
downward vice versa, i.e., the properties of hierarchy and gradience. However, the 
categorization process cannot clearly separate embodied knowledge from semi-
embodied and non-embodied knowledge in a textual structure, but can be categorized 
based on the attributes, i.e. fuzziness; the categorization starts from the whole and 
holistic to the partial and decomposed; finally, this ICM-based prototype of discourse 
structure is an idealized model for the interpreter to follow.    
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      At this point, the discussion is directing towards a question: how can these 
assumptions be applied to an interpreting teaching program? It involves a paradigm 
shift in interpreting study, on the basis of this Embodied Cognition Paradigm. This 
will be discussed in the following section, in combination with the findings from the 
undergraduates of the control group who repeated the interpreting.   
    
7.4 The application of this research: an ICM-based interpreting training 
programme 
 
The undergraduates in the control group repeated the interpreting for a second time, 
and improved their interpreting performance in terms of each section, that is, they 
made the most progress in the semi-embodied section (up to 45%), next in the 
embodied section (up to 39%), and least in the non-embodied section (up to 17%), but 
still did not perform as well as their experimental peers respectively (1%, 7% and 
16% less respectively). The findings show that full preparedness makes a difference, 
which echoes the statement of Lakoff (1987), reviewed in Chapter 4: it is the 
imaginative capacity that enables the interpreting subjects of the control group to 
make sense of what they did not see and feel, but it is bodily experience that gives rise 
to the best understanding and coherence. The issues arising from the undergraduates 
repeating their interpreting performance, reported in Section 5.4.4, are as follows: do 
all interpreters need to have physical experience of everything that could be talked 
about in the conference? Which parts should be physically experienced? Does the 
interpreter draw on some sort of indirect experience?  Ultimately, how can an ICM-
based interpreting training be implemented by virtue of the programme? In addition, 
in Section 7.2.2, some relevant issues are also raised, including: how could a course 
predict all the different possible types of embodied experiences they need for all the 
possible interpreting contexts? In other words, how could a course prepare them for 
all the types of embodied experience? We will undertake an in-depth discussion and 
suggest solutions to these issues by means of this ICM-based interpreting training 
paradigm. In order to provide answers to the questions, I provided a three module 
structure in Figure 26 below, on the relations among the three fields: interpreting, 
technology and business (Gao 2005: 41-45). There are three modules. Module one 
(top) refers to interpreting studies as the dominant theme of this research. Module two, 
the overlapping sections of the three circles (arrow), refers to the bodily experience 
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module which determines a better understanding of the specialized knowledge. 
Module three is referred to as the specialized knowledge of technology and business 
(on each side): 
 
Figure 26 The cross-disciplinary interpreting training modules 
Basically fitting into the ICM structure, the overlapping part is the embodied base, 
from which are extended to the semi-embodied knowledge nearby, and further to the 
abstract knowledge. On the basis of the ICM, the three module structure (Figure 26) 
can be further represented by an integrated three module system of cross-disciplinary 
interpreting education programme, where each module has its own content, and is 
shown in the following Figure 27: 
 
Figure 27 Cross-disciplinary interpreting education programme  
The interpreting model (top) can be divided into interpreting theory and the 
interpreting practice/slots (left). The Embodied Module is mainly targeted towards 
bodily experience-based knowledge: technical and business are indispensable to each 
other in engineering and business projects (in the middle). For instance, if the 
interpreting trainees are engaged in machine building-based translation and 
interpreting, they will learn how to read engineering drawings, and physically engage 
in the metal workshops process, ranging from wood mould, casting, machining, heat 
treatment, testing and measuring, assembly to management control. In addition to the 
subject matter of technology, the interpreting trainees should learn business. The core 
for the business knowledge is the embodied business transaction, which involves how 
to negotiate a business deal, such as offer, counter-offer, and how to document the 
business texts, such types of physically experienced activities. This is the section 
representing embodied knowledge for interpreting trainees. In short, for technical and 
 212
business interpreting, the interpreting trainee should try every means to be physically 
involved in the context. It is best to have a hands-on experience to have access to the 
direct and best understanding of the embodied knowledge, which can be analyzed 
from the propositional model perspective. This is the first step to make sense of the 
technical information, by accessing the origin of coherence. These practical parts 
should be physically experienced.  
From the technical engagement and the business transaction, the interpreter will 
extend to her understanding of the semi-embodied knowledge, which is the outcome 
of her bodily experience and reflections, analyzed from an image-schema perspective. 
The interpreter will further make sense of more abstract theoretical concepts, or the 
specialized knowledge of the given fields. In addition, technical and business terms 
are living organisms, which cannot stand alone by themselves, but rather exist in a 
conceptual knowledge system. This is related to indirect experience that the 
interpreter draws on, and needs more mental effort. The indirect understanding based 
on direct and bodily experience would work best, and can be viewed from the 
metaphorical and metonymic model for understanding.  
The discussions above imply that interpreting specialization will be the orientation 
and trend for interpreter training development, echoing Dillinger’s finding (1989; 
1994) (Section 3.4). Specialization refers to the fact that the interpreter should have 
her own field of subject matter; in other words, she should specialize in one given 
study subject, such as technical and business based subjects. The departments of 
interpreting and translation can design their cross-disciplinary curriculum according to 
their resources in terms of disciplines available in their universities. For instance, for a 
business-based university, business interpreting courses can be designed; while for a 
technology-based university, technical interpreting course can be offered. In reality, 
both technical and business fields are normally indispensable to each other in 
engineering and business projects. Developing a command of such ranges of relevant 
knowledge is possible. According to the Interpretive Theory of translation (Section 
3.2), there are a few principles for natural science, by which the interpreter can infer 
the whole from a single instance. It is worth noting that the relevant abstract concepts 
or non-embodied knowledge can be learned and prepared, but costs more mental 
effort. What is more, it is physical and mental engagement that gives rise to optimum 
understanding. Different study fields have their own contents, but consist of the basic 
cognitive elements – the embodied, semi-embodied, and non-embodied sections. This 
 213
partially answers the question: how could a course prepare the interpreter for all types 
of embodied experience?  
The ICM-based interpreting training programme has its rationale in the paradigm 
shifts in higher education resulting from Embodied Cognition. The courses and 
teaching approaches adopted by the higher education institutions and the academic 
disciplines, including translation and interpreting studies, need to be re-evaluated, to 
bring about a concept shift in education so as to catch up with current social and 
economic development. According to Gibbons (et al.1994), the most prominent theory 
of the New Production of Knowledge consists of Model 1 and Model 2. Model 1 
refers to the traditional fundamental research paradigm undertaken within a particular 
discipline; this kind of research is the in-depth accumulation of knowledge, but the 
problem lies in the separation of disciplines and irrelevance to the present local and 
regional social and economic needs. Model 2 refers to a cross-disciplinary research 
paradigm on the basis of practical issues. In the information age, the research 
paradigm is Model 2 oriented, in that the boundary among disciplines is fuzzy, with 
top priority given to the interaction between theory and practice, one discipline joined 
to another. This kind of cross-disciplinary paradigm will lead to a large number of 
new study fields and potential developments. Model 2 gives more weight to the 
frontier exploration of the discipline, where many practical and social problems exist, 
therefore Model 2 is practical problem-driven research. However, the two models are 
complementary, on the grounds that Model 2 is regarded as an extension of Model 1, 
and also generates new research directions for Model 1. On the basis of the theory of 
the New Production of Knowledge, interpreting studies, as an academic discipline, 
involves not only interdisciplinary (Model 1) but also cross-disciplinary research 
(Model 2). Interdisciplinary study means in-depth research into interpreting by 
referring to the disciplines such as psychology and cognitive science, while cross-
disciplinary focuses on the interpreting trainees’ cross- disciplinary command of 
knowledge, which extends to other subject matters, such as interpreting for business 
and technology, involving bodily experience as the core in the interpreting training. 
    In summary, this section has made an attempt to find out the solutions to the issues 
arising from the previous sections, by designing an ICM-based interpreting training 
programme. This topic has been presented in a separate paper, entitled A Cross-
disciplinary Course Design for Interpreting (Gao 2005: 41-45). 
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7.5 An outline model for coherence in SI 
 
Based on the discussions above, this section proposes an outline model of coherence 
in SI as Figure 28 shows below. This study assumes that the interpreter should carry 
out her interpreting task in the context of embodied experience on the grounds that 
coherence can be reduced if she does not have any bodily experience, especially in the 
applied fields of technology and business. Figure 28 below shows how the ICM is 
used to explore coherence in SI, and how this model combines the relevant elements 
discussed so far. This model can serve as panoramic view of the process of coherence 
in SI, showing a flow chart of the interpreter’s mental effort in processing information 
in building coherence:  
 
Reality →← interactive embodiment → image schema → categorization → conceptualization → meaning →← Language  
              ↓ Sensation/perception/image   ↓ metaphor/ metonym                   ↓proposition / reasoning /inferencing  
               Propositional model                       ↓ CMs 
                ↓                                                      ↓ ICM                                                ↓ 
                                                     
IEF in SI:  activation                                    construal                                                            integration 
SI:               ↓ coherence origin     →            ↓ global coherence                 →                        ↓SI action and product 
                                                                                                                                  ↓Anticipation /judgment 
                                                                                                                                                          ↓Coordination / compensation  
Figure 28 An outline model for coherence in SI   
  
 
Before the conference the simultaneous interpreter will prepare herself for the 
interpreting task in an integrated way. She will start finding out the purpose of the 
conference and understanding all information relevant to the topic. In the case of a 
technical conference the simultaneous interpreter starts making sense of the topic and 
building up coherence, from her interactive embodiment, by being physically 
involved in the technical aspects, for instance, the mechanical device system. She 
observes, if possible, puts her hands on what she will be engaged in for interpreting, 
cognitively speaking, by her sensation, perception, and imagery capacity. In this way 
she will attain an aspect of a directly experienced situation which is directly 
understood because it is pre-conceptually structured. In other words, she will initially 
form the embodied/propositional mental structure of the technical topic. During this 
interactive embodied processing she will activate the links and relations of the basic-
                 Coherence origin                    → ← Global coherence                                   →  ← Local  coherence  
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level embodied concepts to achieve the fundamental coherence, that is, the origin of 
coherence. This process is represented on the first vertical line of Figure 28.                
Meanwhile during the preparation for the coming conference she will encounter some 
abstract concepts, for instance, the subject matter and technical terms, some of which 
are within her comprehension (semi-embodied concepts) but some might be 
understood by analogy or metaphor, and need more hard work to gain this specialized 
knowledge (non-embodied concepts). When she has construed all the information and 
made sense of the topic; she will have an ICM in her mind, which gives rise to global 
coherence. This process is indicated by the second vertical line of Figure 28. 
When the conference starts, the interpreter will access the on-line speech via the 
cognitive world (ICM + background knowledge) by reasoning and inferencing to 
achieve coherence in SI. At this stage, the knowledge acquired via direct and indirect 
understanding will help the interpreter to achieve local coherence. This process is 
illustrated by the third vertical line of Figure 28. Local coherence in SI is established, 
represented by the interpreting strategies – anticipation, compensation, judgement and 
coordination (Chapter 1). In short, Figure 28 shows the way in which the model of 
coherence in SI is built in relation to the three parts which comprise origin of 
coherence, global coherence and local coherence.   
In addition, the interpreter could use this model to organize her mental effort. As 
discussed above, the interpreter uses the embodied experience based knowledge as the 
control centre to extend her understanding of the information available, ranging from 
the embodied to the abstract. The interpreter expends less mental effort on the 
embodied concepts which give rise to direct understanding. The interpreter spends 
more mental effort on some abstract technical concepts which can be understood via 
familiarity with popular science, or made sense of by analogy or metaphor. For the 
interpreter, to construe a structure of abstract or non-embodied conceptual knowledge 
is the most challenging task. On the basis of what kind of information is easy or 
difficult to process, the interpreter will determine how to distribute her limited amount 
of mental effort to the different parts of the source text.  
The interpreter should prepare adequate knowledge relating to the topic for the 
conference interpreting on the grounds that inadequate knowledge will put the 
interpreter in a vulnerable position. According to Pöchhacker (1992) (reviewed in 
Section 3.5) knowledge is the most crucial factor to enable the interpreter to make 
sense and establish coherence, in that the total capacity available to the interpreter 
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must be equal to, and usually exceed the total requirements (Gile 1995) (reviewed in 
Section 3.3.2). This is because each item of knowledge is stored in a cognitive system 
and the interpreter has to spend a heavy mental effort while searching for the item 
needed. In other words, when the interpreter is receiving a stimulus, she will turn to 
the short-term storage and processing resources to mediate the online interaction 
between the fresh input and the knowledge stored in long-term memory. If she fits the 
input in with her ICM and background knowledge she can establish coherence 
immediately, otherwise she will lose the chain of the links and struggle to rethread the 
flow of ideas because she has inadequate relevant knowledge available; in other 
words, her working memory will be breaking down. 
On the basis of the previous literature review and the findings of the experiment, 
this thesis has provided a model of coherence in SI. Theoretically and experimentally, 
I have attempted to explore the role of the interpreter’s relevant bodily experience to 
help the interpreter to achieve coherence, and also the way the interpreter distributes 
her mental effort in processing the textual structure, from the ICM perspective.  
 
 
7.6 Concluding remarks  
 
 
At this point, I have explored the research questions, on the basis of corpora. I have 
developed the theoretical arguments grounded in the literature review of this study. 
The discussions centre on one point: in order to make sense and build coherence the 
interpreter is basically dependent on her interactive embodiment. The interpreter’s 
interactive embodiment, as the compulsive force vector, facilitates her inferential 
capacity in helping her to build up links among the concepts in the contextual 
situation. Direct bodily experience gives rise to the best understanding; the 
interpreter’s embodied experience can compensate for her deficiency in language 
competence. However, it is also crucial for the interpreter to build up her conceptual 
knowledge system, not only relating to the embodied knowledge but also the non-
embodied knowledge, by means of her imagery capacities. In addition, the interpreter 
can distribute her mental effort according to her knowledge structure in terms of 
embodied, semi-embodied and non-embodied concepts. On the basis of the 
discussions above, an ICM-based interpreting programme was introduced, showing 
how this research can be applied to interpreting teaching, and the model of coherence 
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in SI was formulated, demonstrating how the research and the programme work in the 
interpreting process.    
This chapter is the heart and climax of this study which takes up approximately 
double the space of any other chapter. This chapter has developed not only descriptive 
but also analytic and critical discussions on the primary results and findings. I have 
highlighted where there are differences and similarities from the literature or between 
different or contrastive groups. So far, we have completed both the theoretical 
framework and experiment, and will conclude the whole study in the following 
chapter.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
With both the theoretical framework and experiment outcomes covered, this study 
now arrives at its destination – the conclusions. The primary focus of this study is 
summed up in Section 8.1 Synopsis; and Section 8.2 presents the contributions to 
interpreting studies, Section 8.3 to interpreting education and training, and Section 8.4 
to the study of cognitive linguistics on coherence. Whilst claiming the contributions as 
above, this study acknowledges its limitations in terms of its authenticity (Section 8.5). 
Section 8.6 designs future work around the topic of coherence in SI with respect to 
divided attention (Section 8.6.1), pauses and synchrony (Section 8.6.2), time lag and 
segmentation (Section 8.6.3), intonation and stress (Section 8.6.4), cohesive ties in the 
embodied cognition context (Section 8.6.5), all of which are apparent in the data, but 
have not been studied in depth. To address these issues, this study will further 
combine Embodied Cognition with the Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995/2001) to shape a future cognitive and pragmatic framework (Section 8.6.6).  
 
 
8.1 Synopsis 
 
Coherence in interpreting is a topical issue in interpreting studies, and involves the 
ultimate concerns of this study. In order to address these concerns, I proposed two 
specific research questions on the basis of the ICM, as stated in Section 1.2, 
Introduction:  
 
1) Does the interpreter’s relevant bodily experience help her to achieve coherence in 
the source text (ST) and target text (TT)? (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
 
In order to address this point, I designed a bodily experience based experiment, by 
enabling the interpreting subjects of the experimental group to be physically engaged 
in installing the testing tool – the shiatsu device – prior to interpreting. This set the 
platform for comparison between the experimental group who had bodily experience 
and the control group who did not have bodily experience (Chapter 5). The 
experiment outcomes show that the interpreting subjects of the experimental group 
performed better at interpreting than those of the control group, in terms of the 
coherence clues rating; and that the former’s previous relevant bodily experience 
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fundamentally helped them to achieve mental coherence throughout the interpreting 
performance (Chapters 6 and 7). This finding points to the assumptions and theories 
in the framework, in that, through their embodiment-based activation and construal 
stage (Section 5.4), the interpreting subjects of the experimental group had a basic 
embodied mental structure and image-schema of the installation procedures of the 
shiatsu device, basically with the fixing procedures mapped into their minds via 
mental space blending. In other words, the interpreting subjects were able to activate 
the causal concepts, relations and links in a mental workspace, which helped them 
achieve coherence in following the source text (ST) and hence in producing target text 
(TT). The interpreters’ relevant bodily experience helped them to build up the 
concepts throughout their interpreting. On the other hand, I also found that the full 
preparation, displayed by the interpreting undergraduates without bodily experience, 
worked effectively, especially in terms of the semi-embodied knowledge, due to their 
imaginative capacity, but significantly less than the exposure to bodily experience.        
    Following the role of the interpreter’s relevant bodily experience, I also found that, 
the prominent embodied concepts will be activated more easily than those subordinate 
and obscure embodied ones, revealing a more specific and detailed cognitive 
processing property in making sense and establishing coherence, from the ICM 
perspective.  
In addition, I found that the undergraduate subjects’ exposure to bodily experience 
helped them in achieving coherence despite their lower language level and lack in 
interpreting experience (Chapters 6 and 7). The results show that, after immersion in 
bodily experience, the undergraduates in the experimental group not only did much 
better in following coherence clues than their peer group but also nearly caught up 
with the postgraduates and teachers in the experimental group. In short, the 
interpreters’ relevant bodily experience facilitates their capacity in building coherence 
throughout to a greater or lesser degree. The first hypothesis on the role of the 
interpreter’s bodily experience, formulated in Section 5.1, has been confirmed.   
Next, I will address the second question:  
 
2) How does the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence reflect the 
textual structure in the source text (ST)? (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
 
The data in Chapters 6 and 7 show how the interpreter’s mental effort expended in 
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achieving coherence reflects the textual structure of the ST, and how the interpreters 
worked their way through the different sections in the overall structure. It is their 
interactive bodily experience that influenced the mental effort which the interpreters 
distributed to the different sections representing semi-embodied, embodied and non-
embodied knowledge respectively. According to the results, the best interpreted 
coherent section is the semi-embodied information, analyzed from the image-schema 
perspective. The section representing semi-embodied concepts is more easily 
processed than the other two sections representing embodied concepts and non-
embodied concepts. Semi-embodied knowledge has a general and broad nature, in a 
skeleton form. The interpreting subjects spent the least mental effort in this section.    
    When moving further away from the semi-embodied to the embodied knowledge, 
analyzed from the propositional model, the interpreting subjects in the experimental 
group started using more of their mental effort in processing embodied information: 
on one hand, the more prominent embodied cognitive aspects gave rise to their direct 
understanding, facilitating their coherence building; on the other hand, the obscure 
and minor cognitive aspects negatively influenced them in achieving coherence. If 
they were not inquisitive, or careful enough to observe what was going on, in detail 
(e.g. from whole to part, outside to inside), they would have to spend more mental 
effort in processing the current information so as to maintain the coherent links. 
Another factor is that the information is dense which taxes the interpreter’s mental 
effort, as Dillinger’s assumption (Section 3.4).  
When coming to the section representing non-embodied concepts, analyzed from 
the metaphoric and metonymic model, the subjects started to confront more 
difficulties, indicated by the lowest coherence ratings, long pauses and omissions of 
information, and the most mental effort. The abstract concepts were the weakest link, 
particularly in terms of interpreting technical terms and numbers. This shows that, in 
addition to the interpreter’s bodily experience, a conceptual knowledge system of the 
subject matter is crucial in achieving coherence in SI. In other words, the interpreter 
should acquire enough specialized knowledge to process the information in question. 
In short, the section representing non-embodied concepts is the most problematic, 
especially in terms of the subject matter, and numbers, names and technical terms. It 
is the section which demands the heaviest mental effort. 
From the data, I found that, the second hypothesis, formulated in Section 5.1, was 
re-modified: in terms of the process of the interpreter’s mental effort, the semi-
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embodied section came in the first rank in achieving coherence clues, with the least 
mental effort; the embodied section came in the second rank, with more mental effort; 
the non-embodied section in the bottom rank, with most mental effort. The findings 
above agree with the ICM assumptions in processing information, rather than 
contradict them, in that the ICM is basically idealized: the information structure or the 
textual structure does not fit in with the ICM, perfectly or all the time. As a matter of 
fact, this seeming mismatch shows the true and specific situation of the textual 
stricture, as explained in the corresponding sections.  
In following section, I will sum up the findings relating to the objectives formulated 
in Section 1.2, Introduction. I will address the first objective:     
 
1) To make a critical examination of the previous theories in the field of linguistics 
and SI studies relating to coherence (Chapters 2 and 3).    
 
I reviewed the most prominent and representative literature on coherence in Chapter 2, 
and found that coherence has been discussed from a number of perspectives, ranging 
from Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (Section 2.1), a Knowledge-based view 
(Section 2.2) to Mental Models theory (Section 2.3). Next, in Chapter 3, I discovered 
how the theories on coherence have helped interpreting researchers with their analysis 
of coherence in SI, including: Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)-based 
researches into coherence in SI (Section 3.1); and three SI paradigms: (1) the 
empiricism-based paradigm: Interpretive Theory of translation (IT) (Section 3.2), (2) 
the rationalism-based paradigm: the Cognitive Processing theory (CP) and the Effort 
Models (Section 3.3), (3) the paradigm combining empiricism and rationalism: the 
computational approach to understanding and coherence (Section 3.4), and finally 
From Knowledge to Text: Coherence in Simultaneous Interpreting (Pöchhacker 2002) 
(Section 3.5). However, I noted that none of these have addressed the issue of the 
origin of coherence, on the basis of the Embodied Cognition. Therefore, I aimed to 
address this inadequacy.  
  
 2) To provide a new perspective on coherence in SI in the field of research and 
training (Chapter 4 to 5). 
  
In opposition to the previous theories on coherence, reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, this 
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study has used the interpreter’s embodied direct understanding and non-embodied 
indirect understanding (Lakoff 1987: 292-294; reviewed in Chapter 4) to explore the 
interpreter’s comprehension and coherence building process. The kinds of information 
experienced bodily and directly are more understood than those less experienced. 
Therefore, Embodied Cognition theory explains the findings which the traditional 
theories, reviewed in Chapter 2 and 3, have not yet attempted: concepts which one 
word will activate are on different levels in terms of salience; the concepts at frontier 
and remote levels are less likely to be activated than those at a prominent level; 
discourse coherence is in proportion to cognitive distance: the closer the cognitive 
distance in bridging the concepts in pairing utterances, the shorter the time to trace the 
references. According to Embodied Cognition theory, it is bodily experience that 
gives rise to the best understanding, enabling the communicator to build up coherence 
directly. This is the reason why interpreters with bodily experience can achieve more 
coherence than those without; bodily experienced knowledge is more easily activated 
than that not bodily experienced, and it is used to extend understanding to semi-
embodied concepts (from an image-schematic perspective) and non-embodied 
abstract concepts (from the metaphorical and metonymic view). The ICM-based 
theory has provided a new perspective on coherence in SI in the field of research and 
training. 
 
3) To contribute to the general understanding of how coherence is achieved in SI 
(Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
The data and findings (Chapters 6 and 7) show that, when the interpreter forms the 
origin of coherence, by means of her relevant bodily experience, she can have access 
to global coherence, and further attain local coherence in interpreting to such an 
extent that one word will activate a series of her experiences or concept structures in 
the frame, script, and the specific uniform knowledge structure, in a particular context. 
These findings are observable in the capacity of the experimental group in their 
appropriate strategies including anticipation, compensating, judgement and 
coordination, contributing to the general question of how coherence is achieved in SI. 
 
8.2 Contributions to interpreting studies  
 223
As a contribution to the research into interpreting studies, this study has provided a 
case for the paradigm shift toward the Embodied Cognition Paradigm (Pöhhacker 
2004; reviewed in Section 3.5), via the application of the ICM. As reviewed in 
Chapter 3, the empiricism-based paradigm, the Interpretive Theory of translation (IT) 
basically relies on subjective evidence (Section 3.2)； and the rationalism-based 
paradigm, the Cognitive Processing theory only aims to give an objective account of 
meaning by formalist means, i.e. viewing meaning as a series of computer data 
(Section 3.3.1)； and the paradigm combining empiricism and rationalism – the 
computational approach to SI – still uses the first generation cognition theory to 
investigate understanding and coherence (Section 3.4). I classified the three 
paradigms as Objectivism, because they have ignored primary evidence in human 
reason: Thought is embodied. The Embodied Cognition Paradigm of interpreting 
studies rules out the fundamentally irrational element of Objectivism, and maintains 
an Experientialist view on interpreting studies, emphasizing the role of interactive 
embodiment in conceiving the actual and mental world. This research has adopted the 
experientialism-based ICM as an approach to SI and designed the experimental 
procedures, on the basis of the framework of the Immersed Experiencer Frame (IEF), 
and used the ICM-based tools to track coherence clues, taking advantage of 
Dillinger’s computational approach to manipulate the data. This study has also 
contributed to an understanding of how to combine the ICM theory with a 
computational approach (Lakoff 1987) (Section 3.3), in interpreting studies.  
In addition to the theoretical framework, the methodology and experiment, this 
study contributes to research into the interpreter’s mental effort. The findings show 
that the interpreter’s mental effort expended in achieving coherence was reflected in 
processing the textual structure, illustrating the way the interpreting subjects worked 
their way through the different sections representing the embodied, semi-embodied 
and non-embodied knowledge, in the overall structure of the ST. This ICM-based 
framework has set up a prototypical model for the theories of the contextual 
configuration (Tebble 1994) (Section 3.1.1), the information structure in the 
Interpretive Theory of translation (Seleskovitch and Lederer 1986) (Section 3.2), and 
a flow chart and a system for the Mental Models (Gile 1995) (Section 3.3.2).  
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8.3. Contributions to interpreting education and training 
 
As a contribution to the education and training of interpreters, this study has designed 
an ICM-based interpreting training programme, based on the concepts of embodied, 
semi-embodied and non-embodied knowledge structure, required of interpreting 
trainees, showing that the interpreting trainees can acquire the basic level embodied 
knowledge, or the best understanding knowledge from direct physical involvement, 
and extend their embodied knowledge to the semi-embodied and non-embodied 
knowledge (Section 7.4). This study has pointed to both the need for ‘specialized 
knowledge and competence of a given professional or other group’ (Pöchhacker 1992; 
Section 3.5) and the inevitable trend to specialization in interpreting education and 
careers, pointed out by Dillinger (1994) (Section 3.4). In order to help interpreting 
trainees access the specialized knowledge, this study attaches importance to cross-
disciplinary education in interpreting education and training.  
In order to show how this ICM-based interpreting training programme works, an 
interpreting model of coherence in SI has been posited (Section 7.5). The model 
shows the way the interpreter applies her relevant bodily experience to make sense of 
the current utterance and build coherence. This model suggests that, regarding 
interpreting teaching, it is not adequate for teachers only to focus on interpreting skills 
and practice; they can guide their students to engage in interactive embodiment as 
well, particularly in relation to applied fields, such as engineering and business 
interpreting, to build up the relevant ICM for the subject matter and thus improve their 
interpreting performance.  
According to the findings of this study (Chapters 6 and 7), language deficiency can 
actually be complemented by cognitive competence; therefore, it is appropriate for 
third and fourth year undergraduates of language majors to have interpreting training 
courses and/or interpreting programme. Interpreters are made rather than born, 
provided that they are trained according to the embodied cognitive process. This study 
sheds light on the teaching of interpreting and compiling pedagogical material. 
Interpreting textbooks can be compiled by integrating interpreting skills with 
embodied cognition to suit the specialization orientation; the interpreting material can 
be designed in the form of cross-disciplinary interpreting education modules, with the 
embodied module as the core, and further extended to the non-embodied module 
(Section 7.4).   
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8.4 Contributions to cognitive linguistics on coherence   
 
This study contributes to the development of cognitive linguistics with regard to 
understanding and coherence, by putting forward the terms embodied concepts, semi-
embodied and non-embodied concepts, to show how understanding is processed, and 
also offers a holistic view on coherence, based on embodied cognitive linguistics. On 
the basis of the concepts of global and local coherence of the Mental Models theory 
(Section 2.3), this study has put forward the notion of the origin of coherence, on the 
basis of embodied cognitive linguistics, pointing out that the cognitive process starts 
with interactive embodiment with the actual world and it is this interface between 
interactive embodiment and reality that gives rise to coherence (Chapter 5 to 7). In 
other words, coherence begins with interactive embodiment which leads to the origin 
of coherence; the embodied origin of coherence threads through the global and local 
coherence, basically determining the links between concepts and meaning through 
cognitive processing.  
 
8.5 Limitations  
 
This study has made contributions to interpreting studies with respect to research and 
education as well as cognitive linguistics. However, it has several limitations. The 
primary limitation is its deficiency in authenticity. As Mackintosh comments (1983) 
concerning  her own research into message loss in SI, this kind of intensively focused 
experimental research features the lack of authenticity of the experimental data, and 
the initial conclusion ‘would have to be checked against a corpus constituted under 
real life conditions’ (Mackintosh 1983; Pöchhacker 2004: 71). Following the principal 
limitation of authenticity, the first major methodological problem, in terms of the 
subjects, is the inclusion of non-professional simultaneous interpreters. According to 
Gile (1994), professional interpreters might be significantly different from students or 
amateur interpreters in performing an interpreting task, and the latter may not be 
representative of the interpreting activities to be researched. This is because ‘A 
professional’s approach and appropriate working methods in I/T are the result of 
training, experience and selection’ (Gile 1994: 44). In this study, the subjects, 
interpreting teachers, the postgraduates and undergraduates are amateurs in a strict 
sense, so this further reduces the validity of comparability (Gile 1994: 45) between 
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the experienced teachers, less experienced postgraduates and undergraduates in 
Section 5.3. With respect to the experimental material and conditions, the simulated 
speech and manipulated procedures have some discrepancies from the actual 
situations in SI. 
The next limitation is the small corpus size in terms of the material, which only 
lasts approximately 5 minutes, and has only one text.  Although this small sized 
corpus is justified in Section 5.2, to some extent, it has reduced one of the most 
prominent advantages of corpus-assisted studies – processing of texts of a large 
number of words; therefore, the conclusions drawn upon such small corpora are 
slightly shaky and, at best, can be considered as working hypotheses to be confirmed 
in future studies. Also, due to the small corpus size, another limitation is that, 
although the experiment apparently showed how the mental propositional structure 
and image-schema, and partially metaphorical processing  (i.e. the fixing procedure 
and structure of the shiatsu device in terms of frame and script, cognitive processing 
by virtue of schema, such as the container, the part-whole, the link; Sections 4.2.2; 
5.4.2) are reflected in processing the information to achieve coherence in this SI 
experiment, it is not obvious how metaphorical processing works in meting out 
abstract concepts to achieve coherence, specifically, what sorts of schema exist to 
reveal the way abstract concepts are processed. This further suggests its limitation to 
the research into the more intellectual aspects of profession where prior embodiment 
is not a prominent feature. 
With regards to the experiment, I did not undertake the sample T test for all the 
groups to ensure the effect of language proficiency, nor measure the individual 
differences in visual imagination; all the reference to neural events taking place is still 
speculative; the relevant neurolinguistic research is needed to back up the discussion.      
Finally, although I have examined the impact of the interpreter’s interactive 
embodiment on her coherence building capacity, concluding that the interpreter’s 
relevant interactive embodiment plays a primary role in building coherence, there are 
other additional factors, such as language incompetence, gaps in extra-linguistic 
knowledge or coordination problems (Gile 1995), information density (Dillinger 1989, 
1994) also leading to errors and failures in coherence in SI, but I have not 
distinguished between these failures and errors in my corpus. Since the interpreter 
deals with a task, coordination is essential, and since interpretation is a form of action, 
it involves the skills, such as judgement, compensation and anticipation. Although the 
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pilot testing of this study has studied these aspects in the translation process, a large 
size corpus-based study is required to further investigate the issue of coordination.  
At this stage, I might as well turn back to Pöchhacker (1992) (Section 2.4): ‘What 
is sufficient coherence – do we know? I am afraid the answer must be negative.’ This 
point is discussed in the following section as future work.      
 
 
8.6 Future work  
 
This study has started from a concern with the way the simultaneous interpreter makes 
sense and builds coherence synchronically. However, synchronically achieving 
coherence, via overlapping talk and the interpreter’s multiple involvements in her 
interactivity of listening and speaking, involves more relevant issues which need to be 
studied further, including divided attention (Section 8.6.1), and pauses and synchrony 
(Section 8.6.2), time lag and segmentation (Section 8.6.3), all of which are apparent in 
the data, but have not been studied in depth.   
 
8.6.1 Divided attention and coherence in SI  
 
One of the future undertakings is the research into attention-sharing in Chinese to 
English SI. In other words, how does the simultaneous interpreter manage the process 
of alternate switching of attention between listening and target-language output while 
making sense? Or, how can the simultaneous interpreter attend to both the speech of 
others and her own so as to achieve coherence? If the simultaneous interpreter 
becomes more coordinated and automatic in attention-sharing process through 
exercise and experience as claimed by Gran (1989: 97), how is this evidenced 
empirically in Chinese to English simultaneous interpreting?  Furthermore, does the 
simultaneous interpreter learn either to ignore the sound of her own voice so as to 
avoid interference (Kurz, 1996) or to monitor her own voice, for instance, for self-
correction (Gerver, 1971)?  The attention-sharing principle in the interpreting process 
is fundamental to recent studies on working memory and making sense in SI. 
However, as Pöchhacker (2004: 116) concludes, the details of the interpreter’s 
selective allocation of her attention resources remain unclear.   
 
8.6.2 Pauses and coherence in SI  
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Another future exploration of this study is to investigate the issue of pauses in 
Chinese simultaneous interpreting. There are pauses emerging in the data of this study. 
However, what types of pause are existent in SI? What are the causes for the pauses? 
What time length and frequency is shared for each type of pause? In addition, how 
does the simultaneous interpreter take advantage of pauses in the source speech to 
make sense while avoiding the simultaneity of listening and speaking? In other words, 
how would the simultaneous interpreter try to crowd as much of their output as 
possible into the speaker’s pauses (Barik, 1973) while also building up coherence? 
Further, are source-speech pauses either an epiphenomenon of the task or a strategy to 
aid interpreting performance (Barik, 1973; 263) in making sense during the 
interpreting? This study will be based on the pause-time analyses of authentic 
conference speeches, taking advantage of a computer-assisted speech corpus (e.g. Lee 
1999, Yagi 1999, Tissi 2000), and employing a pause criterion of 250 milliseconds 
(Gever 1975, 1976) so as to address the issue of the essential simultaneity of speaking 
and listening while establishing coherence in Chinese to English simultaneous 
interpreting.  
 
 
8.6.3 Time lag and coherence in SI 
 
The next issue for future work is further to investigate time lag or ear-voice span (EVS) 
in Chinese to English SI in terms of time taken to make sense, in that the findings of 
the stopwatch measurements have varied with various researchers. As reviewed in the 
Introduction of this study, Paneth (1957/2002: 32) measured lag times in fieldwork 
data and found average values between 2 and 4 seconds with the conclusion that ‘the 
interpreter says not what he hears, but what he has heard’. Andres (2002) used time-
coded video-recordings to study EVS, and found that average lag time for professional 
subjects working from French into German is between 3 and 6 seconds and may 
mount up to 10 seconds. In order to test their findings I analyzed two subjects’ audio 
segments in Sections 6.2.3 and 7.2.3, however, this small sized audible data cannot 
provide a whole picture of EVS. In addition, according to Goldman-Eisler (1972/2002) 
EVS units are not of a lexical but of a syntactic nature, and EVS units basically consist 
of a complete predicative expression (noun phrase + verb phrase). Along this line, I 
argue that EVS units are made up of theme and rheme chain-like structures (Section 
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2.1), in which themes play a crucial part in achieving coherence and the EVS is 
directly connected with sense-making capacity. Therefore, in order to identify the 
thematic structure as the embodied cognitive interrelation of EVS, this future study 
will observe how, in making sense, the interpreter chunks the segmentations in output 
production while following the sequence of the input segments, on the basis of a large 
sized corpus.  
 
 
8.6.4 Intonation and coherence in SI 
 
In addition to the issues pertaining to simultaneity in interpreting, the findings in this 
study will also progress to research into the use of intonation and stress in SI. This 
study has focused on the coherence clues in comprehension in SI, but has not yet 
investigated how these clues are reflected in intonation and stress, in other words, how 
a prosodic pattern is formed by the coherence clues in SI. These aspects of spoken 
language are so important that they cannot be ignored in analysis of SI. In my future 
work, from the perspective of the rhythmic feature of coherence clues in SI, I will 
investigate how the coherence clues are used by the interpreter strategically so as to 
stay as close as possible to the speaker in terms of the goal which is driven at, the 
speed which is maintained and key points which are stressed. This will be undertaken 
by computer-assisted speech data analysis; phonetic analysis software will be used to 
mark the coherence clues in the spoken/voice text in terms of the rise and fall of the 
pitch and intensity to observe the rhythmic feature of coherence clues in SI. 
  
 
8.6.5 Cohesion shifts in the embodied cognition context   
 
From this study’s corpus, one issue becomes prominent; that is, the interpreting 
subjects use cohesive devices in this embodied cognition based context; therefore, 
what kind of role do the cohesive devices actually play from the embodied cognitive 
perspective in coherence in S? Are there similarities and differences with the findings 
of Shlesinger (1995; reviewed in Section 2.1.1)? Further, does the simultaneous 
interpreter adopt the cohesive devices consciously or unconsciously to establish 
coherence in the embodied cognition context? I will study cohesion shifts in the 
embodied cognition context. 
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8.6.6 A cognitive and pragmatics view, based on neurolinguistics  
 
Although partly involving the pragmatics-based relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995/2001), the model of relevance degrees will be fully used along with the ICM 
to explore this topic. Cognition is relevance-orientated, and relevance can be 
employed to explain cognitive behaviour; it serves as a role of guidance in 
communication, during which ‘the greater the processing effort, the lower the 
relevance’ and vice versa (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 124). This model can be 
represented in the formula: Relevance= context effect processing effort  . Likewise, the interpreter will 
tend to use the minimum mental effort to access the maximum context effect, and 
therefore will spend her energy on the most relevant information so as to produce 
coherent information, enabling the listener to follow the thread of ideas at the 
minimum mental cost. I will discover the answers to the issue of coherence in SI from 
a cognitive and pragmatics view, based on neurolinguistics. This future work will 
attempt to see how the interpreter’s brain works, in the embodied and non-embodied 
contexts, applying functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), to make the 
discussion more plausible rather than speculative.   
 
 
8.7 Concluding remarks  
 
This conclusion has provided a summary of the theme of this study – the role of the 
Idealized Cognitive Model in simultaneous interpreting, presented the contributions to 
simultaneous interpreting in terms of research and training, acknowledged its 
limitations, and finally outlined its future work. While the findings of the present 
study have answered aspects of the research questions on coherence in simultaneous 
interpreting, they have also raised a series of new questions to be addressed as above. 
These questions point to new academic expeditions which will be undertaken as 
described. This study concludes its present exploration on the topic: Coherence in 
Simultaneous Interpreting from Idealized Cognitive Model Perspective, with Eliot‘s 
lines from his Four Quartets (1945):  
 
What we call the beginning is often the end 
And to make an end is to make a beginning. 
The end is where we start from … 
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Appendixes 
 
The CD-Rom attached with this copy of the thesis contains (1) source text, (2) 
coherence clues attained by each subject, and TEM scores achieved by the 
interpreting undergraduates, (3) transcribed protocols of each subject in the 
experimental and control groups.         
 
